# Live – Day 2 of the 13th Abu Dhabi Strategic Debate (ADSD 2026) **Channel:** Emirates Policy Center **Source:** https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A8l8P0SFNDw **Transcript page:** https://www.withtranscript.ai/video/A8l8P0SFNDw ## Chapters - 0:14 — Opening Remarks and Panel Introduction - 6:14 — Gulf Security and Strategic Exposure - 14:17 — Defining the Enemy in the Gulf - 23:34 — Collective Defense Versus National Response - 28:07 — Containment, Deterrence, and Diplomacy - 35:33 — Cyber Defense and GCC Cooperation - 40:33 — GCC Role in Negotiations - 45:43 — Regional Security and External Powers - 52:02 — China, Sovereignty, and Cyber Resilience - 1:01:33 — Audience Questions on Gulf Security - 1:05:46 — Grand Strategy and Regional Alliances - 1:15:00 — Transition to Connectivity Panel - 1:17:30 — Hormuz, Trade, and Connectivity Risks - 1:26:40 — Alternative Corridors and Supply Chains - 1:37:22 — Defense Spending and Connectivity Security - 1:44:38 — Hormuz as Leverage and Tactic - 1:51:26 — Who Sets Connectivity Rules - 1:58:39 — IMEC, Europe, and Long-Term Planning - 2:05:59 — Babel Mandab and Regional Spillover - 2:09:16 — Trump, Iran, and Crisis Management - 2:12:48 — Break and Transition to Iran Panel - 2:35:25 — Iran's Power Structure After War - 2:44:02 — Fluid Politics and Wartime Decision-Making - 2:52:41 — Ideology, Economy, and Regime Survival - 3:03:29 — Pressure, Opposition, and Strategic Limits - 3:08:39 — Nationalism and Postwar Legitimacy - 3:16:09 — Sanctions, Networks, and Internal Crisis - 3:20:00 — Regional Alignments and Deterrence Shifts - 3:32:52 — Doctrine Change and Preemption - 3:35:15 — Capabilities, Sanctions, and Hidden Networks - 3:45:04 — Opposition, Perception, and U.S. Politics - 3:51:41 — Israel, Iran, and the Deal Debate - 4:03:25 — Israeli Priorities and Palestinian Reality - 4:10:31 — Audience Debate on Peace and Statehood - 4:27:27 — Closing the Iran-Israel Session - 4:28:31 — Long Break Before Levant Panel - 5:45:59 — Levant Fault Lines and Reconstruction - 6:01:38 — Syria, Lebanon, and Sovereignty - 6:18:00 — National Identity and Palestinian Question - 6:29:58 — Jobs, Stability, and Regional Futures - 6:40:37 — Transition to Final Vision Panel - 6:43:44 — Competing Visions of the Middle East - 6:52:52 — Israeli, Iranian, and Jihadist Visions - 6:59:26 — Turkey, Disorder, and Regional Ownership - 7:09:25 — Conflict, Integration, and Israeli Security - 7:15:54 — Trust, Cooperation, and Security Architecture - 7:21:33 — Fallout and Militarization Trends - 7:26:00 — Maps, Alignments, and Institutional Cooperation - 7:33:40 — Identity, Strategy, and Regional Reactions - 7:43:22 — Conference Closing Summary - 8:02:39 — Final Video and Farewell ## Transcript **[0:14] Speaker A:** Yeah. **[0:20] Speaker A:** Yeah. **[0:51] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. N. **[1:42] Speaker A:** What for **[2:11] Speaker A:** at foreignific. **[2:27] Speaker A:** form. **[2:56] Speaker A:** Fore **[3:19] Speaker A:** strategy. **[3:33] Speaker A:** strategy **[3:39] Speaker A:** for us. **[3:49] Speaker A:** for **[4:17] Speaker A:** speech. **[4:26] Speaker A:** Above **[4:42] Speaker A:** what? **[5:38] Speaker A:** ladies and gentlemen. Panel six entitled, who will secure the Gulf from strategic exposure to collective security will start now. **[6:14] Speaker A:** Good morning everyone and I would like to welcome you all. For over eight months, the Gulf region is in the no more no peace state. Airports have been uh struck as well as ports, energy facilities, infrastructure and uh navigation in HMO strait was uh halted in a war that was not chosen by the Arab Gulf states and uh for around 40 decc **[6:54] Speaker A:** was based on the principle of **[6:59] Speaker A:** bases, weapons and alliances uh for protection. And this war reproduces the question, who guarantees the security of the Gulf and how would we uh move from the strategic exposure to collective security? I would like to welcome my uh guest speakers in this panel, his excellency Dr. Abdazi GCC Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Negotiations who is joining us uh through satellite communication **[7:44] Speaker A:** also San Al Shah writer and journalist as well as Dr. Ali al Ababi, director of the center for public policy and leadership at the UAE University. Starting with you, Dr. Abdul Aziz. Good morning. You are joining us in this um uh panel. In 1990, if you remember, uh GC country was invaded by Iraq and in 2026, Iran is is attacking six Arab countries. How did this GDC exposure change between both wars in your opinion? **[8:32] Speaker B:** Thank you. I'm happy to be with you. and uh I am the former uh GTC assistant secretary general just to correct the title and my colleague has taken over this position last week. Yes, thank you for the correction. **[8:55] Speaker B:** A lot of uh aspects of exposure this time because uh this time there are no controls and no rules. **[9:07] Speaker B:** It's a war targeting uh civilians and non-traditional weapons **[9:17] Speaker B:** and in 1990 the war was limited but right now there is reliance on drones and ballistic missiles from Iran. **[9:31] Speaker B:** So in this regard the uh military preparations are much wider than they were in 1990 but uh it's not a traditional warfare. **[9:47] Speaker B:** Missiles and drones are being used more extensively and this is uh different from 1990. uh also the interception of missiles is much higher than uh before especially that the targets are not identified. So there are tens of thousands of targets around the clock. **[10:22] Speaker B:** This led to a gap in defense. Uh Dr. rally in 1991. As we know, Washington led an alliance **[10:36] Speaker B:** uh against the occupation and to liberate Kuwait. And in 2026, it led a war along Israel against Iran. some would say here in the region that the United States has moved from protecting the Gulf at that time to dragging the region into a war that's not their war. So how can we uh explain this um move? Thank you for the question and I would like to start by thanking her excellency Dr. Sam. Dram Al Kit for her kind invitation and I am very pleased to be with you in this important event. Your question is a complex one. There are two different stages. In the first one in 1991 which is one of the astrolog exposure waves in the GCC. this um showed the need uh to seek the help of an external power for collective security. However, in 2026, it's a completely different situation as the 1990 uh beginning uh showed us in the Gulf that we need an external guaranter for ex the security in the GCC. **[12:05] Speaker B:** about this external guaranter doesn't mean that we necessarily need a comprehensive protection for the GCC countries. Therefore, uh having the GCC countries involved in this random war against another country in the region such as Iran might be one of the um expected outcomes. So uh there is no basic or key guaranter for complete security for the Gulf region. We have to look internally at the GCC security from a GCC perspective. If we talk about strategic exposure, it would show the vulnerabilities and weaknesses in countries after a certain attack or after being involved in disruptions in the in the region. uh but this uh strategic exposure is preceded by uh another uh exposure that we can uh call the thought exposure. That's a um status of fragmentation in countries about the identification of values and objectives of a certain alliance such as the Gulf Cooperation Council. **[13:19] Speaker B:** So this uh exposure could later lead to expected results including the strategic exposure. So uh the narification of goals is linked to this. So decision makers and officials were not um aware of this exposure. This could be monitored in some kind of document or a certain moment of uh establishment. But if those values and perspectives were not translated uh in order to explain this alliance or this GC block, there will not be an actual value if we agree on identifying who is the adversary and uh the existential concerns in the Gulf region. Otherwise uh there will not be any distractions in the behavior uh regarding the threats in the future. **[14:17] Speaker A:** Mr. Sen, this is a big question. The GCC countries do not have or give a unified definition of the adversary or the enemy. So this means necessarily when you identify the enemy, you cannot have a unified defense system unless you have a defined uh a unified definition. There is an Arab saying that says when tested everything will uh be um clear. So we were actually tested where a lot of our uh aspects were assessed. It's not about dignity. It also tested our unity. We were tested in our internal fronts for each country individually. We were tested in terms of identifying our stance. Uh unity is not only in the uh military reaction. It is also in the uh perspective of our adversaries. Do we look at Iran as an enemy? I believe everyone sees it as an enemy but with varying levels. I mean that we deal with them with containment policy or with uh ignorance and delaying this issue for later. **[15:43] Speaker A:** The issue here is that the region is facing more than one enemy and this is the real issue. Yes, we have two expansion projects. We have the uh Israeli and the Farsy maps. Isra took its uh more attention over the past four decades and we did not give attention to the Persian project that was already implemented where almost 80% of it was uh achieved with Iran reaching Alhada port and Beirut port and Damascus before its liberation. and to Iraq and its parties and militias **[16:30] Speaker A:** and also in Bahrain we suffered a lot. We have the Persian and Iranian project that is being executed. And if Isra is seen as an expansive country, it took only a small part of Syria and part of Palestine and the Gaza Strip. That's a different story. But the expansion of Isra will not be onetenth of the expansion planned by Iran. We haven't given Iran the **[17:08] Speaker A:** I would like to welcome his excellency Muhammad Al Kuwaiti to this panel. He is the head of the cyber security council in the UAE government. Welcome your excellency. Please go ahead before we turn to Dr. Muhammad. So I wanted to say that we as Arab countries and even as Gulf countries we haven't agreed on the size uh and threat of the Iranian risks although the GCC council was established to fill the political vacuum after the independence of countries. So the Iranian claims that Bahrain is supposed to be part of Iran and then occupying the islands etc. The council was established to face this opponent and for four decades. How many think tanks and research centers do we have uh focusing on the Iranian issue? **[18:15] Speaker A:** I know you have a specified or dedicated unit for Iranian studies because uh we have to address such risks. We don't even have uh uh Persian speakers. I expected to see a dedicated analysts on the Iranian issue. We have uh analysts in an in a panel on Iran. That's great. But I hope we give more attention to this issue because uh this is an existential issue for our region. This is very important as we speak about identifying the Gulf enemy. Dr. Muhammad, we were talking about this point from a cyber security point of view. Does the Gulf region define or the Gulf countries define enemies uh equally or does each country have individual definitions? Good morning um everyone your excellencies and guests. I am honored to be in this panel where there are a lot of experts in various fields. We saw their impact during and after the crisis uh with the UAE and Gulf emerging strongers in all these aspects. **[19:34] Speaker A:** Of course, the uh assessments are var variable uh regarding who is the enemy and uh regarding the risk management which differs from country to the other. The uh risk log might be different from other countries. uh we talk about cyber security and uh we see that our cities have transformed into AI smart cities and the region is headed towards having AI as a basis for economic development and daily lives of the people. So it will be a sense of life in our societies. Artificial intelligence was used during this crisis to execute major attacks on our country. And we saw how this uh technology was abused by more than 20 countries and more than 40 terrorist organizations. There is targeting not just to the society. Uh there are targeting uh crimes, targeting uh users uh even with fraud and fishing, deep fake rumors and other ways of attacks that were all under the umbrella of cyber terrorism. **[21:04] Speaker A:** A lot of white might differ in the definition of cyber terrorism, but these uh technologies were used to attack the loyalty of the society such as deep fake or using electronic games such as Roblox and Minecraft where this thought was uh being spread and this is cyber terrorism. The third uh threat is the hybrid and cyber war which we can see in the electronic space with the links to the healthcare, education sector and the energy sector which is one of the key uh sectors and with each drone or ballistic missile targeting these sectors. There was an accompanying cyber attack that is being uh conducted in the dark web in order to attack our uh cyber security. Our assessment for each attack differs from one attack to the other and our interest is different also. uh we have conducted attributions for uh major indicators to identify the patterns and the topologies for attacks in addition to detering a lot of these attacks. **[22:29] Speaker A:** So there was variable assessment of these threats in Gulf countries. Dr. Abdul Aziz, we are talking about uh the Kuwait invasion. When Kuwait was invaded by Iraq, the Gulf states all moved to defend Kuwait in 2011 in Bahrain. The peninsula, the peninsula shield also moved and also there was an Arab alliance in Yemen to defend Saudi Arabia and legitimacy in Yemen. But a lot are wondering when the UAE was targeted in the beginning of the current crisis, the response was late. What uh changed on the Gulf uh scene in your opinion? **[23:34] Speaker A:** Foreign **[23:37] Speaker A:** speech. Foreign speech. **[24:02] Speaker A:** No. **[24:14] Speaker A:** Mrs. What? **[24:20] Speaker A:** So now we moved from an oil and gas based economic model to a sustainable diversified economy that's based on various economic uh uh inputs. So this is the key challenge here and how will the GCC countries maintain the well-being of their citizens and the quality of life and the achievements that were already achieved in the region **[24:52] Speaker A:** and and the key challenge is how to face these challenges and the Iranian aggression, the Israeli attacks by the GC CC countries that believe in the international law and believe that there are key rules and lines that should not be exceeded in terms of protecting civilians and uh how can we maintain the uh values our values without being pushed towards uh actions that are conducted by the adversaries. And as you noticed, the GCC responses towards the Iranian aggression were always within the framework of the international law, including a military and defense component. And when time is uh um when time allows, I want to talk about the priorities of the GCC countries. Uh so there is no disagreement among GCC countries in identifying the threat factors. If you look at the statements of the council and the summit held in Jada and in Qatar and in Bahrain since the beginning of the aggression, you will see that all challenges are agreed upon and the um differences **[26:19] Speaker A:** are in favoring a certain way of uh treating or responding to the threats. If you believe the time allows, we can talk about this right now on how the GCC countries look at these threat factors and how they are addressed starting from the Iranian attack. We will go back to the priorities, but my question was uh different. I always find it difficult with diplomats in finding direct answers. But regarding the UAE uh side, in the beginning of aggressions, there was some kind of hesitance and uh some countries were not responsive quickly enough to face these aggressions. Do you agree with this? **[27:16] Speaker A:** If you remember, the Iranian aggressions targeted all GC countries. no exceptions even even the ones that are not as close to Iran. So every country was focusing on protecting its own territories and helping others. And fortunately the defenses in the UAE are advanced and managed to face this challenge which was also replicated in other countries of the GCC and uh it was uh even better than other countries such as Jordan and countries outside the GCC ecosystem. So I don't agree that there was uh no response and the Gulf summit held in Jeda and attended by all leaders as well as other meetings from the first day of the aggression. **[28:07] Speaker A:** The war started on February 28th and the first meeting was held on March 1st under the GC umbrella including foreign ministers and uh also military leader meetings. There was a mature assessment of the threat and what each country needs. Clear. Thank you Dr. Ali Albab. If we build upon the answer from Dr. Abdaz that each country at the time of the Iranian aggressions each country was busy defending itself. **[28:50] Speaker A:** What could collective defense have added if each country was busy uh defending itself? **[29:00] Speaker B:** Uh the response and the movement were individuals in this uh crisis and every country uh was supporting its own defenses individually and this is a national calculation for each country that was targeted. But in fact when we talk about the GCC countries we are talking about Gulf integration in the defense ecosystem which is required and the uh transformation from individual national defenses to supra national defense is important and the attacks targeting the GCC countries as his excellency Dr. Abdaz said it wasn't only targeting a single country. The attacks included all GCC countries which shows that everyone looks at the GCC countries as one block. But the important question is are we as Gulf countries and Gulf citizens? Do we look at ourselves as a Gulf block that requires joint defense? This is the question that we have to ask and consider in the research centers. **[30:17] Speaker B:** These uh existential questions need to have more uh research and uh political analysis that's conducted by thought think tanks. Mr. the south and some see that Iran traded uh the Gulf as one front while the Gulf countries traded Iran in individually and addressed the attacks individually. Why uh did we see this absence of a unified decision in the Gulf region? Honestly, there is a variance in our perception of Iran and in addressing this uh neighbor and treating it. We all agree that geographically it's a neighbor. we cannot change geography and since the establishment of the Islamic Republic and this regime we all know that from the first day uh they uh wanted to export revolution and expand in the region as as well as being responsible for the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf region. This is what they are saying explicitly in their constitution. So there was a variance in the way of handling the uh this country when we were united uh in the uh time of Kuwaiti invasion. **[31:46] Speaker B:** This unity is absent now. Why? Because we vary in our perception of this adversary and how to uh treat it. Are we talking about uh division or variance? No, it's just a v varied uh look and perception. It's the same stance but the difference is in how we address it. If there is a containment of the Iranian regime we could have contained it uh 40 years ago. Everyone tried to help Iran but it always sees us including all Arab countries as a project a single project of expansion and it has instruments for this uh project. The nuclear file is one of its instruments as well as the ballistic missiles and drones. It's only one instrument. Iran succeeded in uh abusing this variance and stances among the Gulf countries and it succeeded in having the whole world addressing these files as separate ones despite being one integrated project and it was a mistake. **[32:59] Speaker B:** um that uh in 2015 the United States negotiated with Iran on its nuclear uh project slowing the process and of course Iran was happy with that because it was just a delay to of one of its instruments. it delayed one of the instruments. However, the other um instruments such as its arms in other countries uh received a lot of support and almost 8 billion uh in funds to these arms and during those years it managed to build the tunnels and explosives and we saw the uh impacts through all these arms. Even in 2015, we thought we might be able to contain Iran and the Houthis, but this is impossible. They have a project and but we are not uh seeing this uh project. Clearly, this containment is just uh something that uh uh delays the uh the project and the expansion. I don't want to interrupt, but what is the alternative to the containment uh policy? **[34:15] Speaker B:** His Excellency Anor Gargas said yesterday, we have the deterrence and we have the diplomacy. We cannot uh use one uh and avoid the other. So if we we give them both cheeks the left and the right uh cheeks and Iran has given us so many shocks but we haven't done anything serious against Iran. We don't want to be dragged into war and we know no one wants to be part of war but we are in situation where we have to choose because this is an existential uh choice when the U he uh uh provided the anonymous uh aviation. It was an excellent stance by this state because this uh uh shows that we have the possibilities and uh I I have no idea why we have all these armies and all these military preparations and then when we receive all these missiles and attacks we want to contain the adversary. **[35:33] Speaker B:** Dr. Muhammad, do you know that in 2000 uh the joint GCC defense agreement was signed? But in this war, the Gulf countries uh fought in six separate wars. Uh was that the case on the cyber level? On the cyber security level, I will talk about the GCC cyber security committee which was established three years ago **[36:05] Speaker B:** and the nature of cyber attacks and cyber work does not have a governed law for these cyber warfare. Everyone knows that there is nothing uh as the Geneva Cyber Convention and there is nothing like the Budapest Convention for Cyber Security which ensures that no country would uh wage cyber attacks against other countries or their infrastructure which could result in fatalities or other losses. So this is uh still being negotiated in the UN on how to uh link a governed cyber law to uh limit these attacks. uh in the uh Gulf States, we have cooperation and we also share the indicators u uh for attacks as as well as the typologies of uh uh these attacks. Our target is to stop not to uh deter or or to attack. The only way for deterrence is cooperation and building alliances. And this is what we saw international alliances and we have alliances in our with our partners in the private sector and amongst national institutions. **[37:36] Speaker B:** Uh since we are talking about alliances are there GCC alliances? Yes, the national the GCC cyber committee is part of these alliances but it was not responsible for the deterrence of any of these attacks. Each country is supposed to take its own actions according to their uh cyber principles and this is how we uh uh faced the attacks in the neutralization and deterrence of attacks. We were supposed to do this individually and this is what was done. We have deterred a lot of these uh cyber attacks which exceeded 800,000 attacks in one day. I'm not talking about the service denial attacks. I'm talking about uh precise targeted attacks against data and national records and against national infrastructure and this is what happened. Do we need this cooperation uh as um applied according to the agreement that you mentioned? Of course, we want to find a way to come up with the uh GCC uh unity and this front. **[38:50] Speaker B:** Dr. Muhammad, why are we still uh saying we want to the threat is there, it's existing. Why are we delaying the execution? This is uh related to the uh varying interests and capabilities of countries and also because this entity the uh cyber army the unified cyber army is not there. So when there is a targeting of any uh country uh they have to do this individually and there is also the umbrella umbrella of the international law uh which is also absent. Do we have uh any law that gives us the power to attack a country because it attacked another uh country that's in the same alliance. These are all important factors and we want to and what this is what we want to achieve and we hope to see it uh a reality soon and Dr. Abdul Aiz we are talking about the negotiation component and the United States is negotiating with Iran with its own conditions. **[40:08] Speaker B:** uh Iran is negotiating with Washington under its condition. GCC countries uh has have demanded several times to be involved as part of these negotiations because uh its security is uh part of the negotiations. **[40:33] Speaker B:** Some in the GCC are convinced that these Gulf countries or at least some of them are just mailman. They are not an actual uh part of the conflict. How do you respond? **[40:49] Speaker A:** Uh thank you for uh the question. Uh and I would like to clarify two points. The first point based on what Dr. Muhammad said that uh the GCC defense adapts with the nature of the threats when Iran resorts to unconventional war with the ballistic missiles and drones and cyber warfare. This is an evidence of the success of the GCC states in traditional war. What what happened with the unified military leadership convinced no I to challenge the counties with this war. So they have developed this unconventional uh means and I think that cooperation now is been successful. The second point, if you allow me, I don't look at diplomacy and defense and deterrence and development as alternatives. They are not alternatives. Each party should use all those means simultaneously. The diplomatic efforts of the GCC countries uh can be used. Like I said, I'm no longer the assistant secretary and secretary general of the GCC counties, but I worked for uh more than 15 years in that position. **[42:22] Speaker A:** In diplomacy, all the counties of the GCC are engaged in that. If you look at the diplomatic efforts in um in the GCC countries, you will see that it's led by Bahin and they managed to issue resolution and they are also working the resolution 2817. If you look at mediation, you will see that Qatar uh is taking the lead in this field. If you look at international alliances which are taking part in mediation like Mecca alliances and also Oman is negotiating with a to uh freedom of navigation in the state and so the military are working and cyber warfare experts are working on that and economic experts are working on that. So we have four challenges whether for uh diplomatic priorities or defense deterrence or maintaining the level of development and not impacting the welfare of Gulf states and preserving also the global economy. I think these four priorities are being worked on simultaneously and not letting diplomacy and work only on defense or deterrence or development all are working at the same time. **[43:56] Speaker A:** The mistake of an is that to focus on military solutions and we are against that and also Israel the other adversary uh specialize only in military means thank you for that clarification Dr. Abd Aziz but I want to the answer so that I can move to the other speakers in terms of the GCC count is demands when they sit on the table with Indians and Americans. Some say that I am just a koi and uh there are seven conditions and American condition. What about the GCC counter is demand in terms of ballistic missiles and the proxies and others and this is those questions are not posed at least for the moment. So what some GCC can't is is it just conveying messages only? No, this is not true. If you look at the meeting that took place in the kingdom of Bahin with the American secretary of department, the GC count is expressed their concerns and they are not different from those of the international community like they **[45:19] Speaker A:** opening the state of homes and protection of navigation, freedom of navigation and stopping the attacks and the same time through negotiations and seeking sustainable solutions for the future. future. So I don't think that the GCC count's concerns are absent and they have not been absent before and not now and they will stay on the table and cannot be overlooked. **[45:43] Speaker A:** Mrs. S and Ian in the negotiations **[45:53] Speaker A:** talks about a joint regional security in the Gulf although it's an that attack this Gulf count is to what extent are the GCC country is willing to build this regional system that is calling for you asking about what is supposed to be or what is happening and wants regional system without foreign power. I don't trust Iran at all and in the same day it's they attack us and then at the same day will come and say we want to be partners. So uh they can be playing different cards. Uh this is something for Aan. I don't care about it. But what I care about is what I receive from Aan. I receive TNT bombs and uh Ahmed militia and this lead us to the internal front in the the GCC counties. I think we need more coordination because we are fighting against one enemy. So the sale of Albdal in Bahin we see others similar like in in this in the other countries of the Asian. **[47:25] Speaker A:** So we are dealing with one network and this is where the all of intelligence come into play. So when you tell me that we want additional uh system only between us, we need first of all to check the good uh intention they have in case there is a guarante other than the United States because for United States at least uh there is some factor uh for example China or Russia if it plays the role of G to with uh the Gulf country is joined in that case. Where's the government? There was an agreement with Saudi Arabia. Um before they were saying we have no military bases in the Asian if you want to call them as logistic support centers or training center. At the end they are military bases. You may have ambitions but uh uh it's like you want something but you want you don't want to take care of everything. **[48:34] Speaker A:** So they ask to clean up most and then they would come. They ask us to fight the militia and then they come. Uh so by the way yesterday I was watching a movie uh captain of by Tom Hanks Captain Phillips and it was about pirates taking hostages in a vessel and then they were rescued by the military. That was in 2008. Those in those days there were uh states uh men and now there are companies that calculate the cost and expenses. But I can give you now my opinion about a administration. This man looks like he's unstable. He has a goal. He has a clear goal and he wants to reach it and I don't care about his statement and I don't care about the fluctuation of his statement but I would like to mention uh his the secretary of state Obio who is one of the main candidate for the Republican party Obio in 2015 spoke about the nuclear agreement with a clear vision about Iran. **[49:56] Speaker A:** and forecasting vision and he warned and cautioned that that should not be this next North Korea. You gave them an opportunity or you give them a chance. Our mistake with North Korea is that not we not dealt with them at the right time and it has been postponed for many years now. The cost has been double and we are still using the same way the same ingredients and we expect to get different result uh if you can remind me of uh of I don't want to take so much time from Dr. Abdah and I want to say to what in response to what he say we don't want to lose hope from the GCC council because during the crisis I can say that for example for the kingdom of Bahin we did not feel short of medicines or anything and our lives was normal thanks to uh Saudi port and also the aviation when they felt danger They called Saudi Arabia and they said we need a place to shelter this **[51:14] Speaker A:** planes. Saudi Arabia said all our airports are open for you. So this is uh the system that 40 years we would not have felt so much safe and confident and live our life normally without that. So there is a huge support which is not less important than the military support. Of course we would like to have more military understanding and uh we are not talking only about solidarity and aid between the GCC countries but we're talking about the security gap. Uh who will guarantee the security? Uh if I can ask you quickly Dr. Ali **[52:02] Speaker A:** about China. Some Gulf countries were uh is looking up to China to open the state of homes maybe to lead a dialogue between Iran and the GCC countries. Do you think that China hold the keys to the crisis with air and thank you Sammy for this excellent question. But before answering your question, I would like to comment on what Miss Sausan said uh regarding the reaction of Gulf count is due in the ISIS. Of course uh there has been uh national preparedness by the countries in terms of defense and uh also the the way they handled the the crisis and managing the crisis domestically and but uh in my opinion what can guarantee that there will not be repeated attempts by a another and to repeat uh those uh attacks or threats or uh violent action against those countries. What we mean by deterrence is to send a message to the other party not to dare and commit any military actions or threats against the other party. **[53:37] Speaker A:** And this would not happen unless we have a a block of counties that make that such actions will be uh costly. to answer the question regarding China. I think China with its policies about regional and international issues, they are not uh providing security guarantees like is the case for the US in some Asian. China is trying to achieve its national uh goals and to focus on its strategic calculus. We're not trying to confine its old at the level but they are also evolving at a national level and they are moving based on realistic goals and if there is some cards that China can play uh to achieve some inmost state they would do that but based on the strategic calculation they may not act quickly because uh of different actors uh in the world and the impact on the policies. Dr. Muhammad, if we can ask you the last question before you leave and you appreciate we appreciate you joining us here. **[55:04] Speaker A:** When uh we have uh softwares of software of defense detained by others, what is left to you in terms of decision by those when there's a difference between you and those who provide those software? The national sovereign entity uh uh uh entails that we control those software when we build our uh def defense software uh systems. Yes, there are some uh coalitions and the joint systems with other countries which are allies but it's always important to have national sovereignty in contraindis **[55:55] Speaker A:** uh a main data center of one and international companies which is Amazon was targeted and the same company was targeted twice at the data center and services lots of services were disrupted because of that and Amazon with the support they provided and the collaboration we had with them uh to uh build another center in the country and to move some data uh which are not confidential or very confidential uh to move it overseas to facilitate the business continuity. But what we have seen then is national uh data uh centers. So those are cloud services that filled the gap uh for those companies and hosted lots of uh system and ensured business continuity for different sectors such as banking sector, health sector, government sector. So we see here the importance of having such national sovereignty we don't need to rely continuously on companies uh although we expect them and they collaborate with us in many of these sectors and main operation but during the **[57:20] Speaker A:** crisis what we have seen is that uh there are those who helped us and we have seen national sovereignty by using uh national uh our national sovereignty and thanks to our people also who are the national UAE assets uh whether they are UAE citizens or residents or visitors those who supported us and this is when we have seen national unity this has allowed us to continue this work without any losses so uh In our national strategy of cyber security, we focus on the importance of having such national sovereignty when we uh forge partnerships or alliances and build national leadership in this field. Before you leave us, I have an important question. The next war may start with a virus that would uh freeze our cities, our airports. What do we need to build uh in GCC together before such war starts? The scenario you presented happened and it was targeted by a virus uh viiber malware. **[58:44] Speaker A:** This vibr malware we find it in operational technologies. We're not talking about uh normal technologies like application and servers and websites. We're talking about uh application technologies where we have water and dalin water dalination, electricity and also like like was the case recently with the fages in Europe. So yes, there are viruses with the same scenario you described and it's important to have ways to deter and prevent or at least monitor such targeting. There are five uh pellets to take here into consideration. We need first to have governance clear law on how to react to such attacks. Second technology, the uses of AI because wiber in wber AI was used to find the gap that was not uh available before uh to activate this virus that was able to uh clear those points. Technology is important. Then third partnership many times uh I will not be able to uh get rid of this virus. **[1:00:03] Speaker A:** So I need to resort to some entities that are specialized in this sector. Third or fourth fourth uh the human capital by using and analyzing this point and we see this is very important to have a national team or a joint team to deter uh such attacks. And the fifth uh deter deterrence. How can we ensure this will not happen again? This is where the all of partnership and coalitions after we uh deal with all these points. We need to ensure that this sector will not be targeted again and and so our our networks now are interconnected. What we have can be exist in other Gulf countries. So we need to ensure that this virus will not move to other sectors and impact them god forbid and have a big impact on the Asian and sorry that I cannot stay for very long but I was happy **[1:01:15] Speaker A:** to be here with you. Thank you very much and we are also pleased to have you with us and for your addition to this uh uh panel. Uh thank you very much uh Dr. Muhammad Alui, head of cyber security council of the UAE. **[1:01:33] Speaker A:** Now we will open the floor to questions uh to those who would like to ask uh the questions for this session. **[1:01:48] Speaker B:** Mr. Hammud. **[1:01:54] Speaker B:** Uh good morning everyone. **[1:01:59] Speaker B:** If you allow me uh to ask a question from a different angle. You spoke about the Iranian attacks on Gulf counties and uh absence of joint response. But the question here is why do we feel the importance of uh Gulf's joint security when there is direct threats from Aan while the threats uh from the south through the Houthis in Yemen is not receiving the same attention although it has a direct impact on the Gulf counties and the freedom of navigation. But we have even seen that the UAE and Saudi Arabia they have been mostly affected uh in terms of the cost of the of this conflict. But uh we have seen at the same time uh some neutrality by some uh parts of the Gulf system. Does it this mean that we need to revisit the concept of Gulf security and ensure that it includes uh dealing with the sources of direct direct threat starting with the conflict in Yemen. **[1:03:24] Speaker B:** Thank you. U if you can take all the questions and then answer. I don't know to whom you asked your question but uh the panelist uh they can uh answer later. Uh Mr. Wa **[1:03:55] Speaker A:** There is one word that has not appealed heard. Please to the mic. Mike m **[1:04:05] Speaker B:** when you have a threat to your security to your national sovereignty nations adopt what is called a grand strategy. That's what the US did 1947 with the formation of NATO. Preempt Soviet threat. Now 19 50 seven 10 years ago Dr. Tisam invited the former national security advisor to President Obama who used to be head of NATO forces and when he talked about grand strategy he talked about the need for an Arab NATO to face the challenges we have been talking about. So there is no Arab grand strategy and unless you have an Arab grand strategy you are mainly talking or shouting at the winds **[1:05:05] Speaker A:** Brian **[1:05:09] Speaker A:** thank you thank you very much um really enjoyed the discussion the question I have concerns Iran's grand strategy just to paraphrase or quote the question just then what exactly is Iran 's grand strategy visaves the states uh that we're speaking of here in the region and how should we respond to this increasingly recalcitrant more hardlined entrenched and dare I say reactionary regime in tan which doesn't look like it's going away anytime soon and yet concurrently you know is posing an active threat for all of us here in the region. Thank you. **[1:05:46] Speaker B:** Amen. **[1:05:48] Speaker A:** Good morning everybody. My question to Dr. Abdaziz and Madame Sosan. Uh we have witnessing last I'm from Turkey by the way. Uh we are witnessing last four years uh Russia and Ukraine uh two neighbor war and Russia Iran alliance keeping this war ongoing with shahid drone supply daily basis hundreds of shahid drones attacking uh Ukraine and destroying houses residents and killing so many uh uh people and we have witnessed also Ukraine, Europe and United State alliance to defense themsel but we can see that uh we can see the result actually and we have witnessed also GCC countries regional alliance with United State with the recent uh war with Iran we have also seen the So today UK and United States when you look at uh their army structures it is not uh born in US or UK. There is so many uh ethnic uh members also employed in uh in the US and UK army and many other countries. **[1:07:29] Speaker A:** So today my question I'm coming to my question **[1:07:34] Speaker B:** uh what should GCC countries beside of alliance of technology and all this the gap how should close the gap of the human resources. Do you think that uh any other alternative than alliance like Saudi Arabia has done alliance with uh Pakistan and and Turkey or Turkey? This is my question. **[1:08:03] Speaker A:** Thank you. Uh you read **[1:08:08] Speaker B:** uh so who would like to start answering first? U maybe Dr. Alawish you can go ahead. Thank you. I think uh the question asked by Mr. Hammud is very important. We need to deal with the threats of Aan proxies the same way that we deal with Aan attacks sometimes uh diplomatically. It would be important to separate both but for defense and deterrence like Mr. Hammud said we need to have a unified position. uh and fortunately there is a unified position by the GCC counties. I think uh the problem is that Arab counter is did not participate that's true because Arab participation in counter in the hot attack is limited while the attacks is a threat against the whole Asian regarding the question of Mr. Auda that's important. He's asking about the Arab grand strategy in uh dealing with those challenges. I think for that question the oblique is trying to answer that maybe the new secretary general can look at that although in the previous phase there was a divergence in the opinions in the Arab world in the in **[1:09:33] Speaker B:** terms of the Iranian threats and uh not dealing with it with the same seriousness maybe because of the distance and some kind is been far away. They may not look at any the same way we do in the Gulf. The question of regarding the grand plan of the grand plan of Aan is to dominate the Asian using military power. There is nothing to hide. And the last thing they did was to control uh the the straits. uh some of the consultants of Aan was talking about controlling four waterways babel mandabal and even j ala he said those are the goals of an but the goal is clear is to dominate the Asian by using military power and not using economic cultural factors. the question of uh the gentleman from Turkey. I think it's very important and we need to have alliances uh with each country in the field where it can benefit us. **[1:10:53] Speaker B:** Turkey is advanced in terms of defense and interceptors of the owns and as far as I know there are more than 10 alliances now just in the own interception and G count is uh use technologies from all countries from Korea from Japan from Turkey uh different countries is and I think this should continue and should deepen. Maybe you noticed that with the uh Mecca pact and also the uh status of the agreement of Mecca there is a cooperation in military industry. Thank you Dr. Abdazi's Mrs. Sen Mecca alliance. Um some look at it as a new approach to security in the Asian. Some look at it as a tactical action. How can we look at the Mecca uh agreement and we have GCC council here? Let us uh limit the situation and not talk generally. We are facing a crisis in the Asian. What the problem we have now is that this is a security crisis of the Asian the security of the Gulf country if the Gulf water uh the sea. **[1:12:31] Speaker B:** No, we are talking about international security is no longer Gulf security. When China asks us for alternatives uh they should worry about their interest. So we need all countries to be engaged in that not to defend us only but to defend their interests for India. I was saying yesterday that 9 million Indian expats live in the Gulf count is 30 billions that uh uh sent from the Gulf countries to India. They come from the Gulf countries. So if these are not interest then uh what are the interests for you to intervene? All countries have their interests in the Asian babel mandab and uh waterways in there not just gulf waterways. Uh so in a nutshell because we don't have much time if you can answer quickly. Yes, I will try to give one answer the Yemenite threats and uh it's its weight in terms of the Gulf threats. **[1:13:39] Speaker B:** I think uh it's equivalent to the Iranian threats and the movement of Yemen in the south they are just a proxy of so uh the movement like Mr. Abdazi said Dr. Abdazi said uh it should not be considered of less importance regarding the the grand strategy that the other party has and what is the other grand strategy that Gulf count is need to have. I'm sure that uh the Gulf count is have good intention about the the plan but uh we have doubts about the intention of the other party. The idea of additional coalitions is good but the problem is that it is linked to parts uh of Gulf counties to individual counties but they don't deal with the collective golf work. Therefore, I think the first step is to build uh a comprehensive defense system of the Gulf and then there can be an additional work at this level. **[1:14:54] Speaker B:** Thank you Dr. Habi, Miss SH, excellency. **[1:15:00] Speaker B:** Thank you for being with us in this panel session. Thank you to the audience. Thank you. **[1:15:31] Speaker B:** Ladies and gentlemen, the next panel **[1:15:36] Speaker B:** Heat. Heat. N. **[1:16:16] Speaker B:** Yeah. **[1:16:20] Speaker B:** Heat. Heat. Heat. N. **[1:17:30] Speaker A:** Ladies and gentlemen, Panel seven entitled Between the Hormuz Gamble and the competition over Middle Eastern connectivity will start now. **[1:18:03] Speaker A:** Good morning and welcome everyone and thank you for joining us on this interesting panel panel. Uh we have a group of people who can bring an insight into business trade shipping and risk. Uh we have uh Dr. Franchesco Parisi. He's the CEO of an old essentially old company, shipping company that has been operating and moving goods since 1807 when Napoleon was redrawing the map of Europe. So he brings an insight into trade, logistics and risk for shipping. And we have Mr. Muhammad Baharun and many of you know him but he's the co-founder of Bahus which is a leading Dubai think tank and he's wellversed into telling us how geopolitics geography and connectivity has turned United Arab Emirates into a global crosswork for capital trade people and data and we have Mr. Kabir Taja he's the head of OFF in the Middle East and he brings a totally different perspective from the from outside the Arab world and the western world uh how India is looking and perceiving the security changing security **[1:19:16] Speaker A:** landscape in the region with hormones at the center of the global crisis. 21 nautical miles is how narrow the straight of hormones is and how big a crisis it has created for the world economy. We all knew that you know Iran has long worked out that it didn't need a navy to put pressure on the world. Speed boats, mines, missiles and drones have been enough and it has been since 1980s during the tanker war that uh the state of Hormus has been a strategic leverage for Iran and and the you know hormos means different things for each player you know for the Gulf it's a lifeline for Washington it's a commitment for China it's a vulnerability for Europe it's a shock direct shock to the world energy energy prices and the Gulf region is trying to build its way a way out of Hormuz to avoid this problem with pipeline to the Red Sea and Ferra to ports like Duke and new corridors like IMC. **[1:20:24] Speaker A:** But nothing can match a tanker moving 2 million barrels of oil every day. And as for liqufied gas, it has been there is no way outside Hormos. So my question to the panel will the the region or the world be able to bypass hormones and can this race for connectivity uh create new shock pods and who would set the rules who will build the the roots and who who will control the you know the data and uh uh the cables basically uh so and who will gain from geography and my question will start with you Mr. Sins you are in the middle of the crisis in the region Mr. Uh good morning everyone. Pleasure to be here again uh with you. I don't think we are really trying to bypass the straight of actually accepting that we need to bypass the straight of mean Iran one. **[1:21:19] Speaker A:** What we're doing right now is that we are building new roads, new bridges doesn't mean that the old road is not there. It's not important. I think a big message from the UAE particularly with the zero hormones uh strategy is that this is not that we do not need hormones but it's zero dependency for Iran they will not choke us so the idea is a strategic view if you are building new roads doesn't mean that the old roads are are not important horm will always be important and I think there is a need for the international community to make a stand on this but building other roads is going to respond to the extensive massive need for this region and we've we've been hearing about the geostrategic space we're in. This is the Arabian Peninsula with four waterways around it. This is a very important area. **[1:22:10] Speaker A:** What we're connecting is we're connecting the global south with the global north. So we need more roads whether the straight of of horm is is open or closed and that's why I came before the straight of horm was closed. uh the the silk road uh or the uh belt and road uh initiative came before straight of formers were was was closed. Uh the GCC rail came before the straight of formers was closed. So building new roads doesn't mean that we are accepting the fact that Iran can switch on switch off the straight of form or even switch on and switch off connectivity. **[1:22:44] Speaker B:** How how does it impact uh you know your country or India and uh the Asian world? Mr. Kabir **[1:22:52] Speaker A:** uh first of all thank you Dr. some for the uh invitation. It's great to it's great to be here and I think you know what's what's been happening over the past couple of months has shown uh a couple of points. First, I think uh the narrative that oil remains the new oil, right? Nothing has changed as far as the world's energy mix goes. Hydrocarbons remain very central. Uh the only difference is that uh the demand for hydrocarbons in Asia has grown exponentially. uh and perhaps in in western countries because of energy diversification it has sort of either stagnated or gone down but it's equally important uh from let's say let let's take India as an example you know we import about 85 to 86% of our oil and natural gas uh requirements a lot of it comes from this part of the world why geography distances costs so on and so forth um and straight of hormones and the blockade of **[1:23:43] Speaker A:** state of hormos has really really impacted uh uh the cost of of of fuel uh in a very price sensitive market uh such as India. Yes, there are 1.4 billion customers uh in India for for oil and gas and and we rely on uh on imports from from outside. Uh Iran has been for example a big part of India's energy mix for decades. Uh it it is not so at this point of time but it has been for for a long period of time. Countries like India don't have the luxury to choose where they're going to pick up oil and gas from wherever it's available, wherever it's cost effective. Uh we do it and you know let's not forget that when we're talking about state of hormones, we often talk about critical infrastructure of of of energy. State of hormones itself is critical infrastructure. Yes, it's a natural critical infrastructure, right? **[1:24:31] Speaker A:** You require access through the state of Hormuz for a uh for an economic movement of oil and gas to and from exporters and importers. You need that. So a prolonged blockade of state of hormones is going to impact very heavily. For example, let me just sort of um uh put this around uh around uh something that I witnessed while I was I was in in New Delhi. Um we always talk about oil. Perhaps natural gas is not talked about enough of how critical it is and how difficult it is to move it. Oil is still, you know, you put a few million barrels onto a ship and it's and it's on its way. Natural gas is a little bit more um more difficult. Uh when this crisis was peeking out a couple of months back uh in in in New Delhi, which is a city of about 20 million, uh uh there were rumors that there's going to be a loss of uh **[1:25:21] Speaker A:** gas supplies. So people were running hell to skeletor buying electric cookers, electric stoves and so on and so forth. There was no shortage but there was this impression that it seems to be that there is going to be a natural uh gas uh shortage and it really really impacted how people were looking and and feeling energy security because of what had taken place. So as far as you know uh energy suppliers go it's in non-negotiable for a country like India which is trying to grow at 7% minimum and let me put it this way. India has to grow at 7% minimum. It doesn't have an option not to do that. So uh uh you know what happens uh with the future of state of homos or just unfettered supply uh u uh movement of uh of energy is very critical for most Asian economies. You've seen country like Japan actually go into its its reserves uh to make sure that the pricing and supply is is balanced. **[1:26:10] Speaker A:** U China has benefited from Iranian uh oil and gas for a long period of time. And we're not even talking about the Asian countries right now that will plug in more into uh uh into energy supplies from this part of the world. **[1:26:22] Speaker B:** Thank you. M Dr. Franchesco from all the project to by bypass hallmot which one do you think would reduce Iran's leverage? You know we there are different you know IMAC is one of them. Which one do you think provide this kind of reducing Iran's leverage? **[1:26:40] Speaker A:** Thank you very much. First of all, allow me to express my thanks to Emirates Policy Center, Dr. Episan Eli for inviting me to this extremely interesting debate. Um, well, I come from the business side. I'm not an academic and so my point of view is very practical so to say. And uh uh we have started in my country in Italy, the European Union uh to look with great interest at the IMAC concept well before Hormwood's problem started because we had experienced several different kind of disruptions which basically uh created a great concern about the um trade between Europe and the whole Indo-Pacific region and the greatest concern uh regards the Swiss canal the Red Sea Babel Mandab. It was November 2023 when the first attack started at Babel Mandab and since then the volume of trade passing through the Swiss canal especially I'm looking at general cargo container traffic has decreased sharply and has taken the route **[1:28:14] Speaker A:** of the uh Cape of Good Hope and this is a situation which has hurt the Mediterranean countries, the countries facing the Mediterranean, not yet so much, but the perspective of sews not recovering the full capacity that was handled before the uh UTI attacks in 2020, November 2023. That is a big threat to the whole region facing the Mediterranean. **[1:28:53] Speaker B:** We uh believe very much that the various disruptions that we have experienced in the past six years, I would say since uh COVID pandemic in container trade between Asia and Europe, uh uh has pushed the supply chain managers to look after alternative routes and Um every supply chain requires now an alternative plan B, plan C, plan D. You know uh not only geopolitical disruptions, we had also disruptions due to weather change and similar other uh incidents, you know. I would like to uh tell you that I fully fully share the vision which has been expressed by the works of the Emirates Policy Center in recent works. If I am allowed to court, the objective should be limit limiting the relying on single choke points. expand on geographic options, alternative overland corridors, reducing the gain an adversary can derive from disruption or reducing an adversary ability to turn a single passage into a broad instrument of coercion. **[1:30:31] Speaker B:** So these are uh words quoted from work of the Emirates Policy Center that we share 100%. Um the IMAC project is interesting not only for the Europe and the countries facing the Indian Ocean. It is interesting for the whole trade between the Asia-Pacific, Indo-Pacific and Europe which is the greatest flow of trade in in in in in the present world you know and uh **[1:31:14] Speaker B:** of course it has been affected the concrete development of these uh land bridge between the shores of the Arabian Sea and the southern shores of the Mediterranean has been affected by the many events that have happened in the last three years in the region. uh but still there is you know after the uh Iran war the need of a noveland connectivity between the Gulf um region and the Mediterranean has become real and we have practiced uh con connectivity between uh the Emirates and my region by truck both via via uh uh Israeli ports, Hifa and via Turkish ports. Uh in the meantime also, you know, there are alternative uh uh ideas like the one that has been uh developed and uh by Turkey, the development road uh memorandum which has been signed also by the Emirates. This is quite interesting. The Emirates is signatory of both IMC and development road. **[1:32:34] Speaker B:** showing that it has an open view to the uh alternative routes and we fully share this view. In our opinion, the geographic uh um um best option would be Hifa but we understand that there are political reasons that makes it difficult right now and uh we also see alternative routes both via Turkey and also via Egypt. and also Egypt is looking at uh uh landbridge alternatives you know. So this is our our vision and we are uh you know we see one result from the activity that also we have done as business pushing our um government you know to promote this concept and uh it is remarkable that um we have not developed a joint work among signatories of INC but there has been a lot of bilateral activity **[1:33:43] Speaker A:** and just to mention one remarkable thing the prime minister of my country Italy Mrs. Melon has visited in the last three years 13 times the Gulf uh council countries and four times the Emirates in three years. This has not happened before. So it is a way to push and develop further uh cooperation between the regions and I mean Europe remains the second largest market in the world and is very close to the Gulf region you know. Yeah. So the the the the business uh the business community is looking at with great interest at further strengthening the cooperation among the countries facing the Indian Ocean and Europe itself. **[1:34:40] Speaker B:** Thank you. Uh I will move to Dr. Baharun. Why does the same set you know waterway constitute a different strategic asset for every country the Gulf you know Iran of course China United States and Europe and what does this mean for collective for a collective response from from all of them **[1:35:01] Speaker A:** we do have a lot of interest not interest I mean if you look at just the amount of trade that goes out from the trade of uh it is significant not only for the Gulf states but the whole world, India, China, Asia, Europe. Uh but we have collective benefit that is not equating the collective security. We haven't seen the collective security not only from the you know uh from the region but also uh global collective security. We've seen uh France and the UK start creating a coalition. That coalition was never put into place. uh we expected that this would be the first move after the MOU was signed but that was not and and this is not exactly the same way for instance Europe particularly I I can't just talk about Europe but it's an example uh it's it was not as fast as Europe developed aspus was developed very fast and responded to the disruption in in the Red Sea we haven't seen something similar to that we already had a European **[1:36:07] Speaker A:** mission which is IMSO We haven't seen it act at all. Actually, it was extremely dormant when it was supposed to be, you know, the moment where this awareness, let's say they're focusing on awareness between GCC and Iran, uh should have been triggered. Also, we haven't seen that. So, yes, there is and it's natural more benefit coming less investment when it comes to securing. And I think this is the missing point because if I go back to the last point I was making, Iran is trying to switch off connectivity and they did it in Baband, they did it in Hermos and they have even uh threatened to do it to means that you know uh move beyond the straight of Hormuz particularly the uh both the Saudi and the UAE uh pipelines. Uh so there is an a definite strategy for them rather than invest in connectivity they want to switch it or weaponize it and I think this is far more dangerous to the whole world because it can easily happen **[1:37:12] Speaker A:** in other places in the Baltic Sea in in the state of Malika you can easily find it spreading around **[1:37:20] Speaker B:** okay thank you Dr. Bon Mr. **[1:37:22] Speaker B:** Kabir, why does defense spending although being uh you know rational on national level is irrational when it comes you know to collective security and can this be overcome if you know inte with integrated air missile and maritime defense? uh I mean on paper sure uh uh but I think there there is there is a strong understanding I presume now that you know defense is something that is non-negotiable if you are going to be at the center of global commerce if you are going to be at the center of uh international um trade routes if you want to be at the center of movement of finance um uh you have to have a very strong defensive mechanism it's not a bad word uh to uh Rearm yourself. It's not a bad word. Uh to have uh weapons, to have military capability, to protect what you are building because if you are not able to protect what you are building, uh you have to remember that business is is uh security agnostic. **[1:38:24] Speaker B:** Uh and business has no uh or very very uh international business has very little u uh you know patriotic or nationalistic sense uh when it comes to where it wants to do business and how it will do business. If it's too dangerous in place A, it will go to B. If B becomes very difficult, it will find a C. And if C becomes very difficult, it'll build a D. You know, it's it it's it's a nature of how how commerce works. So it it comes down to countries that are building these new highways of of the future of uh investment, future of trade uh to make sure that they are protected uh against whatever threat uh uh that may that may that they may be dealing with. And that automatically means that you have to build military capacities and you have to be build both deterrence which is a word which we hear a lot in the Gulf. **[1:39:10] Speaker B:** But let me push that push on that a little bit. Uh I think deterance is a very safe word to use uh when it comes to the kind of crisis we are looking at this part of the world. I think you have to build both capabilities of defense and offense. Uh and you you you it is only these kind of outcomes that we are witnessing right now. uh as far as geopolitics is concerned that you sometimes have to come up with also theories and you have to come up with blueprints on how to mobilize those offense and defense and how is it going to function uh because uh you know at the at the end of the day uh uh what has taken place the attacks that have taken place against the Gulf happened because the US and and Israel decided that they're going to **[1:39:52] Speaker B:** strike Iran uh for multiple reasons of course 2025 was the nuclear file and 2026 was were different reasons and Iran's response to that was okay we will now exert pressure uh on both US and Israel through the Gulf because they are unable to penetrate with their defense mechanisms uh uh Israel's air defense or or or American interests uh so they just decided to to strike something via something else and that is the kind of collateral that is a a state Indian existential crisis will make and you have to be prepared for it you cannot have an excuse that you don't have uh uh military preparation uh for all eventualities when you are successfully building uh the future of uh of global trade uh global trade and commerce because now for example the big task comes to Gulf countries is how do you reestablish yourself as that as those centers of of global trade and commerce **[1:40:45] Speaker B:** because these are the questions that are going to be asked by businesses by other countries um so you know defense spending is not a bad word building arsenals unfortunately is not a bad word it's a necessity and I think that should be taken taken on uh uh at a war footing, pardon my French, but uh uh by countries in this in this region as well. **[1:41:04] Speaker A:** Thank you Dr. **[1:41:05] Speaker B:** Sam. Can I jump on this concept because you said that interest is not a bad word. **[1:41:10] Speaker A:** Actually, it is very important for any state to have national interest. There is no state that does not have national interest. But the point that we were trying to do is and that's where connectivity comes in is that you need to take the intersecting national interests. So a number of countries have national interest and there are points when those national interest will intersect. That's what we need to build on. Last year Dr. Tam have got you know uh the deputy minister of Iranian foreign affairs here and we were talking exactly about this what is the role of Iran in the in the role of connectivity but what we've seen was the opposite. So uh once we get those you know different national interest intersecting that is where the one-dimensional object becomes multi-dimensional object and that's where we can grow exponentially. **[1:42:04] Speaker B:** Thank you. I'm going back to uh to you Dr. Franchesco given what Mr. said you know IMAC is you are a signary you can't sign to IMAC the India Middle East Europe corridor um do you think IMC plus one architecture could evolve into integrating you know industry finance energy data uh together and you know it hasn't moved much IMAX so what should be done to make it move **[1:42:33] Speaker A:** well um IMAC is uh looking at three uh areas which are trade which is the part I am mostly interested as logistician but also energy and data which is nowadays of course very interconnected and the ports are uh interchange points for not only goods but also energy and data. Therefore, for sure this is an integration which is necessary and uh of course the from the point of view of Europe know which is lacking on sources of energy. Energy is an extremely important uh area that should be integrated into IMAC and there are several ideas along the corridors how to develop more uh investments in the area of energy you know but also data I mean during the previous panels it has been quite clearly indicated how delicate the aspect ect of data. Uh connectivity has become you know and therefore security on the data is something which is extremely important and requires also some redundancy to avoid the risk of being dependent on just one cable crossing one single canal you know. **[1:44:13] Speaker A:** So this is something which is for sure extremely important and I think from the um business world in the area of uh both data and energy there are advanced discussions on how to develop also along the so-called IMAC corridor uh further uh connectivity. **[1:44:37] Speaker B:** Thank you. **[1:44:38] Speaker B:** I will ask an open question to the panelists. You know the the horos is it Iran threat to close homores or to blockade it. Is it a strategic commitment or a deterrent signal that Iran cannot afford to carry on permanently? I mean we've been now I don't know six months into the crisis and negotiation are going on and what how should the policy of the region and the western world be be shaped around this basically especially that we we know that there are negotiations going on now **[1:45:11] Speaker A:** you uh I mean look the the problem for Iran uh is that it's the only ace of spade they have in the in in the deck of cards. If this is not functioning for them right now, I don't think it's a lot of their leverage is going to be able to mobilize as far as securing their interests are concerned. To be fair, I mean closing off or disrupting uh the straight of hormones has created those ripple effects in energy markets in in and and it's not just the energy markets. It's you know straight of hormones does not only carry oil and gas. It carries a whole bunch of other uh other stuff and is fertilizers whether it's aluminum and so on and so forth that is very important to a lot of economies and and how they function. Um so the the the disruption that that that was that was being pushed through did raise a lot of concern did raise a lot of pressure I think even on the US and and and other sort of uh **[1:46:02] Speaker A:** uh uh uh countries that that that have been part of this uh uh this aberration uh to come and find solutions uh and to to get past this uh this um blockade that that we've been that we've been we've been facing. Let me take IMC for an example because Imech I think is one of the or was one of the first uh um uh sufferers from uh from what has taken place and of course you know like connectivity are I know we like we live in a very hyperconnected world where our lunch and dinners come in 15 minutes through noon and karim but connectivity is a long-term thing connectivity is a decadesl long project it's not something that dies or lives in a short period of time so I think the entire narrative of how much iMac has suffered or whether IMECH will succeed or not succeed is very very premature at this point of time. **[1:46:51] Speaker A:** If you talk to all the countries that are part of it, India and the UAE have actually done a lot as far as proofs of concept goes uh on how to take IMC forward whether it's on the digital front. It's called uh or whether it's on the regulatory front uh or whether it's on the trade front uh uh it's it's just the extension of of extending that requires a level of security clarity. uh when we are going forward that clarity has been disrupted uh at this point of at this point of time uh but you know we've seen that in the past as well uh for example India has been part of something called the north south transportation corridor which includes Iran uh and it has not been a breeze let me tell you whether whether wartime peace time is it's it's it's been a very very difficult ask for the **[1:47:36] Speaker A:** past 35 years to get that uh to get that going India's been part of bimste on the other side of the bay of Bengal again a very very difficult endeavor between uh countries such as Bangladesh, Thailand and so on and so forth. Connectivity just takes a long period of time with the with the whole threat. Now the problem well not the problem but the solutions are coming also thick and fast that the diversification. One of the core criticisms for IMC for a long period of time was how is this going to work on land that you know you take a container you put it on a ship it comes to the UAE it gets off the ship and then you truck it down and in the initial stages of IMAC which is around 2023 2024 everyone that we were talking to said this doesn't function you know just you just put it **[1:48:16] Speaker A:** on on a ship take it through the SW and it comes to Europe why do you need to go up and down and now suddenly that in that exact same land route that was being criticized in the first year is functioning suddenly very well. Why? Because it was a necessity of the time, right? So, it got it got really really pushed through. So, as as I said, the the hormones card is just the one ace of spades for Iran. if it doesn't function for them in the long term they will not have that kind of leverage that they have uh that they have been having in the past couple of years and they know that and I think that is one of the main reasons Iran always pushes for also for a diplomatic out uh uh which they I think they will find at some point of time because it is equally untenable for them in the long **[1:48:59] Speaker A:** run. **[1:49:00] Speaker B:** Thank you Mr. Baharum. If closing the straight of Humus is Iran's strategy, then it's a strategy of creating a super chip, an AI chip using a hammer. You cannot really create a chip using a hammer. Then this is not a strategy at all. What Iran is doing at this moment is a is a tactic. It's a gorilla tactic. Gorilla groups, uh, hackers, terrorist groups, they disrupt. They do not build. That's not a destruct. That's not a strategy. That's a tactic. At this point, this is a battlefield tactic for them. And that's answer to your question. Will it sustain itself? If it sustains itself, it actually going to affect Iran more than anyone else. We have other options. They do not have as many options. But I want to go also to idea of what is IMC and the in the growth. In my view, I is not a pipeline. **[1:49:59] Speaker B:** a pipeline. Something comes in from the point A and leaves point B. This is an artery and an artery needs to branch out through vessels. Artery that carries blood but blood carries a lot of things, blood cells, enzymes, uh you know uh toxins, oxygen, carbon dioxide. So it's a supply chain concept rather than a trade container concept. So when we're looking at IMAC, we're looking at a new strategy rather than just a platform to move a container from point A to point B and in a supply chain other elements will be added to the product as it goes in. That's why we and this is the experiment of the UAE reexport. What is reexport? You bring in a good add something to it and then it goes back away somewhere else. So this is a this is a strategy and I think this strategy is going to be uh there and I agree with you we are getting more hyper globalized rather than globalized and with this hyper globalization driven by **[1:51:00] Speaker B:** AI all of the supply chain for AI is going to be critical. So yes the way Iran you know behaves today is a behavior of a gorilla group. they they're trying only to disrupt rather than build. Once that phase in their thinking changes, I think connectivity is going to be the way to save Iran from what it is today. **[1:51:26] Speaker A:** Thank you. **[1:51:26] Speaker A:** And this is a question for all of you. Who will set the rules for connectivity? Dr. Francisco, you know, uh the Gulf States, uh India, Europe, the United States, China, who will set all the companies that are operating the underlying systems. Well, this is a very difficult question very especially nowadays you know but I tend to believe that um there is the need of a wide corporation not one single player can dictate the rules. It is something that has to develop among countries that have the goodwilling to develop and facilitate this kind of connectivity and uh of course uh I mean uh we are here in Abu Dhabi in the Emirates and uh the Emirates have been playing an important role if I'm not mistaken tomorrow there will be an important meeting here concerning Russia Ukraine. So **[1:52:38] Speaker B:** this uh role of facilitator and of diplomacy can of course be played by who lies in the in the middle of this corridor. This is the Emirates. So but anyway it requires goodwill of a number of countries. It cannot be **[1:52:59] Speaker A:** uh directed by one single country. So this is my personal opinion and of course the business should be pushing the government to go in the direction of because you create then the conditions for economic growth which are interesting for all business in all countries along the corridor and in the region. **[1:53:22] Speaker B:** Thank you so much Mr. Baharu. **[1:53:24] Speaker A:** No one is doing that. It is developed as we're going. We play it by ear. Frankly, **[1:53:32] Speaker B:** it happens on national projects. It has happens between countries that have common interest and they're developing it. We don't have something similar, let's say, uh uh to a UN uh uh organization on connectivity. We have something on trade, the WTO, but we don't have anything on connectivity, let alone even supply chain. These are two different worlds. have different need for governance and those governance areas are being overlooked entirely. I'm really hoping that we will have something similar to that either here in the UAE as a as a global conference on connectivity where heads of state because connectivity is not about trade you know I don't want we cannot discuss it during W for instance because that's only economic connectivity brings in economy it brings in politics it bring in security infrastructure maritime all of these issues have been discussed here in this conference and also brings in **[1:54:31] Speaker B:** people Because without policies for people that's why the UAE is investing so much in in in tolerance you cannot have connectivity between people if there is no tolerance it is the vessel that allows that type of movement. So frankly nothing there is a big gap there's a big need and I'm hoping that the UAE you know uh jumps on it and says we really need a big conference on connectivity. **[1:54:56] Speaker A:** Thank you uh Mr. Kav. Uh look, I agree with the general sentiment that uh it's a it's a very old adage, you know, you build and they'll come. So that's that goes for regulation, that goes for technology, that goes for everything. U in the beginning I think what we still lack at this point of time uh as I said before is a string of proofs of concept of how IMC is going to function and that it can function in those manners irrespective of not just what's happening as far as a conflict goes but there are broader questions as well there is there are broader questions of tariffs there are broader question of of how trade is going to flow between these countries whose interest is what all of those conversations are yet to be taken place in in a very very serious and formalized manner. **[1:55:40] Speaker A:** I think it's high time at least those conversations start. Uh since IMAC was was conceived on the sidelines of the G20 you know there was a lot of momentum at that point of time but of course after October 7th it got completely sidelined and now I do see there's a lot of pessimism on it on how to restart it and and where do we restart from and whether if if it's even possible anymore uh to do that. uh and uh I think the fundamentals of what what created IMC haven't changed. There is a security situation unfolding. Yes. Uh there is a security question mark that is unfolding. Yes. But you have to remember when IMC was conceptualized. I don't think anyone who formulized or drafted the idea were under any illusion that there are not going to be challenges such such as these ones in in the Middle East. **[1:56:28] Speaker A:** I don't think anyone was under that kind of illusion. So that means that the conceptualization was of for a long-term uh project uh uh between these between these geographies underpinned by the fact that the world is drastically changing from the postw World War II era. Right? Those institutions are changing. This is the this is the moment to rebuild newer institutions and you will have all of these challenges. You'll have the security challenges. You'll have the geographic challenges. There are going to be conflicts. There are going to be wars. It's not the only region where conflict is taking place. There are there the the fundamental the questions that we should be asking is not that the conf that these conflicts are hotspots at this point of time which includes Russia and Ukraine. Uh uh there are broader questions where conflict goes is that uh conflicts are not coming to logical ends because let's say there is an infusion of technology now there's infusion of gray zone warfare there seems to be this **[1:57:22] Speaker A:** continualization that conflicts running for years is being normalized. I think that there's a bigger problem at this point of time uh than uh than the future of of trade connectivity. The trade and connectivity will happen irrespective as it has happened historically for IMC. I think that there are two or three points that I can leave behind that may be beneficial for for uh for colleagues in this in this room. As I said, I think the first set of meetings that were supposed to happen in 2023 between partners need to happen now uh uh irrespective of what the regional situation is. Second, there are a lot of proofs of concept between India and the UAE, especially on the digital front. We have the M3 system between India and the UAE that updates real-time regulatory frameworks between India and the UAE for traders. Uh uh that can be very easily expanded to all other parts of of of IMAX just to show that there is continuity uh taking place. **[1:58:13] Speaker A:** And third, I think it's not a bad idea to start thinking about a secretariat. Uh uh and even if even if it's Baron, even if it's not in a physical format, I think tanks in in all of these uh geographies can come up with a virtual secretariat that can start engaging with business or anyone else who wants to talk about and how it is going to function while we wait for more formalization uh to to take place and move take it forward. **[1:58:39] Speaker B:** Thank you. **[1:58:39] Speaker A:** Can I push back on on two points? Sorry. Uh I'm not in the in the habit of uh but uh on pessimism I think you're sort of right but we have seen from Europe far more interest now when IMAX started it was Germany France now we've got Italy **[1:58:57] Speaker B:** we've got uh Greece interested and Cyprus so there are more countries in Europe believing in connectivity the EU itself looks at connectivity and IMC as as the stem cell of its future of connecting to this whole region It's no more the the uh neighborhood policies. This is a corridor now that extends all the way. Also pushing back on you the the lack of interest is coming from Asia. It's not coming from Europe. And I think it's not we need more than India. India is important but we need also the rest of Asia because that's where the production is happening. So uh just to add to your **[1:59:35] Speaker A:** Thank you. We spoke a lot about hormones but we have another problem or another crisis which is Babel Mandab. How would this what is the most likely scenario for the future of Babel Mandab and how would that affect the regional balances and the global economy and this is again an open question **[1:59:55] Speaker B:** I would say the same thing frankly Bab is just like straight of Iran is acting to disrupt this this this flow of of trade they think that the the moment that the world suffers they become stronger That's their only strength is to hurt people and their strategy for instance when it comes to the US to pressure President Trump was focused on increasing the the price of oil the the price of uh gasoline and diesel. That's why the Houthis focused on attacking the areas where Saudi Arabia started to export its oil out of out of the uh the Red Sea instead of. So they wanted to make sure before the elections that the prices go very high. That is disruption and frankly it will not stop there. If the Houthis can do it in the in in this in Bab anyone can do it anywhere and I think this is the the real danger and that's why the world will need to take a stand. **[2:00:56] Speaker A:** Kabir would you like to add anything? uh very quickly actually you know uh and it's more of a conceptual fluff in my head when it comes to bal Babal mandab because everyone is impacted again you know most of the Asian uh economies are impacted because it is the most economical and easier way to conduct trade uh going through the red sea across the su canal and so on and so forth and often you know the the the um um on on crisis with the Houthis and and and how do you manage uh how do you manage that we saw China basically cutting out a deal with the Houthis and saying that okay fine the Houthies will not uh attack the Chinese ships. And when that deal came through, it made me it it made me think that we are actually in a very precarious global position when it comes to these kind of challenges where I think prioritization of management of crisis **[2:01:47] Speaker A:** rather than resolution of crisis is being uh is being favored uh uh by most countries. So there are lots of countries that have overlapping interests uh in in in in in the Red Sea for example. U there have been times in the past where actually a lot of countries have come together to fight back against piracy for example. you know there were international coalitions, there were deployment of uh naval naval ships uh uh and they did manage to uh push back on on global piracy in in in in uh on the off the coast of Somalia and and and so on and so forth. uh this of course is much more intertwined into into local geo I mean regional geopolitics and a lot of countries are just risk averse in trying to get into those uh into those conversations uh or taking sides as it as it uh as it may. **[2:02:38] Speaker A:** Let me give you an example. India is one of those examples. It has very good relations with Iran. It has very good relation with Gulf countries. It has very good relation with Israel. But it does not enter these conversations. Uh uh because all of those interests from an Indian security point of view uh deliver very different things. Uh and and and there is this thinking um I'm not I'm not going to get into the rights and wrongs of it. Uh but there is this thinking that if you enter these conversation in in implicitly and take sides or take very very strong positions uh uh even if if that's in your favor when it comes to global trade uh you are entering uh you're entering conflicts and and and conversations that you really don't want to be part of. uh and so that keeps a lot of these countries out irrespective uh and despite having significant interest in 2015 uh I think India was the country that evacuated most number of people from Yemen uh uh uh uh between **[2:03:30] Speaker A:** Djibouti and and Sana. So uh but that was that was the length and breadth of the interest at that point of time is to get the people out uh not really try to incubate any conversations or or push uh uh pushing towards resolution. But just to as a as a finality of the point uh I do worry that we are very normalizing uh uh just uh conflict resolution uh conflict management rather than conflict resolution at this point of time. **[2:03:57] Speaker B:** Thank you. **[2:03:58] Speaker A:** Can I make please Dr. F? comment on two things. Of course, from the beginning, our idea was that IMAC is a long-term uh concept. I was always saying I engaging in this for my grandchildren, not for myself. Second thing is that of course you'd never have a single corridor, but it's branching out. It's a network of corridors so to say. **[2:04:25] Speaker B:** And uh why is it a long term? Because yes, we have been compared to practice the I'm a corridor because of the closure of the Hormwoods straight but this is you know an emergency situation. It is not efficient. You know the efficiency requires infrastructure and infrastructure which is required is rail connectivity and here we start to have a problem. You can't have five railways connecting the Arabian Sea to the Mediterranean. You have to invest on one basic then you can branch it out. But we have to look at other uh similar projects to create redundancy. For instance, which is quite important for Europe is the middle corridor connecting China to Europe, you know. But you cannot see this as a purely connectivity between China and Europe. You have to see it also what is creating along the corridor. It's very important the middle corridor for the central Asian countries to create a better connectivity to the rest of the world of the central Asian. **[2:05:40] Speaker B:** And this is my personal opinion is that the the IMAC corridor uh would create uh uh extraordinary opportunities for the Middle East to develop further in cooperation within the Middle East. This is my **[2:05:58] Speaker A:** Thank you. **[2:05:59] Speaker A:** Thank you. My last question before we open it to the audience audience which parties stand to gain or benefit or lose if uh you know the security of Babanda becomes a core component of any future settlement for the war in Iran. We start with you Mr. Baharun. **[2:06:17] Speaker B:** I mean frankly my fear is not whether Iran can control Baband or not. My fear is that the means by which Iran control bal and it it has it has done this by means of giving weapon technology to non-state actors. This is the big problem. That's where this thing can blow up out of proportion. We can see for instance if the uh drones hyper missile technology that the Houthis now own can easily be transmitted to people like Shabbab or Boo Haram. What would that mean to Africa? What would that mean to Europe? It will grow all the way up and instead of Europe suffering from immigrants, Europe will suffer from drones. This is the problem. It is not whether they want to. If Iran wants to be part of this, Iran can set up, you know, a company like uh Dubai World Ports, that's that's how you build a super chip, not by a hammer. **[2:07:24] Speaker B:** But it is the means by which that is happening. And unfortunately today uh the Houthis think that the only way they can get a deal favorable for them from Saudi Arabia is by attacking not only Saudi Arabia but Babel Mandabub and and that's this is the contagious we've got the good infection if you want and how it is the stem cell of of of connectivity but we also have something else happening which could be the antimatter if you want uh and that's what Iran is doing in in Babu. Thank you, Mr. Kabir. Briefly before we open the question. **[2:08:00] Speaker A:** Yeah, I mean very quickly I agree with him. I think one of the main concerns going forward is uh is a is a this new sort of proliferation of very low tech warfare. Again coming back to a point I made earlier is the continuation of these conflicts that there seems to be very little offramps coming into play that would allow you to come to a political resolution uh in a certain manner or there is some sort of uh u uh agreement that a war has been won or lost. I think those those variables don't exist anymore. So the chances of continuation is is is is much higher and you know it in when it come either it's hormuz mande and so on and so forth. One thing I do sport uh is that more and more conversations are actually taking place. They may not be in the same theaters that we're used to looking at those conversations. **[2:08:49] Speaker A:** But just the fact for example the UAE met Iran in in in New Delhi on the sidelines of Briggs. There are other such forums that are trying to push some of these at least these conversations. Now we can have a discussion whether what the motives of those conversations may be but at least they are taking place and I think for a lot of countries uh these platforms are becoming more important where they can engage with actors such as Iran where it may not be possible to do so in in in other frameworks. I just **[2:09:16] Speaker B:** thank you and we have now Mr. Amin Katme a question. **[2:09:22] Speaker A:** Good morning again. My question to Dr. Francisco and Mr. Muhammad um from Turkey again to remind the audience uh let's look at to the uh dates 3 January 26 United States changed the regime in Venezuela. 28th February 26 the regional war started. uh he's selling the Trump his oil and gas including the Venezuela's oil and gas from 3rd January to the world with very good prices and ever United State oil and gas companies made uh uh the most uh epipitas and uh profits uh within this year by selling their own oil and gas including Venezuelas. So we know that uh Trump is a great uh gamblers and casino operators and opportunist. **[2:10:25] Speaker B:** So do you think do you think the question **[2:10:28] Speaker A:** do you think that **[2:10:30] Speaker B:** uh Trump are really want peace soon in the in the region and resolve her problem? This is my question. Thank you. **[2:10:39] Speaker A:** Okay. Can can we Yeah, please Dr. Francesco, can we answer and briefly **[2:10:43] Speaker B:** I didn't understand the question. **[2:10:45] Speaker A:** Yeah. Sorry. **[2:10:48] Speaker B:** He He's basically at the end asking if Trump would like a solution in the region, right? **[2:10:55] Speaker A:** Yeah. He's asking a political question if Trump would like a a solution for the region with this crisis. **[2:11:01] Speaker B:** Resolve the problem. **[2:11:03] Speaker A:** Resolve the problem. **[2:11:04] Speaker B:** Resolve the problem because we can see the game and gamble. **[2:11:08] Speaker A:** Let's address this question to Mr. Baharun because you know Mr. Dr. Franchesco is dealing more for business. Mr. Do you want to answer the question very briefly because our time is running out? **[2:11:19] Speaker B:** Well, Iran possibly benefited as much as the US from from the closure. They sold uh their oil that was sitting outside and they've they've got relief from the US. Uh and I don't think this is the idea that the US have started this war just to benefit. I think this is a a a really uh you know onedimensional view. Does Trump want a solution? Yes, I think he wants a solution. He has acknowledged that this war cost them the the midterm elections. So yes, he wants a solution. **[2:11:55] Speaker A:** Okay. Thank you. As we're ending, we just this crisis shows that geography is power and connectivity is leverage. The Gulf cannot change its geography of course but it can change how vulnerable it is to this geography. So the question we leave with this uh session is whether uh they would this region will act together to shape the future or remain hostage to the next choke point. Thank you very much for joining us and I'm sorry that we couldn't take more questions because other session is going to start. Thank you. **[2:12:48] Speaker A:** Ladies and gentlemen, please enjoy a 15minute break before the next panel. **[2:12:56] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. **[2:13:33] Speaker A:** Hey. **[2:13:44] Speaker A:** Hey. Hey. Heat. Heat. **[2:13:57] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. N. **[2:14:07] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. **[2:14:23] Speaker A:** Heat. **[2:14:44] Speaker A:** Hey, heat. Hey, heat. Heat. Heat. **[2:15:09] Speaker A:** Heat. Hey. Hey. Hey. **[2:15:34] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. N. **[2:16:00] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. **[2:16:07] Speaker A:** Heat. **[2:16:30] Speaker A:** Heat. **[2:16:48] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. N. **[2:17:21] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. N. **[2:17:31] Speaker A:** Heat. **[2:17:47] Speaker A:** Heat. **[2:18:32] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. **[2:19:05] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. N. **[2:19:15] Speaker A:** Heat. **[2:19:33] Speaker A:** Heat. **[2:20:05] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. N. **[2:20:53] Speaker A:** I'm a dream. **[2:21:41] Speaker A:** There you go. **[2:21:53] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. Heat. **[2:22:35] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. N. **[2:23:03] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. **[2:23:50] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. **[2:24:25] Speaker A:** I'm telling you. **[2:25:21] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. **[2:25:44] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. **[2:26:11] Speaker A:** I'm a dream. **[2:26:26] Speaker A:** Heat. **[2:26:37] Speaker A:** Heat. **[2:26:47] Speaker A:** Heat. **[2:27:06] Speaker A:** Heat. **[2:27:11] Speaker A:** Heat. **[2:27:30] Speaker A:** Heat. **[2:27:35] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. **[2:27:58] Speaker A:** Heat. **[2:28:12] Speaker A:** Heat. **[2:28:20] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. **[2:29:32] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. N. **[2:29:42] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. N. **[2:29:52] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. **[2:30:41] Speaker A:** Heat. **[2:30:55] Speaker A:** Heat. **[2:31:03] Speaker A:** Hey. Hey. Hey. **[2:31:29] Speaker A:** I'm a **[2:31:41] Speaker A:** kid. **[2:32:29] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. **[2:33:16] Speaker A:** I'm a **[2:34:15] Speaker A:** Ladies and gentlemen, the next panel will begin now. **[2:35:25] Speaker A:** Ladies and gentlemen, panel 8 entitled New Iran, Old Iran, regime transformation and the future. of the Islamic Republic will start now. **[2:35:56] Speaker A:** Welcome back. Uh my name is Daw Alin. I'm from the Middle East Research Institute based in Ari Kurdistan region of Iraq. With me um Sultan Aimi from the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, uh Hamid Raza Azizi from International Crisis Group. Uh we have Muhammad Zahul uh from Emirates Policy Center. We have online Dina Espandiari from Bloomberg Economics. We all thank you uh Princess Sept Samuel Kitby as well as your wonderful team including Ammani Aean and everybody else uh for making this uh such a great success and um it's all about Iran and Iran and even more Iran. So everybody in this audience is an expert on not only on Iran but also on speculating whether there will be a war or not. By a show of hands, how many of you think that there is a window from now until January there may be a war? **[2:37:03] Speaker A:** And how many you think there will be no war? Okay. Well, by the show of hands, you've got four times four times more of uh more people think there will be no war. Now we are not going to talk about war but I've asked my fellow panelists to be really novel add a lot more because you've got an audience of experts about they remember when the war started when they know exactly the dynamics inside the United States inside probably Iran. So, we better come up with something really novel and and uh and and clever to show people to actually to clarify the dynamics, the complexity inside Iran. And don't tell me it's complex inside Iran because we know it is. **[2:37:49] Speaker B:** No, no, not at We look at you to make it simple and tell us what's going on in terms of power, in terms of the dynamics with the economic security as well as political dynamics inside how Iran looks at the Gulf, the world, how it interacts with these as well as um what would be the future in terms of the regime that survived. It showed resilience. But what is the future of this regime uh in in all these aspects that I mentioned? So, uh, forgive me. I'm going to go to an Iranian first, uh, just to, uh, um, see if we can clarify what power means. We all know that after the war um the IRGC emerged as the strongest um actor or say the group of actors. The new supreme leader is deeply connected with the uh revolutionary guards. The foreign minister, the speaker of the parliament who've been sent to negotiate on behalf of Iran. **[2:38:49] Speaker B:** They're all all part of revolutionary guard as well as the doctrine that we are facing and we don't know if they um will be designing policies for dealing with the short-term, medium-term and long-term of Iran. So please Hamid Raizi tell us a bit about this dynamic of power what is going on in simple terms. **[2:39:11] Speaker A:** First of all uh I would also like to uh thank Emirates Policy Center for inviting me. It's a pleasure to be here. Um I think uh there's been a few times so far that uh President Trump has said that the United States has conducted regime change in Iran twice and that uh now they are dealing with the third uh generation or third layer of the leaders. Um I think to um some extent uh that is true except that u there is a misunderstanding about the concept of regime to what extent it is applicable it was applicable to the Islamic Republic before the war and the extent to which it is applicable now. And here I'm not uh doing any kind of value judgment. It's about uh having a systemic view of the Islamic Republic and how it evolved before the war and where it is now. **[2:40:08] Speaker A:** Because um actually what Ari did in almost four decades of his supreme leadership was to uh turn a revolutionary regime into a system that was uh based on two main pillars. uh a very strong uh clerical uh and ideological uh one and the other one was a security military based on the IRGC. Um so uh the Islamic Republic's um survival and uh stability was basically based on these two pillars. Um the empowerment of the IRGC didn't happen overnight. what you are uh rightly mentioning in terms of uh the guards having the upper hand. It was a process um that um kind of was fasttracked as a result of uh the latest war and and and the developments that came with it. So uh the system was there and one of the things that uh Ali oversaw actually during his supreme leadership was the establishment of institutions. **[2:41:16] Speaker A:** So the institutionalization of power was another process which was quite important is is important in understanding Iran. But uh in a way it was based on parallel and sometimes competing institutes like the IRGC and the regular army like the RGC intelligence and uh the intelligence ministry so that uh Kam himself would work as the final orbiter of the system. He had the final say. uh after the 12- day war there was a moment of reckoning and uh there there was a process that I uh tend to call councilization. So adi hommin mindful of the possibility of another war and even without that uh his age he was already 86 um kind of uh he himself oversaw the decentralization of power and the empowerment of the councils of power. Supreme national security council which was already there was empowered by appointing Alarani as the head of it. **[2:42:17] Speaker A:** Uh the defense council was established and so on and so forth. So that was at the heart of the resilience of the Iranian system um during and following the war. Now what we have is a system that is less hierarchical, more horizontal, more based on the councils of power with the supreme national security council now elevated to the position of decision making uh unlike the the decision shaping and uh consultancy function that it had before. And Moshavi as the new supreme leader is one actor among several and he tries to influence the dynamics of power through his uh appointees in the supreme national security council with uh Mosendra Zi as the secretary of the council being uh the uh main uh manifestation of that. So in just one word I would say the system is still in transition but uh it has never been a one-man show and now even less than before and there's also one nuance I would like to emphasize and **[2:43:22] Speaker A:** that is I think it would be misleading to consider the system as an IRGC dominated or a military system. The way I call it is uh the system is run by military security establishment among the two pillars that I mentioned before. The clerical identity of the system has weakened. Um and the clerics who are now uh in the position of power within the system be it himself be it the chief justice they get their authority from their background in security establishment not uh as being clerics. So that is the shift in that we are observing right now. **[2:44:01] Speaker B:** Thank you so much. **[2:44:02] Speaker B:** I'll bring in Dina if you don't mind if um you were uh with us. Dina just add whatever you have on this. Um but do tell us where are the conservatives? Where are the reformers? Where are the moderates? Where are the hawks? Uh so basically um we think from outside and we just heard that the revolutionary guards are really pretty much on the front and maybe calling to short but what's your understanding uh about this power dynamics and what should we expect now if the if there was no war and there now we're living in the immediate days after the war but there is also long term so which direction are we going uh in your opinion Dina? Thank you so much. Good morning to everyone and uh and apologies that I can't be there with you. Um I feel like I'm really missing out. **[2:44:54] Speaker B:** Um so to answer your question um you know we have a tendency to put the the the different actors within the Iranian political systems into boxes and we have a tendency to allocate those boxes to individuals um and and parties long term. But actually, if there's any system um or any government system that we know of where that doesn't work very well, I think Iran is one of them. Uh the Iranian political system is fluid. Um and as Hamijza described, it is currently changing. We used to have a situation where we had a supreme leader that was the final decision maker, but he was not the only decision maker. He still sought counsel amongst other people. And today we have as Hamid Dresza described a much more horizontal system. So one where you don't actually have that final hammer that comes down from one individual uh which I think makes the decision-m process a little bit messier. **[2:45:56] Speaker B:** Add to that this dimension that we are now in a in a wartime scenario. Um some of us may think that we're transitioning to postwar but from perspective we're not. They're on alert. They're they're ready for the next round. They've been planning because the first time they got struck, they got caught off guard. And that's not a mistake that they're going to make twice. Um and so they've really put in place this highly decentralized decisionmaking what um many people call the mosaic decision- making which is like a wartime structure where the where decision-m is devolved to um units to councils to areas so the people have more responsibility in terms of decision-m and why have they done that well simply because they want to avoid something that the Islamic Republic at times is known for which is that infighting, that dynamic of debate, discussion, which on many levels is a positive because it allows the leadership to take into consideration many views, but in a wartime scenario is actually a terrible idea because it delays decision-making and Iran's ability to act. **[2:47:07] Speaker B:** So, they put in place this system to overcome that. The other thing that I would add is that again, you have to think like the way that they are thinking in a wartime scenario. What are Iran's objectives in this war? The Islamic Republic wants to survive. They need to survive not just a war, but a war that is being fought against them, but a far superior military power. Um, and that really is driving every consideration, every decision. The second goal is they want to deter. That means they need to make sure that whatever they do today ensures that they don't see another war in six months, in a year, in two years time every time a new US president comes and decides they want regime change in Iran. And finally, and this is the one that I think people tend to forget, Iran doesn't want to set a precedent for the future. **[2:47:59] Speaker B:** Now, what does that mean? They don't want to capitulate to concede too much because if they do that today then in their minds um down the line when the US or Israel or anybody else wants something the lesson that will have been learned is squeeze Iran enough attack Iran and eventually they will give in. And this is why you're seeing such an intrigent Islamic Republic because it can't be seen to give in because it's worried that if it does survive this war down the line when other powers will want something from it, the only thing they will need to do is go back to a wartime scenario which is what Tehran is trying to avoid. **[2:48:38] Speaker A:** Thank you. Thank you Dina. I'll come to you Sultan now. Um your reaction to what you heard but also add to it. Do you really believe that this current regime can survive without the revolutionary kind of legitimacy and without this ideology that started 47 years ago? Can they actually change to survive even longer? Now they survive the war but it's long-term survival that we are after. **[2:49:06] Speaker B:** Thank you Dav. And uh I'm very delighted to be among my the distinguished experts. Um here I am in UAE and I think uh if you allow me I will speak in Arabic. Um **[2:49:21] Speaker A:** for uh sorry I I know that **[2:49:24] Speaker B:** we have a very amazing u interpreters so they will transfer what I will **[2:49:30] Speaker A:** but **[2:49:30] Speaker B:** I offered you to speak in Kurdish if you wanted to. So **[2:49:33] Speaker A:** yeah my best now so wait me for the next year I'll I'll be there. **[2:49:40] Speaker B:** Um And back to your question, could this regime survive without having a revolutionary ideology considering the establishment of this regime? It was in the beginning based on revolutionary uh aspects. But I hope and uh call on the uh audience to have a closer look since 1979 until today. Let's look at the Iranian parliament and let's look at the official elements in Iran. We will see some kind of transformation from those clerical uh personalities who used to uh occupy several positions in the parliament at other positions and gradually there was a transformation and they changed from clerical attire to uh the usual civilian attire. So this change of ideology means that there is a great problem and direct impact on this regime. I remember the uh late Iranian leader in 2015 had a statement after the 2015 agreement was signed. He said that we will not allow the satanic toxic toxins meaning the US to um uh impact Iran culturally and socially and economically. **[2:51:18] Speaker B:** So uh it is very clear the existence of Iran and survival of Iran is the survival of its revolutionary ideology. this revolutionary ideology could it move or transform from a religious Islamic revolutionary ideology to a nationalistic ideology? This is the important question. Could there be um transformative or infliction point in the regime? At the same uh time, I could bet that the current the current bet of the Iranian regime is to be more more revolutionary against the United States. What Basian said yesterday that Musta allowed him to end this no war no peace status but in a manner that preserves the pride and dignity of Iran. So this doesn't mean that there is a space to think that this regime might survive without having a re revolutionary ideology because those are two faces of the same coin. If there is no revolution then the whole regime will not be surviving. **[2:52:40] Speaker A:** Thank you. **[2:52:41] Speaker A:** I'll go back to uh the economic or legitimacy. Uh do you want to speak in Arabic or English? I speak in Jordanian. **[2:52:52] Speaker B:** Uh uh same question I will answer. Uh if you want to talk also about economy that's fine. Uh thank you very much uh Mr. Dawa and thank you to Dr. and could be uh honestly I know that she received lots of thanks and appreciation during this two days but I believe she deserves more thanks uh not only because of her efforts uh in this uh debate but also about what we are talking about today because Dr. She's um she was one among many uh thinkers and intellectuals. She was one of the leading Arab thinkers uh who br the gap between uh the decision making centers and think tanks uh besides uh the institutional work and we have seen something remarkable in the UAE is that the margin of error in strategic calculus has become almost zero and what the Asian is suffering now and the crisis that the Asian has seen um recently is mostly due to the errors in strategic calculus. **[2:54:19] Speaker B:** the Iranian regime. The colleagues already spoke about it being underpinned by ideology of militarization. But the Iranian regime was an elitebased regime and the personality of Ali and an elite of leaders who were loyal to him. The vision for Iran and for the Asian and the world is an essential component of the approach of Iran towards different issues. And since the vision of the former leader Ali Kamina, it was based on a strategic reading that lasted for many years based on the end of the American empire and the western civilization and in a sense of the east and that we are living the last years of the American dominance and with its 36 years of rule in Aan that was uh translated and which was found to be built on lots of strategic errors and then we have started seeing strategies of uh going towards the east and thinking that Isra will be moved from the map from 202021 2025 now they say in 2028 and this uh errors in strategic calculus has contributed significantly in **[2:55:57] Speaker B:** the situation that Aan has itched. Now this elite regime that we have now has changed into something similar to a plant which finds its legitimacy and uh funding from different roots and this can add to militarization. We are now dealing with different elites leading which get the legitimization and also funding from different sources. This means not accepting each of the parties not accepting the dominance of the other party and this is what Mr. Aizi and Mr. Mrs. FIA said saying that the the regime has become it is not hierarchical anymore but it's finding its legitimacy from different sources and now we have different heads of any Egypt and not one **[2:57:05] Speaker A:** economic question we stay with inside Iran before we talk about foreign policy and reaction to the Gulf to America and elsewhere but staying within Iran I have a question for Dina and and Hamid about the opposition inside and outside Iraq. So get ready for that question. But before that I want to come back to you on what Iran's uh infrastructure. **[2:57:32] Speaker B:** No one uh Iran's infrastructure whether it's economy whether it's military in every sense has been really badly damaged if not destroyed. So what they what we have is a regime, okay, and its ideology and its maybe capacity to defend itself. But one day, hopefully there's no war. If there's no war, one day the real priorities, the real challenges will come back. Services, economy, rebuilding in the absence of money, maybe if the sanctions continue. So do you think soon the economy will dictate change? change of regime, change of mentality, change of doctrine as well as accommodating whether accommodating their own people as well as accommodating the neighborhood and the international community start behaving like a normal country where economy, trade and uh prosperity would be the priority. Do you think this is imminent? This can happen uh that we see the signs of that happening. Um **[2:58:38] Speaker B:** uh like I said before, the economic aspect can negatively impact the Indian regime. And here I I I go back to Ali Kami when he mentioned in 2015 saying that we will not allow the Americans and uh to be uh involved and infiltrated in Iran economically, politically and culturally because Ian has a clear vision. uh any opening of the doors to outside for infiltration will impact the criteria of evolution and uh mindset and the evolution mobilization inside. So this is a core component inside the regime. Uh the turning point uh there was a main turning point that uh we did not hear for so long after after Trump uh came back for the second term. There was a very important statement by the Indian foreign minister when he said that and even the super leader is not against the return of American companies for investment. **[3:00:01] Speaker B:** Why do I mention that? Because during the first term of Trump uh there was also uh his election campaign. He was saying we did not benefit from the nuclear agreement in 2015 and the Congress had imposed sanction on American companies not to invest more than $20 million in Aan. So it was difficult to avoid that. So what happened is that the issue of changing by allowing American companies to invest. This is a main change by why thisian regime allowed American companies to contribute and to invest inside Iran. Because I still remember Muhammad Jawadi when he was talking about how you were negotiating with America in Oman. He said to preserve the Iranian regime we do not object to have talks with the devil even in the heart of hell. So the margin of manuver of foran is available. Now the main question will this lead to the collapse of the Iranian regime. **[3:01:29] Speaker B:** For me it's important that we do not link the Indian regime to MUTA but there is an extensive network when we say that there is no head but there is a vast network for decision making that's still the case now within the cycle of interest. So boosting the economy inside and the and the main goal is that there is this network inside and it's not hinged on one person not that Mushtaba decides and the other implement the other point I would like to mention and it's very important we learn from in Iraq and Saddam Hussein there was a global consensus of sanctions and complete uh blockade for almost 11 years on with its uh national assets and with the borders from other countries and the ejection by China and others we don't think that economic sanctions will lead to the collapse of the regime because I think that theian regime made its calculation and is ready if that could be some big pressure. **[3:02:58] Speaker B:** Yes, but the question whether the war takes place or not. But what are the results of that? So we can exaggerate in the war and we can also not do enough and leading to the same situation now of no war no peace. that we were in the situation of no war and no peace that theian regime was extending in the Asian. Thank you Muhammad. **[3:03:29] Speaker B:** Same question but uh it's possible that that one day will live in side by side with America even as the big devil. Let us say that the economic pressure exerted on Aan its goal is not economic one but to achieve political action. The military pressure also is to get uh political action. So we are using different tools to achieve action and with a different methodology, different approach. The Iranian economy is suffering. We all know that. We know about the inflation, unemployment and the structural crisis that the Iranian regime is undergoing and uh this is also threatening the stability of basic services. But let us assume that we continue with this pressure until the e the Iranian economy reaches the the point of no return. Will there be action from the Iranian regime and will the economic pressure be able to achieve those assaults? I think that's more important than this uh description of the situation. **[3:04:49] Speaker B:** We can write a lot about the situation of the Iranian regime. We are putting pressure on the Iranian regime to achieve political reaction for one goals that we don't have other alternatives. The Iranian opposition overseas has proved during the crisis its vulnerability and have seen importance of domestic opposition from Beluch and quotes. We all know that those opposition domestic opposition Kurdish and Beluchi the that leads to vulnerability inside the state itself and this could lead to situation where the regime will not be able to control its border and its geography and since the world doesn't have an alternatives able to hold the situation with the current regime you will have to choose it will live in Aan in chaos and the whole Asian will suffer or to work yourself and monitor the security in Iran and this doesn't doesn't look like what the US wants to do because it's too expensive and then based on this approach what is overlooked here mainly is the elites inside and trying to the **[3:06:21] Speaker B:** situation in Iran definitely from the normal way. So the main enemy of Iran our biggest enemy in the Asian is to is simplification. We are still in the Asian in the world. We're still approaching the Iranian issue with too much shallowness and simplification and we're dealing with issues in in Iran and thinking that there are generations of people who did not get education. There is social issues and deep issues within those societies. But when we want to approach the issue of militia, we call them proxies of a to summarize it. But are those proxies aren't they linked to objective issues in their societies? Isn't the Iranian issue linked to deep dimensions about what happened in Aan in terms of transformation at the cultural and civilizational level in the whole last century. I think we need uh to revisit this issue and to uh give more space to this issue and I mention here the all of think tanks and to give more space to uh experts so that they can become **[3:07:51] Speaker B:** an efficient part in decision making because the absence of their all can lead to more complexities of the crisis. Today, Iran is on the edge of no return in terms of its factual crisis. Are we going to push it uh further and then what will be our responsibility uh towards security in the Asian and Iran or should we help Aan and help ourselves also uh to find the solutions and those solutions will not be uh by the hammer by by other ways. Thank you. **[3:08:39] Speaker B:** Thank you Muhammad. survived. **[3:08:45] Speaker B:** It showed some resilience. Has it reinvented itself as 2.0? Therefore, carry on as it was completely ignoring the opposition. Um, its legitimacy coming from the doctrine that we accustomed to. Or do you think one day either the regime itself reintegrate its people and its opposition or do you think the opposition at the moment uh is organized enough has got sufficient structure and leadership inside outside the country we do hear every now and then upurge of demonstrations killings and then suppression and then move on so that in the long term we don't know if the Iranian regime is actually a regime or Iran is nationalism and people and the identity of Iran becomes more important or is it the regime that we're talking about? So do tell us and with Dina afterwards maybe the same question so that I don't have to spend time uh repeating the same question. **[3:09:51] Speaker B:** Tell us about this dynamic of regime versus the opposition. Look, on this uh topic too, I think uh it's important to um see it and look at it as a process rather than something that just happened as a result of this war. Um as I said the process of regime transformation with an eye to post ali era and uh the succession had already started and was ongoing for almost a decade. And uh people who were closely observing the dynamics within the Islamic Republic were already anticipating uh system in which the IRGC would have uh the upper hand and uh either as an institution or as a constellation of actors affiliated with the IRGC and the military security establishment. it would uh basically play uh the key role. Uh so part of that process when it comes to the identity of the system because obviously as I said uh among the two pillars of the um survival and stability of the Islamic Republic one was the clerical which **[3:11:08] Speaker B:** was um which had to do with the um ideological/revolutionary um side of the system. So uh we started to see uh sort of a reinvention of uh Iranian identity in terms of nationalist um discourse but in a way that would uh eventually justify u the uh Islamic Republic's uh policies and a clear example of that a clear manifestation of that was about how in uh many instances the uh Iranian regional policy used to be justified by uh not just officials but also uh the people who uh used to be sort of aians of uh the uh Iranian government. So uh for example, the Iranian intervention in Syria was depicted as um I mean from a security perspective as part of extending Iran's strategic depth. But um I can refer to for example the words of Yahim Safavi, the former chief commander of the IRGC who said not long ago actually in 2024 that uh for the third time in history uh Iran has reached **[3:12:30] Speaker B:** the shores of the Mediterranean. The first time was under Cyrus the Great. The second time was under Xerxis and the third time is thanks to the resistance fronts i.e. Lebanese Hezbollah that Iran is present in the Mediterranean. So trying to depict Iranian expansionism in the region in sort of an pre-Islamic imperial uh form and I can tell you that uh it has uh some support among the uh core base of the Islamic Republic. So the evolution is already happening. So let's park it here. Uh speak about the uh broader population. We saw a major um uprising already in January and that was an inflection point of a series of protests that we have seen over the past few years and uh uh violent uh suppression of the protesters resulted in the killing of thousands of people. Um so what I can uh see is that uh for the majority of the Iranian population and they are really feel um disconnected uh from the system um and especially after the uh suppression. **[3:13:43] Speaker B:** So uh this sense of hopelessness is really there. There was a moment when some people especially the diaspora opposition but also inspired by them. People inside the country were u hoping that some form of an humanitarian intervention would help them but then the scale of the war and the civilian casualties um basically have left them between the rock and the hard place. uh so that's about the majority of the society and as long as that process of transition that I told you about uh is ongoing this is uh sort of the best case scenario for uh the Iran governments why I'm saying this because there is a majority that is um for now in check by the means of intimidation and suppression and uh a minority of hardcore supporters of the Islamic Republic which uh is prepare to support the system which we saw uh almost every sing not almost actually literally every single night on the streets supporting the uh Islamic Republic. **[3:14:52] Speaker B:** So can this be sustainable? I really doubt it. Um so what I expect is that uh once the war ends there's going to be attempts at extending this idea of Iranian nationalism as the new pillar of the ident of the legitimacy of the system uh toward the broader population. some form of a um security state uh with uh much less emphasis on revolutionary ideology. And by the way, a very interesting trend is that uh now uh there is u evident uh discontent uh within the security establishment toward the more ideologically oriented side of the system uh the so-called uh paid camp uh the stability front uh uh who is which is affiliated to say jali the former nuclear negotiator. So um and this is not only my uh expectation. There are other people who think the same way that there's going to be a purge of the ultra hardliners um consolidation of the security role and probably an attempt at redefining the legitimacy of the system. **[3:16:02] Speaker B:** Is it going to be successful or not depends on a lot of factors economy included but this is the process as I see it. **[3:16:09] Speaker A:** Thank you. **[3:16:09] Speaker A:** Thank you Kimari Shafi. Um just to add two things because I think Ham Jazz covered it pretty well. Um the first thing is regarding the opposition. Uh the opposition that most people sitting outside Iran is acquainted with is one individual based in the US. Um he's made a lot of noise. He has a lot of support outside the country. arguably he had a decent amount of support inside the country before uh the war uh and and uh and was perhaps one of the instigators of the protests in January. The problem is um this is someone who you know hasn't lived inside the country for many years. Uh the the movement is not a very inclusive movement. So while some people support it, many are anti- that movement. Um, and like many things that involve the Iranian public, it's created a lot of divisions, a lot of anger. **[3:17:06] Speaker A:** So, it's not it's not a it's not for me, it's not a he's not a viable member of the opposition. In looking when you're looking inside the country, there are grassroots movements and there have always been uh grassroot grassroots movements inside Iran. You have to consider that the Islamic Republic um there has always been protests. So, this is not nothing surprising. We've had nationwide protests for many years. Um uh again, it's nothing new, but those grassroots move movements have not been allowed to grow to germinate. They they've been um repressed obviously. Um so there's no real viable opposition inside the country either. Now there are different elements within the diaspora who are trying to organize but we are so far off from a real viable opposition that could actually um take advantage of protests and of the struggles of the Islamic Republic to to change the leadership that I think that today that's uh that's really far away. **[3:18:07] Speaker A:** The second thing that I would add is that um the Islamic Republic was having to deal with multiple crises in January. A political one, an economic one, uh an environmental one, a social one. It's what led to the protests. Um the war allowed the leadership to consolidate itself. So effectively they shoved all of those crises under the rug, put on a wartime mentality uh and blinders and are now operating in this uh in this scenario of first we need to get through this and then we'll deal with everything else after the war. Um that means that they've consolidated themselves. They are in a stronger position that they were in January. So effectively the war actually pushed back any prospect of change in government in Iran. Um, but those crises haven't gone away. In fact, the war has exacerbated many of them. The one that we're most aware of is the economic one, obviously, but also the the cost of rebuilding once all of this is over. **[3:19:07] Speaker A:** That means that should we get to a real postwar situation, which I I don't believe we're in right now, but if we get to it, then the leadership is going to have to contend with these crises again, they're not going to be able to keep shoving them under the rug in the hopes that people will forget. People have to eat. inflation has to come under control. Unemployment has to be tackled. Um, and there is no easy path to that. That's why you see a lot of the technocrats today focusing very much on the economic benefits that they could possibly get out of a deal with the US in order to say, "Okay, well, we have something to show for what we went through in this war." Um, but the but that's not going to be enough to tackle these crises. And I think many within the leadership are hyper aware of this and are very worried about what's going to happen the day after this wartime scenario is over. **[3:20:00] Speaker B:** Thank you. **[3:20:00] Speaker B:** Um Kenyan um Ammani can you confirm the time because this shows that we have half an hour more but I my my watch says maybe 15 but we have 30 minutes more. **[3:20:12] Speaker A:** It is **[3:20:13] Speaker B:** excellent. In that case, this will give us a chance for another round before we go to questions. Um, and I'm going to come to the Gulf now. Um, and and for both um, uh, your good self and Muhammad, uh, we are seeing a lot of movement in the Gulf. U, uh, realignments, alignments, um, different ways together sometimes. But we do see Saudi Arabia uh engaging Pakistan and and Turkey and possibly one day Egypt and others. Um we are not here to comment on the credibility of that because this is a long-term issue and we are not talking about alternatives to America because this is not what it is. Emirates is doing its own thing having its own alignment and if you ask an Iranian they think we should be part of that. So uh in an ideal scenario we we need stability. We need uh whatever creates an equilibrium that allows economy, trade and prosperity. **[3:21:18] Speaker B:** Uh so you tell us what's going on in terms of this uh these different arrangements because we are still in a war uh setting. Uh we are not really talking about normal uh phase of of this uh era. So tell us what is going on and decipher the the fears the future and this alignments that are still in flux please. Uh **[3:21:49] Speaker B:** uh does the UAE take a different direction or its own direction if we are talking about development stability and prosperity and the well-being of the people. Uh if this is different than other countries then the UAE will choose this path. If the UAE comes one day and will sit uh on around the table not on the table then the UAE will choose different team. If the UAE one day will have discussions with others uh from a strong point uh without losing or giving too much and then we will choose that. Uh so clearly the UAE is looking for development stability and is fully aware that development and stability cannot be achieved unless there is an environment of peace and stability uh to each that development. And the other point regarding uh a different uh direction the UAE starts from a clear point in the Gulf country is uh we believe that there is a Gulf uh foundation and it should be solid to overcome challenges **[3:23:12] Speaker B:** and should be flexible and able for development and to be a blueprint for others. So the perspective that his excellency an G shared that our perspective is that uh that's that block that will have clear understanding maybe some specific movements in one direction or the other but if at the end we have one goal which is the stability of the Asian and preserving the gains of the Gulf countries and partnership of developments ments. This is the main thing we want now and since we are talking about so our perspective from the UAE towards others uh sometime there was a name in Iran uh calledin so a power inside the regime and a power outside the regime. And it's about and it's criteria set by the former leader power within the regime is the power that believes in the in so I look at the UAE from I look at this from different perspective ways this regime **[3:24:36] Speaker B:** of would it be a power inside the the cycle of power and outside of the power. So this contrast when we have the president of the public who comes and apologize to the Gulf counties and then few minutes later uh the evolutionary guards attack the Gulf counties and then I also attack the ships. So here we are talking about the Iranian regime within power inside the regime and outside the regime. So now the way we look at from the UAE from the Gulf is with whom are we talking with whom are we looking for to achieve stability today like you said cooperation with other countries is at the end. The idea is what is the main premises that we have if we have interwined the networks the main network is the one of national security of each country. The UAE has proved that in the same in the same cycle the the cycle of the GCC countries and then we can welcome other cycles that will be interconnected with us to achieve stability and peace but we should **[3:26:03] Speaker B:** not focus mainly in the Gulf cycle to enhance that immunity and the power. uh I think we need to view that the Iranian perspective I'm saying here where is the cycle the impactful cycle and and how there will be cycles inside the regime who will be outside that that cycle uh it looks like GC in a cycle and Mushta in another cycle and maybe one day they will be it will be like Muhammad like a power outside the cycle of the regime. **[3:26:47] Speaker A:** Iran since from the very outset um has been a player difficult player. Um Iraq invaded Iran and changes in their their mindset ever since. So security because of what we did in Iraq and and the rest of the world supported Iraq. The mindset in Iran changed became security security. So one couldn't blame them at the time but for them to carry on they created concerns in the Gulf. This is probably the essence why GCC was formed. Not that they stayed united or integrated. Not that they were successful but that that was the reaction. Ever since there has been a lot of reaction in the in the region and the most recent one has been these realignments and clearly uh Saudi and and other Gulf countries want something out of um Turkey and Turkey want something out of them. The same with Pakistan. What is uh noticeable is that Saudi sought enrichment um uranium enrichment facilities from both the United States but maybe one day from Pakistan and remember Pakistan is the one that helped Iran to have a nuclear program, help North **[3:28:04] Speaker A:** Korea to have a bomb. What would stop Pakistan to sell to help Saudi to have a bomb? Do you think we might see a nuclear race regionally? If Iran carries on, survives, carries on with the same pace towards nuclear enrichment and possibly a bomb, we might see the Gulf. It's has got the money, they've got the links, they've got the alignment, the the um partnerships. Do you think we're heading that way in the future if we don't deal with it? How **[3:28:38] Speaker A:** you are in many issues actually uh I think that the main victim of what happened last year is the concept of deterance in the Asian the Iranian regime like it's known has been uh working in its equation on three pillars it's a missile system uh and militia system uh as part of the deterrence and also the idea of the nuclear program and using it as part of the deterrence. But uh given uh uh the fact that United States and Israel were focusing a lot on the militia uh the system of militia became weak and that led to question on how uh to restore uh the deterrence system and that lead to different uh points and the first thing was uh to give more importance to the issue. view of missile program. Ian was started sticking to the missile program and found it as uh shelter in case there is a to the Indian regime and that should not be subject to any discussion. **[3:30:02] Speaker A:** And the other thing regarding the change of the nuclear doctrine and to make the nuclear weapon part of the equation of deterrence in Aan and this was a part also of different setbacks that we can see between Aan and it in this level of deterrence. And then the third uh proposal which is most diffic most dangerous which is to exert pressure the neighbors uh and then came the idea of the trait of hormones and pressure on the economies of the Gulf countries. So that these countries become also um means to restore uh the deterrence uh system and to uh avoid the war but uh as we know in the strategy like uh in the games you can't use the same card twice. So when Aan felt that uh the war could come back again uh they developed this uh hypothesis to go towards the fur the neighbors and then started thinking about hitting Europe or iting bigger geog geographies and expanding the **[3:31:28] Speaker A:** geographies of their targets. And uh within this uh uh this context uh the the political power uh kept being divided inside Iran on whether negotiations taking place with the United States are part according to the uh conspiracy theory is part of the overthrow of the Iranian regime or the American uh diet. action or is America using it as a tool to reach the ultimate goal or is it something on purpose and maybe inside this could lead to different solutions uh last uh last point the war led to a change in the military doctrine and intelligence doctrine of Ian and I think This will be uh very important in the months and the coming coming months and coming years and IRGC will structure the uh systems uh and its intelligence and security apparatus after the absence of the supreme leader. **[3:32:52] Speaker B:** She came back. **[3:32:53] Speaker A:** I understand. I'm aware. I'm aware. But Samir Taki and Hanifaki get ready for your questions. **[3:32:59] Speaker B:** Yes. **[3:32:59] Speaker A:** Uh but just before that I just wanted to open it for discussion. Before that I wanted Hamid's reaction to very very briefly to whatever we discussed about this regional alignment and and Dina um was offline for a bit so she might have missed the main question. I'm going to spare her that but uh Hamid you can uh briefly discuss that. **[3:33:23] Speaker B:** Sure. I mean on the um issue of uh changing doctrine I think um what was just said um is very important because uh just as uh the Iran Iraq war in the 1980s had a significant impact on uh strategic thinking of the uh Iranian leadership and led to uh the whole ideas of forward defense strategic depths and so on. We are already seeing signs of a rethinking of uh the national security doctrine uh and um at the same time uh very widespread debate on uh the value of uh nuclear weapons. Uh there is still no indication that uh Iran especially after the attacks on its nuclear facilities does have the capacity to develop a nuclear weapon. But the fact that this has come to the surface and is being discussed so widely uh in the public and also by um um referred to by uh semi-official figures is uh very important. **[3:34:25] Speaker B:** I think uh what we can see so far is that um and this is again something that the Iranian officials are quite open about that uh the so-called strategic patience that define their policy especially visav Israel and by extension uh toward the uh United States trying to manage the conflict uh has gone away and now uh they are even ready to act uh preemptively and in a more offensive manner as we saw already in July in the attack that they conducted against the US base in Jordan. Um so these are the new elements and in terms of uh so military and security policy no strategic patience uh more offensive strategy and also uh potential preeemption together with the uh a potential nuclear elements are the ones that we need to take into **[3:35:14] Speaker A:** Thank you. **[3:35:15] Speaker A:** Thank you so much Samir Samir Taki. **[3:35:19] Speaker B:** Thank you very much. I'm really very much uh happy to this very deep discussion and uh actually thank you very much. Um my question could be a bit wide but depend on what you would like to reply on. I'm very much concerned and we are I'm working in the Atlantic Council and actually we are following the political economy changing now after what had happened after the war and the main issue is what how do you assess the uh social bases and socioeconomic bases especially when you mention the the fact of the consolidation and decentralization those two factor will have new dynamics in terms of the alliances, loyalty system and the control of the state itself. Uh I think here we are following the uh command and control of the state at the civil level. I'm not speaking on the on the military. So if you can add any ideas on those issues that would be thankful. **[3:36:28] Speaker A:** Thank you Hani. **[3:36:30] Speaker B:** Uh thank you very much. Um my question to those who know about inside Iran. Uh the war revealed some capabilities that Iran had that we probably did not know uh related to drones to very sophisticated missiles and most importantly to targeting capabilities. uh the fact that these things have developed uh under 47 years of very honorous controls and sanctions uh was surprising to many people. And my question to those who understand what goes on inside Iran is that how did these things develop? Who within the organization uh government if Iran was responsible for it? How did they coexist with this clergy dominated type government and and rule? Uh and to what extent uh uh they received support from outside uh that got them to develop those kind of uh missiles and sophistications. What other capabilities do you believe that exist that have not yet been revealed that could surprise the world in the future? **[3:37:44] Speaker A:** Thank you. um the two questions or the several questions within those two questions are interconnected. So I'm going to give you the chance to respond to to these in your own way. But I'll start with Dina because these are the questions that you heard. Well, the other one uh you were disconnected. So please go ahead and tackle them the way you wish. **[3:38:06] Speaker B:** Sure. Um I'll probably focus on the second one a little bit more. Uh, in terms of Iran's military capabilities, yes, they're very widespread. Um, many of those of us watching Iran, who have been watching Iran now for a long time, um, were aware that they had some pretty sophisticated capabilities because Iran has invested a considerable amount of time, effort, and money into developing its missile um, uh, arsenal. Um, it it did it through a variety of means by developing dual use uh mechanisms and and processes but also through uh collaboration not not so much collaboration but I guess I guess purchases of parts and components from various other external parties um and as you rightly pointed out all of that under stringent sanctions um and under the Islamic Republic at a time where state finances were on and off dwindling um uh Which by the way **[3:39:11] Speaker B:** goes to show that this, you know, the the stringent sanctions that Iran has been under hasn't really affected its ability to a invest in programs that are problematic to the rest of the world from the nuclear to the missile and b uh uh work, collaborate and send money to groups in the in the region. Um contrary to what uh perhaps many in Washington believe. Um **[3:39:37] Speaker A:** can you make it can you make it brief? uh data **[3:39:41] Speaker B:** can you make it brief your your replies also **[3:39:46] Speaker A:** yeah um just one more thing I'll say Iran has developed a military political relationship also with Russia and China um and this throughout the period that there was the the weapons ban and weapons uh blockade on Iran um that was put in place by the UN so uh they've also helped in the development of Iran's programs but by and large uh these These are massive programs that Iran developed um on its own and has invested heavily in. **[3:40:14] Speaker B:** Okay. Thank you. Um I'll come to you um Sultan answer the questions if if you have any comments but you don't have to. **[3:40:22] Speaker A:** No I do. **[3:40:23] Speaker B:** Okay. **[3:40:26] Speaker A:** Okay. Um, **[3:40:30] Speaker B:** I think there are three uh elements and I remember one of my close friends whenever he speaks he says three points. I I think the change of the military doctrine in in Iran we need to all when whenever Trump says there there's he says no the Iranian regime and not so so the Iranian regime has no maritime forces they were all drowned oh the danger is not in those forces because although the conventional uh force should exist. We have ballistic missiles and drones and all those attacks in the Gulf count is where because of ballistic missiles and missiles and in the past uh countries could not have missiles system. Now you can you imagine the Houthis from 2015 till now they have program of ballistic missiles. So now the threats from the Indian regime is still existing and very developed because of ballistic missile because of the drones and because of the militias in the Asian. **[3:41:49] Speaker B:** So three elements are important for the Iranian regime and it will always make it s of danger for other countries. These are the three elements unfortunately that we cannot overcome unless we have one thing which is important and not three point to uh make it costly for theian regime and unfortunately Dr. in the Gulf country is all our development is on the ground but the Iranian regime the Indian regime its development is under the ground for and we're talking about missiles and others and but is the Iranian regime caring about economy development and everything theian regime needs to be open to everyone else to achieve development but for survival for its survival theranian regime is to communicate with China and so how can we make it costly on the regime? This is the main question that we need to think about very briefly. Yeah. Um I think actually the two questions are somehow related and um although I'm not an expert on economy but uh what I can say is that u this whole uh complex pressure uh that's been uh there on the **[3:43:19] Speaker B:** Islamic Republic in terms of the sanctions and and so on um has actually u in a very uh interesting way shaped and reshaped the um uh not just uh internal dynamics of the country and uh the variety of patronage networks that have been uh formed uh but also uh its military strategy and by extension its uh regional policy because uh one of the um issues that's been uh usually uh discussed uh when uh speaking about the uh implications of the sanctions has been that uh how uh it has led to the emergence of networks from within the revolution. utionary guards from within the security establishment that has been involved in uh circumventing the sanctions and through that actually benefiting. So this kind of a variety of mafia-like networks that has been shaped uh has been very effective in u as a decentralized means of control from uh within the country because there's just a network of interests that are **[3:44:28] Speaker B:** there uh regardless of the ideological side of the uh system or regardless of its revolutionary identity. That's one of the things that has been very crucial in saving the system. And at the same time because this existential mindset has been there uh the the the sense of so-called the strategic loneliness in the region the priority has always been on uh funding the military uh program funding the uh regional partners and non-state actors in order to uh secure it as part of their military strategy. So this is what I can tell. **[3:45:04] Speaker A:** Thank you question. **[3:45:05] Speaker B:** Forgive me Muhammad. I'm going to take those two final questions then come to you. So sudden you had you changed your mind. Yeah. Okay. You changed your mind. **[3:45:13] Speaker A:** No, no, no. **[3:45:14] Speaker B:** You you're back on. Okay. Fine. Fire away. I know. Fire away. **[3:45:21] Speaker A:** So ask uh **[3:45:23] Speaker B:** quick question. Uh it's uh weird that uh during such crisis that uh we talk uh about uh uh kuda in the military is that excluded in Aan if we took uh into consideration diversions between the army and IC and different defenses they have and also the security infiltration that led to the killing of the first lines. and which is like the acceptable institution inside there will be no oppositional **[3:46:06] Speaker A:** again you went off and on **[3:46:08] Speaker B:** yeah where is it **[3:46:10] Speaker A:** yeah I think we have here **[3:46:12] Speaker B:** uh thank you I have a question regarding the in the the inside of the Iranian society did theian societ society uh view on the regime changed because of the uh American Israeli war on Iran because America uh because it looking it at it as an existential war **[3:46:40] Speaker A:** of you the only **[3:46:42] Speaker B:** capable of answering these questions I'm going to end it there please **[3:46:48] Speaker A:** thank you Mr. for the question and Mr. And yes, we need to listen carefully to the Indian people now and uh we need to uh give space to uh internal mechanism to function because those mechanism have been disrupted since February of this year because of the existential threats and irresponsible statements and unclear uh goals of the war led to some sort of existential initial threats among different uh parts of theian society. The Indian society since the beginning of the evolution they were demonstrating and uh taken to the states and they were but we need to give the opportunity to those people so that they can come up with solution from inside. Sultan you have to second the Indian regime was ahead of us in tin and most of the leaders in the military from IGC the other point uh can we uh can we have from the IRGC I can tell **[3:48:03] Speaker A:** you there is a font uh it's just a facade facade for the the Islamic evolution and behind it there is the Ianian uh nationalism. When the evolutionary gods reached Lebanon, they said we are back again. So the nationalism is there. What can change as a complete uh change is a leader from the IRGC who would get rid of that co-option and will move to Iranian Iranian nationalism and will lead the model as is the case now for Pakistan. But is this uh nationalism in is this nationalism for inan will be better for the GCC count is or not if the and and lots of people went to **[3:49:00] Speaker B:** and they didn't win it because Trump's policy I think it was both of the issues was in both election it was cost of living and the rest well and uh uh some aid agreements but it still remains the cost of living. Now you can say that's because of the war in Iran. Maybe that's because of the uh some of the Democrats try to uh uh depict like the the cost of living is because of the aid to Israel. But I don't think this is the case. **[3:49:27] Speaker A:** Now it's true that **[3:49:28] Speaker B:** it's the perception of course the perception **[3:49:31] Speaker A:** 100% especially among the media. But I think if you go to uh to the to most of most campaigns inside the the different states, you see that it wasn't the main issue. The main issue was cost of living and the president's policy especially in Texas, in Kansas, in Ohio, in these places that the Democrats actually gained seats. It was not because of Israel. I understand why uh Vice President Vance is saying that probably as a if I were his political advisor, I would recommend that he will do that. But I uh think that campaign wise that's that's wasn't the main issue. Uh I think in the ne in the new Congress there are a lot of people who are very close and have a strong relations to Israel and the numbers of the new Congress members that are not friends of Israel is not as high as people think. **[3:50:22] Speaker A:** Uh I think it was in panel number two that Dana Stroll talked about reassessment. Now my colleagues are younger and don't remember 1975 reassessment but this is not a good word in Israel politics. uh but I think it's uh it's a necessity that we uh we are facing and Israel and United States will have some kind of a reassessment on their on their policies and I think the region will have a reassessment because it's not only Israel uh for example I think I heard the new senator from Michigan talking about the human rights in Egypt uh and how he would put pressure on the government of Egypt on this issue. It's going to be a lot of uh challenges but I think there's a lot of work. Now the story and the narrative that Israel and the United States has been going along for the last 70 years was based on the fact that we had shared values. **[3:51:14] Speaker A:** Uh the Zionist movement was established as a very liberal movement and the last couple of Israeli government were not that liberal and I think both parties in the United States Democratic and and the Republicans have changed a lot as well. So we will have to come up with a new narrative and a new story uh that will make sure that we both earn from this relationship and I'm pretty positive that will be the case. **[3:51:41] Speaker B:** Optimistic **[3:51:42] Speaker A:** optimistic. Yes. I I I anyway the push back is that I think it's not just a story right it be a policy and I'll get to this in a second but Zor I want to follow up on this because one thing that is seems to be a rare consensus on both sides of the political divide in Washington is there's no appetite for more Middle East wars and um if we look at Israel's if we assume that this war whether it resumes or not the end of we're going to see the end of at some shape or form soon. How do you see Israel's future policy on Iran going forward? Uh assuming a reduced US footprint in the Middle East and maybe another attempt at pivoting to Asia. **[3:52:33] Speaker B:** Basically, we and the Iranian used to have outstanding relationship till uh the Iranian revolution as you know in the 79. Since then, the Iranian decided that they don't like us so much and they want to destroy and eliminate the states of Israel based on their we took it personally. I mean, in the last 50 years, the Iranian revolution promised to the Iranians to become an superpower, regional superpower with nucle military nuclear capabilities with fl economic flourish and things like that. It seems to me that after the last two years, Iran is not in the same place that the revolution used to promise their own people. Almost 100 million people in Iran right now are in a very, let's say, problematic situation right now. The fact that Iranian used to be very aggressive and launch without any reason 300 ballistic missiles, cruise cruise missiles, UAVs against the states of Israel at U April 24 and later on another 200 thousands of ballistic missiles and **[3:53:50] Speaker B:** rockets against the UAE, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar. We saw the nature of what happened over here. Not mentioning the proxies, not mentioning the Houthis, not mentioning, not mentioning Hamas. Now the issue is very simple. If the Iranian are going to give up their vision and their pursue after a military nuclear bomb, this is the most important issue. The second one is to stop the aggressiveness in the Middle East against all the partners over here in the Gulf States. Um, and this is the second. It seems to me that we can find a solution over here. As long as the Iranian will continue to push, eventually somebody will have to deal with them. like it like in the last three years for the time being Americans and mainly President Trump and this administration trying to engage the American the Iranians in order to try to cut kind sort of a deal about these **[3:55:00] Speaker B:** two key elements not mentioning the last um conversation that you used to have over here when Iranian decided to block the straits of form. So it seems to me there is kind of couple of issues strategic issues the nuclear the ballistic missiles the energy meaning the straight to form that the international community basically have to deal with that Israel is not the issue we like to see that there will be eventually solution to this issue it's not by coincidence that we never um I think the Iranian from a strategic point of view made a mistake by launching the ballistic missiles two years ago. They don't have anything with to threat anymore. It seems to me that the region know how to deal with that. The Americans have done outstanding job how to protect the Gulf States and how to protect Jordan and how to protect Iraq and other places in the Middle East. **[3:56:00] Speaker B:** And it seems to me that we have kind of window right now that if we will work smartly, we can ease the tension a bit in the Middle East. A bit. But I want to emphasize not only that because of the last two years, we have couple of windows of opportunities. First of all, it's after 40 or 50 years that Lebanon we have a chance to a different kind of waves and administration in Lebanon. president on and his prime minister his ballet is much more weaker because what we have done in the last two years over there we have opportunity where's the problem nobody is dealing significantly how to solve the problem in Lebanon how to kick out and to give the Lebanese and the Lebanese army a chance to take over Lebanon and to diverse the situation in Lebanon. We have opportunity over here and sadly if the Europeans, the Americans, the Arab countries are not going to help the Lebanese, we're going to miss outstanding opportunities. **[3:57:04] Speaker B:** We'll have to do it as well as Israel. I think that after the Gaza campaign, we'll have also some opportunities over here. It's already a year since Trump 19 points or whatever the peace plan of Trump. For the time being, we're stuck. There is not enough money. there is not enough resources. Everybody were promising to send so many aids. Nothing for the time being is done enough for that. So if I'm looking from the strategic picture as you spoke about Iran and what happening right now in the two years, I think that we have couple of opportunities that all of us the good guys need to reshape, relax a bit and to try to carry on some of the plans that we uh used to have. get to Tamir in a second but I just want to ask we don't know if those leaks are correct but there are different reports of possible agreement with Iran that speaks about uh limited enrichment and down blending of **[3:58:02] Speaker B:** the highlyenriched uranium not very different than the JCPOA that AI just mentioned with very active Israeli opposition to undermine the agreement would there and I think you know it could be a yes or no from you and I'd love Tamir's view also would would now Israel be more amenable to such an agreement or Israel would uh feel that it's not abided by such an agreement. **[3:58:25] Speaker A:** Define Israel. **[3:58:26] Speaker B:** Define Israel. Okay. Sar just one yes no **[3:58:31] Speaker A:** Israel always we are not against agreement. I think that somebody that know the Middle East understand that 17 years in the Middle East is like nothing and the sunset that used to be in the JCPOA was not serious. And the fact that we gave to the Iranian the ability to spin and to reach to 60% of uranium was a mistake as well. Eventually everything will find a way how to sort it out in in agreement. I would say that as for Netanyahu, even if the Supreme Leader will convert it into Judaism and sign the Zionistic Accord, he would not sign a deal with Iran because according to Netanyahu, the only solution is the collapse of this regime and any lifeline by any means is not acceptable. But as said before that depends what kind of Israel are you asking and I would comment another things all three options right now in terms of strategy against Iran all of them has flaws and all three of avenues **[3:59:41] Speaker A:** are not on Israel's uh sovereignity. If uh you go to uh uh the military option, it seems like we have tried everything from killing the supreme leader, destroying the infrastructure, killing all of their command and control except for extensive national infrastructure destruction that will end up with a regional destruction of equivalent essence. We have tried everything and the only solution in order to achieve a regime change is a ground massive ground operation conducted by United States and it seems like nobody has its appetite a deal I don't think that the Iranian will make the necessary concession in order to sign a comprehensive deal that is better than the JCPOA. The maximum they will reach is an intermediate deal and they will eventually not not abandon the idea that nuclear capabilities and nuclear deterrence are the only guarantee for the survivor of this regime. And a no war no deal situation like we are facing right now takes a lot of time and nobody knows which clock will tick first the nuclear talk clock or the collapse the regime collapse and by by historical **[4:01:08] Speaker A:** presidents under severe pressure external pressure those kinds of regime does not collapse from inside on the contrary they are being more and more supported by the regime so there's not a lot of sense of them cutting the lifeline and going to protest against the regime. So and and we can see that in the meanwhile where are we speaking right now we are in a certain and no war no deal situation if you look what is happening inside Iran in terms of accumulated strategic threats it's very troubling the evidence that they are reconstitutions their lost capabilities so all three are false what's the best first of all nobody knows I think there's a huge perplexity and a huge discomfort of all all three strategies. We know that according to Iranians officials and thinkers after a certain period of quiet and ease of this tension there might be in the future internal opposition that will uprise as we've seen in the historical presidents of USSR **[4:02:23] Speaker A:** and etc. those kinds of reform, those kinds of evolving internal oppositions rise just on the verge of of release of power. So in the meanwhile, we should make sure that they will never have strategic capabilities that will threaten the region in Israel by various of capabilities and efforts that we that stretch from special operations to intelligence. Secondly, we should somehow mitigate the problem by some form of an intermediate deal and uh eventually prepare ourselves militarily to dash into operation if the for some reason they will return back to becoming a threshold nuclear state or do some extensive work on the non unconventional weapons that they are trying to promote. **[4:03:25] Speaker B:** Thank you. **[4:03:25] Speaker B:** And I think I think it is worth mentioning here that it depends what Israel is and he was uh you remember that Gaddy Eisenhot when he was chief of staff in uniform at a speech at INSS he did say that the JCPOA had advantages because it contained Iran's nuclear program. And of course this was something that I don't know if it's reflective of where he's thinking at the moment but clearly there's divergence in views in Israel even on this issue. But I want to continue with you uh Tamir. If there's a new government, and it's it's a big if, um it's going to be a heterogeneous coalition, uh there are numerous domestic internal challenges to deal with the regional issues, all these uh buffer zones that Israel now has across. Uh it's not the top maybe five, maybe not even the top uh 10 on the on the agenda of the incoming government yet. **[4:04:16] Speaker B:** The situation, I think, cannot wait. We're seeing uh the winter in Raza, what's happening in Lebanon, sanctions from Europe. I mean, so I can't wait. I I want to ask you sort of where do you see maybe the lowhanging fruit? What are the priorities? And I'll add to this because I do want to get to audience questions. You know, it's saving the best for last. No one wants to deal with it. But the Palestinian question, this is the most difficult question objectively for any Israeli government, let alone one that maybe doesn't have Smootri and Benvir and the coalition, but they will have them in the opposition. What do you propose going forward um on on all these? Well, I think the first thing needed is to replace leadership in Israel. Right now, Netanyahu himself is a toxic leader in terms of international standwide inside is inside United States and across the region. **[4:05:08] Speaker B:** It's been more it's he spent he exceeded the times necessary for leadership and it's it it became a personal issue. I'm not criticizing that from the political level. It's not it's a strategic analysis not a political point of view. Even if the liquood party takes the lead but it's a different identity, we'll get a grace period in order to make the necessary changes needed. Secondly, I think starting from lowhanging fruit, settler's violence, that's a consensus among Israeli that this is this phenomena is ugly. It's not aligned with Jewish values. It destroys our international standing. It promotes violence inside the Judah and Samaria, the West Bank and Gaza. So destruction, a full annihilation of this phenomena and I've been there, served there. I know that we can do that in a matter of days. It's only a matter of resources and and a will and it's can be it's going to be crushed. **[4:06:10] Speaker B:** Second, I think acknowledging the importance of peace agreement, the existent peace agreements. I would imagine a peace summit in UAE that brings to one table all of the countries that Israel signed peace with. Jordan, Egypt, UAE, Bah in Morocco, all of them under one table. The agenda is doesn't really important. The setting is important reflectant that Israel is returning back to this peace aspiring nation that doesn't really believe in an endless wars but see peace as aligned with security. Third, I would say that acknowledging the sovereignity and dignity of Arab states and stating that is we as as as long as we are currently uh conquering or taking over buffer zone in in Lebanon in in in in Syria. It is a temporary situation that will be changed as soon as we get some uh answer to our security threats there in to respect the the sovereign Arab states in the Middle East. **[4:07:24] Speaker B:** very important because there is this sense that Israel wants to be a haggamonic player that Israel want to disrupt the nation states and it's very important to state that then we are coming to the more problematic issues. Uh I think Gaza we should return back to the 20 points plan. It's a problem because of the bridging plan of Miladdin of the 15 points plan was rejected by Israel in the current situation that kamas controls Gaza. We should fix that because replacing kamas as the ruling entity of Gaza is one of the objectives of the war. So yes, we might end up with a situation that you have a technocratic committee that runs Gaza and beneath that there is a armed sections of kamas. It's bad, but it's better than the situation you have right now where kamas controls Gaza and controls the weapons. So it's a we need to choose the least problematic solution. **[4:08:30] Speaker B:** And I think it runs with the Israeli interest as long as we have this very deep buffer zone. there's no real h challenge to our security and we can take this calculated risk which will even help us when facing the threats or the or or the problems that Egypt has with Gaza and then last the most problematic and I think in this last aspect the no I I won't I don't have much expectation from the next coalition if it will be under guard eisenot which is a vision of separation from the Palestinian system. Nobody will ever say a Palestinian state and even mentioning a Palestinian state and two-state solution right now in Israel you end up hit getting hit by by tomatoes on stage. Nobody is really **[4:09:28] Speaker A:** is really thinking about that. But that doesn't mean that we don't have a vision of separation. That doesn't mean that we not we don't carry out the idea that the Palestinian should should have some independent sovereign identity that we need to discuss what how to name it state miners atom plus this demilitarized federation. The naming is is important and it should be a fresh new name but striking a vision even if it's a long term will signal positive to the region and to United States and I think those this might might be adopted by a certain coalition maybe more if it will go with the Arab parties that more definitely that it will go that way if it will be a coalition with the ultraorthodox less probable right now. **[4:10:30] Speaker B:** Okay, thank you. **[4:10:31] Speaker B:** So, we are getting some questions and we don't want to take more time since we are the ones separating between uh you and lunch. Uh so, I'll just open to questions. Uh Bisher, I see you, but I think you need to press a button so you get on so the mic works. But I'll start by the by the line here. So, we have Emin Kak. **[4:10:51] Speaker A:** Right. Thank you very much. My question to all speakers just give me two minutes please. **[4:10:58] Speaker B:** Since uh 200 years **[4:11:01] Speaker A:** only question please. We we we have no time. Only question. **[4:11:05] Speaker B:** Yes sure. So uh the former the former prime minister Madame Gold mayor former prime minister of Israel had an interview in UK TV 1970 and said that she had holder of Palestinian passport since from 1921 till 1948 and she was say she she said that call herself ainian at east and west bank was Philistine. How must said peace in the home and peace in the globe. This is a great word. My question is to all speakers. Why we are not seeking peace at home and peace at globe rather than trying to change a regime of a country thousands kilometers away from you. And we as Turkey neighbor 600 year with Iran. We never change our border lines and we are peacefully living together with any kind of regime with sha or without sha. Why you do not try to change your internal regime to integrate an Israel and festinian population together? **[4:12:22] Speaker B:** I was very happy when I visited 1992. **[4:12:27] Speaker A:** I seen all the direction tabas Arabic and Irani language. I was very happy and hopeful that **[4:12:35] Speaker B:** am I mean I'm sorry we have to we have to give the speakers the chance to answer. **[4:12:40] Speaker A:** No peace at all. **[4:12:41] Speaker B:** Okay. Who wants to take this? Sorry. Who wants to take this? **[4:12:45] Speaker A:** Please take all the question then **[4:12:47] Speaker B:** at one time. Okay. So um uh we have uh Bishair uh number second. **[4:12:54] Speaker A:** Thank you so much. This is a very interesting and fascinating session as always in relation to the dynamics and complexity of the dynamics of the internal Israeli politics. Now, someone as someone who had worked in a system and and and for those who don't know me, I'm the former prime minister of Jordan. I was heavily involved in peacemaking efforts in the region. uh uh and still a diehard committed person to comprehensive peace and to integration to quote you Shira of Israel as as as part of the region and and not just as a country and entity that's located geographic geographically within the region. Even the Trump plan, the 20 point plan uh which is creatively ambiguous spoke about a pathway to Palestinian self-determination. It did deviate from mentioning clearly uh statehood because understandably this might not have been something that's quite fashionable uh in terms of an expletative and term to use in Israeli politics post October 7th. **[4:14:05] Speaker A:** uh and the calamity and and ugliness that came with the killing of civilians in October 7th. uh but also the dynamics evolved uh and and the response so similar uh ugly manifestations in Gaza that have basically also I think deeply impacted the reputation of Israel globally and and and led to uh to some form of uh of isolation uh and maybe revision in Europe uh and a measure of isolation in in the US particularly by uh by human rights groups. Uh General Tamir, I I'm I'm fascinated with with with your your ability to be an a person of integrity and a straight shooter on identifying the possibles and the impossibles uh and uh and and your courage. uh but uh uh and I'm interested your your when your ideas about an entity with with with limited sovereignty **[4:15:15] Speaker B:** but but generally that again is not something that jives with the notion of self-determination because self-determination at one point in time should lead and would lead to a corrective decision by those who are in the process of exercising this right to decide what they want to do and and how would they want that to be uh crowned and ended. So they might choose at some point in the future statehood. Uh separation requires apparatuses, systems uh to basically run that part that has separated from the administration of the state. So how does that play out? Um uh those those questions require thinking and I think require a lot of answers. Thank you very much. Thank you, Bisher. Uh, next we have Albad al-Shhatari. **[4:16:07] Speaker A:** Well, thank you very much. Uh, I just have a question, a very quick one. Uh, I did see before February 28th that the region was moving toward more consiliation, especially after the Shawi Iranian agreement in Beijing. That's until Netanyahu was able to persuade uh President Trump to attack Iran and we are in this chaos because of that. So my question is, is there any rethinking about this issue in Israel? And is Israel going to double down and triple down on this path of war rather than finding a solution with different uh countries in in the region. Thank you. **[4:17:00] Speaker B:** Thank you. And last but not least, we have OD. **[4:17:06] Speaker A:** Thank you. I just have a simple question. Jordan is important to stability in the region to the Palestinian issue along with Saudi Arabia and the Saudis have made it clear we need a path to a Palestinian state. On top of that, the Arab League nations have all spoken about a Palestinian state. Why doesn't the Israelis respond more positively in spite of what you mentioned about what happened in Gaza and that you cannot talk about a Palestinian state at the moment but you have a vision. We've been talking about this vision since 1979 when Sadat went to Israel. How can the Israelis respond to the Jordanian Sudi and Arab wishes for reconciliation? Thank you. So you also it's a chance for final words. We'll have eight minutes **[4:18:16] Speaker B:** guys. I will try to to give more realistic approach to the Palestinian issue. All right. Peace, love, and understanding everybody wants. We used to have an earthquake on October 7. earthquake. It was after 20 years that Israel disengaged from Gaza completely, no settlements in Gaza, no IDF in Gaza, the Israeli lesson from October 7 that maybe we made a mistake. Whether it's true or whether or not, I'm not judgmental. I'm just describing what is after the second father. It took us like 20 years in order to recover from the second father and the suicide attacks. If somebody thinks that there will be two-state solution tomorrow morning, if even if the government in Israel we change completely the day after tomorrow, I suggest to relax a bit. We need to wrap it up. We need to cool off. We need to settle down. We need to close sins. **[4:19:20] Speaker B:** We are controlling right now 60% of Gaza. We need to go out. But if we're going out, that will create a vacuum that kamas will come in. The international community is not into it. As I said before, we need to take go out from Lebanon. We need not to go out from Lebanon without there is somebody that is not taking responsibility. And right now, the only one that have the ability to fill the vacuum is his bal again. So when you're looking about the picture after three years of a war and I just want to remind you that couple of days ago there was also a fear that there will be another American attack on Iran and we used to have question mark where we going to do this conference or not to flip after the three years in like a no time to peace love and understanding I suggest that we will be more a bit **[4:20:16] Speaker B:** realistic and try to close the seams, close to find the solutions, try to work out the Americans and the Europeans and the Arab countries in order to cool things off. And Israel will have to do also our part in this issue. But it's not going to be from today till tomorrow as a vision as to speak with the Saudis how to find a solution in order that Saudi will come to the Arab courts. No doubt that behind the scene we have to do it but it's not going to be with a magic sticks. Abu Mazen guys is over 90. He is for decades with stagnation corruptions billions of dollars and euros that vanished. He never visit Gaza after October 7. He haven't been in Gaza. So when we speaking about two-state solution for that it's between first of all between Gaza and the West Bank. **[4:21:09] Speaker B:** It's not one entity. So we have to be very much realistic and it's okay. You can criticize Israel. You can criticize that we need it's fine. But the issue is whether the criticism will change the reality. Let's try to work and to do whatever we need to do first of all to cool things off then we'll go about other big issues. **[4:21:33] Speaker A:** I see. **[4:21:34] Speaker B:** Just want to add to what Zoro said. I think uh if Eisenkot uh will be the prime minister, I think he will probably one will be one of the most moderate prime minister in the history of Israel. But even for him and his government, it will take time as Z said. But I think the most important thing is to go back on track towards these issues uh and not to be completely against it. I had the privilege of working with Prime Minister Ariel Chaon and when he was elected, he was very notorious around the world even inside Israel. But after 18 months in an office, he had he was the head of the government, the first government in the history of Israel that accepted a two-state solution in a official document. And two years later, he was the prime minister that actually evacuated Gaza during the disengagement process. **[4:22:21] Speaker B:** So I I think Israel needs a refresh, a new start, and to go back on track. But as well said, it's a process and it's not a a one month solution. It's going to take time. Thank you as Tamir. Well, first of all, it's not that simple to reach a solution in the Palestinian arena because as I laid before you, Israel, Israelis thinks that they've tried everything and the recent event in under prime minister when Israel is offered prime minister Israeli prime minister offered 97% with of the territories with land swap and it was rejected not by our by Abu Mazen because the right of return that reflects and echoes in Israel that it's not about land, it's about identity, it's about religion. And it for that reason, it is very hard to breach the lack of trust, frustration. Secondly, and I' I've tried to picture that in in colors when the invasion of October 7 happened, those butcher terrorists from Hamas held the Palestinian flag on their shoulder. **[4:23:36] Speaker B:** They were Hamas. They were not a PA, but we whoever in Israel watched those horrible pictures that was filmed by Hamas operatives. So Palestinian flag storming over nondisputed areas because those villages surrounding Gaza were is not a part of disputed area. That's sovereign Israeli state and their phone calls from the during the butchering to their families. We are taking back our lands. We are returning back and destroying. You can't wipe that off. And it will take time. It will take enormous effort by all of us to return back to sanity and back to responsibility and and for that reason we need a process and we need it very very we need it conducted. Secondly regarding the the what can be done. No Israel is no I would say there are radical left and radical right but apart from the radical right and radical left nobody wants the one state reality in Israel where it's either be an apartheite state that will **[4:24:52] Speaker B:** be boycotted and sanctions by by the rest of the world and that's the end of the Israeli dream of high-tech science culture etc etc or it will be an Arab state it will be a majority of Arabs in between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean will be a state. No Israel is in his right mind will adopt that kind of a strategy. So that is a huge potential. What is the problem? How you bridge be between the potential and the threat? The potential of avoiding a one-state reality and the threat we cannot trust them because they want to to destroy the the state of Israel. And between those two lines, we are introducing the idea of a limited sovereignity state or entity with limited sovereignity. That is full recognition of the sovereignity of the Palestinian entity with zero responsibility in terms of security, security, spectrum, air, borders, every that is under Israeli Israeli sovereignity. **[4:25:59] Speaker B:** We are basically taking area A, area B and part of area C in the west bank and consolidating it into one entity and that is a process that is intermediate stage in order to block the deterioration for a one-state reality. As for the normalization and this is my last sentence, Israel wants to be integrated in the Middle East. The problem of facing Iran does not contradict that. And and in February 28, it was not just that President that Prime Minister Netanyahu drove President Trump into the war. It's not true. President Trump saw the demonstration in the streets at the end of 25, early 26, and he said, "Help is on the way." He wanted to help. It's true that we have Israelis saw the accumulating threats and joined in and together they conducted what apparently seems like a strategic failure. But that was the story and I have no time to to clarify it. **[4:27:04] Speaker B:** It does not contradict the the will and the and the aspiration for integration and normalization. And I hope the pathway toward a limited sovereignity state a vision of separation might help Saudis and others in the region to normalize situation relationship with Israel. **[4:27:26] Speaker A:** Thank you Tamir. **[4:27:27] Speaker A:** So I'm just going to say this last week we marked 3 31 years since his Kakrabin was assassinated and minutes before his speech he spoke about how he fought for 27 years but he believed then it was a chance for peace and it's not maybe the chance for peace now but we all saying you know first replace the government and then create the conditions so the vision of peace comes later so we just now that we've solved all the problems please join me in thanking the panelists and the one and only Kisam Dr. **[4:27:59] Speaker A:** Thank you. **[4:28:13] Speaker A:** Ladies and gentlemen, please enjoy a 1-hour lunch break. **[4:28:31] Speaker A:** Heat. **[4:28:44] Speaker A:** Hey, Heat. **[4:29:07] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. **[4:29:21] Speaker A:** O **[4:29:26] Speaker A:** hey. **[4:29:43] Speaker A:** Hey. Heat. Heat. **[4:31:02] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. N. **[4:31:12] Speaker A:** Heat. **[4:31:31] Speaker A:** Heat. **[4:31:46] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. **[4:32:08] Speaker A:** Heat. **[4:32:29] Speaker A:** Hey, Heat. Heat. **[4:32:47] Speaker A:** Heat. **[4:32:55] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. **[4:33:17] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. **[4:33:46] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. **[4:33:51] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. **[4:34:11] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. **[4:34:36] Speaker A:** Heat. **[4:34:51] Speaker A:** Heat. **[4:36:49] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. N. **[4:37:27] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. **[4:37:49] Speaker A:** Yeah, **[4:37:59] Speaker A:** I am. Heat. Heat. N. **[4:38:35] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. **[4:39:08] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. **[4:39:51] Speaker A:** Hey. Hey. Hey. Heat. Heat. N. **[4:40:21] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. **[4:40:54] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. N. **[4:41:31] Speaker A:** Hey. **[4:41:37] Speaker A:** Hey. Hey. I'm telling you. **[4:42:55] Speaker A:** Hey **[4:43:00] Speaker A:** everybody. **[4:43:09] Speaker A:** Heat. **[4:43:21] Speaker A:** Heat. **[4:43:41] Speaker A:** Heat. Hey, heat. Hey, heat. **[4:45:09] Speaker A:** Yeah. Heat. **[4:45:38] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. **[4:46:53] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. N. **[4:47:25] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. **[4:47:34] Speaker A:** Heat. **[4:47:55] Speaker A:** Heat. **[4:47:59] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. N. **[4:48:35] Speaker A:** Hey. **[4:48:42] Speaker A:** Hey. Hey. **[4:49:00] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. **[4:49:46] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. N. **[4:50:10] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. **[4:51:22] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. **[4:52:10] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. N. **[4:52:32] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. **[4:52:54] Speaker A:** Hey, **[4:53:01] Speaker A:** hey, hey. **[4:53:27] Speaker A:** Heat. **[4:53:43] Speaker A:** Heat. **[4:53:50] Speaker A:** I'm **[4:54:04] Speaker A:** a dream. **[4:54:17] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. **[4:54:38] Speaker A:** Heat. **[4:54:59] Speaker A:** Heat. **[4:55:15] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. **[4:55:50] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. **[4:56:12] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. **[4:56:46] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. **[4:57:32] Speaker A:** Heat. Hey. Hey. Hey. Heat. Heat. N. **[4:58:22] Speaker A:** Heat. **[4:58:38] Speaker A:** Hey, Heat. **[4:58:46] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. **[4:59:07] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. N. **[4:59:28] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. N. **[4:59:48] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. **[5:00:27] Speaker A:** Heat. **[5:00:45] Speaker A:** Heat. **[5:00:51] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. Heat. **[5:45:59] Speaker A:** Ladies and gentlemen, Panel 10 entitled The New Arab Levant, States, Fault Lines, and the Politics of Reconstruction will start now. **[5:46:35] Speaker A:** This will be the 10th session from this forum uh which I've been aiming for 13 years to take part in it and indeed after 13 years in this journey in United Arab Emirates here I am with my family. Thank you for inviting me. Uh the new Arab Leant states and fault lines and the politics of construction. And this is a big title and difficult but we'll try to simplify it from Gaza to Damascus passing by Baghdad and Aman crisis their colleagues crisis of the Arabs are not disconnected but they are all connected. The the Asian is going through different transformation. and some countries are tying to again the control and armed forces are disputing decisions with them. We're talking about all these countries without exceptions and borders facing challenges not only security challenges but also economic challenges and today the wars has depleted them and this is compounded by displacements and others in the heart of these **[5:48:03] Speaker A:** changes. We can see the constructions counties that are willing to help and countries that are in need not by describing it as building what was destroyed by wars but as main factors for identifying the future of those count is how can those counties live and have a pulse again without the aid. Of course the question is who holds the decision and the leverage in those countries all of this and we should not forget the international competition and the original competition of this Asian I have a big question for this panel session. Are we uh witnessing uh the emergence of new ablant with stronger countries and more independent institution or are we just a distributing the between us while the crisises remain where they are and do not change and without solutions. This is the question uh for this panel for which I'm honored to have with me here his excellency Dr. **[5:49:18] Speaker A:** Basher Al Kasana former prime minister of Jordan and Dr. Pow senior fellow non resident from Washington and Dr. Samuel Alap known as senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Aik Center in Middle East program from Washington. Welcome to all of you and thank you to the attendees. Your excellency Dr. Bishop. Do you believe that we are witnessing the emergence of a new uh 11th or those old conflicts just taking a new names and they are the ones who still control? First of all uh Shantal allow me to uh express my thanks and appreciation to um my uh to Dr. KBI and MRS policy center for its strategic patience and is and organizing 13 editions of this debate and this is the first time that I'm honored to be here and I believe this will this debate will have an impact in the new lines in identifying the new uh lines of the policies and thank you to you and to your partner ers and those **[5:50:46] Speaker A:** uh who participated in the previous uh panel discussions to go back to your question miss Shantal I believe that today uh we are uh in Baines we are like waiting for the nap of the we are in the nap time and the destination depend on some elements of the the day after when uh the fluidity we are living now the the situation of non peace no war in the Gulf Asian and uh and disruption of the chain supply and energy supply and because of the instability and uncertainty and also the vulnerability of some systems and countries and Arab 11 after many uh control elements have been designed whether in Syria or in Lebanon. If we want to uh categorize this and we can say that Isra **[5:52:12] Speaker A:** and this also depends on behavior of Israel after the elections. This is why we are in the between uh we are uh in the phase of waiting uh what what happened until we reached this stage. Now what has changed is that we uh badly failed in producing uh collective approaches that will handle the challenges of the region in a way that responds to challenges of the region not only the levant and of course in my opinion to meet the Arab needs and I believe there was uh some leniency and from different uh sites and the official Arab systems. Even before the establishment of the European organization 50 or 60 years ago, it failed to have trade between them and our country is our uh organization failed to produce such systems because they could not produce networks of interest to benefit the population. in the population thought that they would be protected and have more investment. **[5:53:37] Speaker A:** Maybe I will stop you here doctor and want to intervene in a point where I disagree with you. I could say that there is a failure but I want to look for the reasons behind the failure and the problem not to blame only our counter and decision makers. We can't look at these counties now without asking uh who holds the who are the decision makers and I ask here Dr. Paul Salam, how can these countries now who are been taking the consequences of Ahmed militia that how can we gave them the sovereignty and make those countries stronger in a country now like Lebanon with Lebanese president? uh what prevents him from taking a decision of disarmament. **[5:54:37] Speaker A:** Uh thank you thank you Shantal and uh and thank you also to Dr. Sam and her long journey in this debate and for inviting us. Let me comment first on your question regarding the 11th. Definitely the 11th uh is made up of different countries. I think that the change in Syria in Lebanon in the last two years is a historic and important change but where it will lead us and how long it will last we don't know yet. But there is a profound change in the position of Syria and this is Asian all there is a big change in Lebanon not like what happened in Syria but a big change with the the weakening of Hezbollah and the opening between IRGC and the Lebanon and Hezbollah but also for Lebanon the change that is the change that happened in Syria because the organization you mentioned they were not NGO organization you mentioned is Iranian organization that was **[5:55:51] Speaker A:** established in Lebanon for strategic Iranian reasons in cooperation with Assad regime. This was a project of counties and if we look at other countries in the 11 there are different paths. Jordan has a different part. It did not go to such historic change like it happened in Syria for the Palestinian Israel part which has become worse and Palestinian suffer now more Lebanon is also suffer in Syria and Iraq has its own situation. It's evolving but not a deep change in Syria and Lebanon. The change is big and profound and Dr. Seami will tell us about the potential scenarios in Syria. But I can speak for Lebanon. the new president, prime minister and the government for the first time after 40 years the uh regain Libanese sovereignty and emphasize the control of the arms by the government and to make big economic reforms. that progress is been done and uh some achievements have been made but uh there are some problems in terms of controlling the arms because still strong has big base and is supported by and is emerging as a winner **[5:57:26] Speaker A:** in its confrontation with Iran and but Hezbollah is weaker than what how it was four years ago. So it's weak at the level. It has been destroyed because it has no direct bridge to Iran. It has no country that will be obedient to it like before it started the war with Israel. It thought it would survive against Israel like in 2006 but it could not and it has been uh inflicting lots of losses and the Shia sect. Now there is some support of the party but not like it was for the choices of the party and the cost uh that the people of the south are paying and the sh are paying but is the current situation uh has been which has been posed by last chance do you think it's sustainable or is it linked to the results of the American Iranian negotiations and the impact that would have on the all ofah the all **[5:58:30] Speaker A:** of Hamas in Raza the role of uh mo popular movement in mobilization movement in Iraq. Uh there is lots of concern in Lebanon from negotiation that could happen between United States and Ian we have seen in the memorandum of understanding the first item Lebanon is mentioned three times. Yes, Hezbollah which was the most important element of deterrence for Iran against Isra and the US before the last three years and now it doesn't have such strategic importance maybe it comes at the fifth uh rank for Iran the missiles and drones then state of then the Houthis then the mobilization uh party and then the party and then we have an ideologically historically they will not give up on the Hezbollah and they always insist on keeping the Hezbollah and this is an obstac an obstacle for the Libanese state if such deal is is between the US and Iran and the Lebanese state has taken significant steps but that should be uh boosted by its presence **[5:59:52] Speaker A:** in the capital bay and other is Asians the Lebanese state doesn't need to confront militarily Hezbollah because maybe that would lead to disasters but the state needs to uh reinforce its position and need to inform the economy and the banking sector so that the economy can protect the resources of the Libanese country because the amount of corruption in the Libanese states and the Lebanese parliament and the Lebanese media just exacerbate the situation. So a reform is needed. This also applies to the Syian situation. Sya has changed a lot. How would Sya look like now? When I was in SEAK in the process of political change, I was surprised how this country is ready for change. Uh first of all, I would like to express my thanks and appreciation for inviting me to uh this debate and Dr. TSM has demonstrated the uh political courage to organize such debate in Asian witnessing lots of turmoil between different parties which are having wars between them. **[6:01:23] Speaker A:** So I believe this is uh something positive for the Asian and I would like to build up on what his excellency the former prime minister uh said and the colleague Dr. **[6:01:38] Speaker A:** Paul I would like to talk about the big elephant in the room. I think that the fault line in the 11th will remain as they are. All what will happen is probably distribution of new os and division of all of of work between the dominant parties. What is the condition for that? Two is that we move to the internal issue that we don't talk about which is the issue that stability is possible only in this country is in case uh security authority is moved to a legitimate authority through a national pact. If we take Jordan, if you allow me, a country which has achieved a very important national identity and I am I consider this source of pride for all of us not only say it in front of you and with the exception they have Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and Gaza. uh there's a collapse uh as mentioned by Iban Caldon collapse of the national collective identity and this is something that maybe other countries in the world has dealt with with a new approach linked to uh Vistalia concept which **[6:03:11] Speaker A:** means uh like like we talked about yesterday about Lebanon as a federal state but not federal enough because at the end gradually we constitute the country as is the case now in the UAE. How was the UAE established then this uh issue of national identity and also the other element that was mentioned by Dr. Paul is the idea of the Kono state capitalism and which is the capital of the state. We talk about corruption and this is a a vicious cycle failure in development, failure in governance. um a failure that leads to disruption of national belonging but uh without intervention from foreigners. So the main cycle here is to have a new social contact in this country which will be collective. It will be voluntary towards a model of economy that allows governance and e development that doesn't allowian or is or turkey to intervene. **[6:04:36] Speaker A:** One more thing is that for the fault line which are Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen for them they should leave this such national conflict for say to leave this national conflict and have peace with Isra issue and is very important. How much of that was achieved? What what do do we want to achieve in Syria? is a conflict there's competition Turkey and is and then are coming on the way. So as long as we have 71% of unemployment among the youth in Syria, why I'm talking about state capitalism um because this prevents the Syrian bourgeois to come back to the country and the current authority and collapse of uh property in the country, the IT property and and the collapse perhaps uh of this because who will build yeah who will build Lebanon the human capital of this country is this will not happen by donation. **[6:05:57] Speaker A:** You need to build an environment for that and the main issue here is national peace built on a new social contract and practically development. This is the only way for us to exit the vicious circle and the fault line will remain as long as we don't build a national country and the the state nation for Lebanon and for Syria and to exit all the those slogans based on Dr. in but the question is how can we achieve that? How can those country achieve that? You started with negativity and you said that those conflicts will remain as they are but I will come back to you uh the Indian model Dr. Bisha do you think that we can benefit from it in this Asian and to what extent uh do you have concerns for Jordan which has witnessed in the last week a very difficult experience. **[6:07:08] Speaker A:** Uh I have no concerns for Jordan because Jordan now has it this level of building than this nation state more than 100 years ago and uh it's a coherent country and we have seen how society responded uh to that with uh with what happened in Alak village and also the attacks against one of security officers that was at the Sri Lankan embassy in Aman. So we have seen the reaction from uh different uh segments of society in Jordan. Even those who who classify themselves as opposition they all stood uh in one line around this issue. So the the Jordanian model went through some turbulences. Um and uh you can talk about the 70s but uh this Jordanian model was tested in and in the 50s we have seen some coups uh some coups that were taking place every five months because of the propaganda of NASA uh in Egypt and the Jordanian model went through some challenges by losing the West Bank in ' 67 because of the war of 1967 and this was an opportunity for the kingdom of Jordan built on unity **[6:08:46] Speaker A:** since 1950 to 1967. Um but uh the Jordanian model was a coant model because the country of the 70 started dealing with an important taboo which is not allowing any party in the state with its civilian party regardless of its uh loyalty or belonging to have any all in decisions linked to monopoly and exclusivity of the state on all the decision starting with the decisions of peace and war. The second thing which has become like a taboo that nobody uh should uh should dispute the monopoly of the country of by the state of weapons. So even at the parliament we they can see lots of dispute lots of arguments against the the the strategy of the country. But when we reach a point where we will be tested and that those taboo like like the monopoly of the weapons and monopoly of decision of war and peace there is a part where the country would respond with **[6:10:06] Speaker A:** determination. We have seen like two years ago that there is a group that is connected with Hamas uh another group linked with Hezbollah and other group linked with the Muslim other and they started to follow an approach to break the monopoly of weapons in the state. So uh uh it was destroyed in the beginning and uh they could not do any intervention after that. So what is different in Jordan? Why country like Jordan is capable of dealing with such a go in such way while other countries in the Asian cannot take the similar decisions because Jordanian model uh in power there's a consensus on legitimacy of the the **[6:11:09] Speaker A:** uh this in we have a king uh who is the king But uh also his uh but we have also a constitution for uh which subjects general discussion general dialogue uh to different criteria where you can have differences and will give immunity to the king and then the prime minister will have his mandate. But everything is taking place within uh peaceful dialogue. Whenever we see uh disturbance of that uh peace, we will see that everyone will be against that because our people they can see uh has seen models that we're not as strong as we are in handling such taboos that like not anyone been taking part in monopoly of weapons or breaking that monopoly of weapons. by the state. This is what led me to ask about the Jordanian model and then move to other models. And one more uh point uh the Jordanian since the Hashimite came to the king the Hashimite kingdom uh they there was not been any political opponent. **[6:12:41] Speaker A:** uh we didn't have this model in our country. Uh can the neighboring countries benefit from this model or is it different? And uh we cannot talk about this new event without talking about the Gaza and the Palestinian cause. How is it situated in the future of the Asian? And can we talk about additional stability in our Asian **[6:13:08] Speaker B:** without final political solution of this case and which has been exploited many times. We are talking here about different point when there is the model of the Arab state. It has been clear that the successful model in the last 20 or 30 years were the kingdom's models based on so uh legacies or if we can call them traditional models and those models they are uh flexible when dealing with political life because they can't be overthrown by elections. We have seen that in Morocco, in Jordan, we see that in GCC countries in different ways and in Kuwait in different way. So, uh the kingdom's model where you have the state is already there and is the state is the backbone of society. It's not that society built the state in the European way. uh this is closer to the concept of Benaldon to have the state of someone the state of a group to have that will hold the reigns of society. **[6:14:32] Speaker B:** This is models of the Arab states and Jordan is one of them. The second model that emerged in the 50s and 60s is the evolutionary or the military state which tried to jump over the kingdom institution and to build something new. Most of them reached the levels that are worse leading to blood, bloodshed like Syria and Libya where the pretended or alleged to be democratic and having legitimacy and he had to exercise a passion to preserve his position and those experiences failed. There are other countries like Lebanon and Iraq. Lebanon doesn't have the choice of Jordan doesn't have kingdom. Iraq doesn't have that option. uh maybe also uh within the regime of power. Lebanon has to deal with this regime in a democratic way but with a diversified uh society, divided society and each uh community is underpinned by other power. I think that there is a path for countries like Lebanon and Iraq to move forward towards sovereignty and better governance. **[6:16:03] Speaker B:** Uh what Lebanon achieved lots of it came from Syria to destroy the state and to weaponize foreign agent and Lebanon from the early 70s was a prosperous country. There was yes some problems but it was a successful country. Uh now with the president and the prime minister uh they are trying to go to the positive way. The in Iraq it's a complicated experience but we have seen efforts to move forward. So I believe Arab countries are destined to have different experiences and but I want to conclude with one idea as we go back to the idea of the Levant uh specifically Syria and Lebanon. Syria practically until the last 70 years was in a trench and it was against the Gulf count Saudi Arabia starting with the Soviet and then with the Indian start today Syria is open to the Arab counties to the Gulf counties Iraq and Turkey and Mediterranean this change we have not seen it since the 40s or the 50s of the last century. **[6:17:29] Speaker B:** Second, the crisis of state of Homos poses the issue of the level in geo economy. So uh this change between politics and geo economy for Syria and Lebanon opens an important part for Gulf count is and we have and then also trying to join this economic and political openness and this could benefit Syrian and Lebanese economies. **[6:18:00] Speaker B:** construction in the traditional way is uh out of discussion like an entity that will come give you 10 billion for extra econstruction. This is out of question. So it will be through uh commerce and prosperity and it's possible also to uh this will support stability. If people are living comfortably with a good income, then the political situation will be calmer and easier for the authorities. But if you want to get from out from the Israeli conflict or maybe god forbid an Israeli Turkish conflict, it will be what much worse. So want to go back to the issue of Gaza. you mentioned uh connections of those goss inside the country is uh with the outside agent. So maybe we can get involved in new conflicts of influence. So it's a very uh tiny line. Uh maybe Turkey is get is joining. We have Israel, we have the US, we have Europe. **[6:19:20] Speaker B:** All of these counties has interests. Even the Gulf counties. So the question each one of this party has its own calculation in the 11th. Do you think that the Asian is heading towards understanding to achieve stability like Dr. Paul said or are we getting ready for a new conflict of influence in the Levant? The situation is linked practically to political leaders in Lebanon and political leaders in Syria. There's no doubt that Sya and in Syria Lebanon they took big steps in this uh context. Why am I talking about this? Because there are some regional powers that want to change this Asian uh into uh into a field of conflict until they solve things between themselves and then Isra will go back home and will go back home. So the main theme now is the how can countries become nations with enough nationalism and to expel uh those who intervene for Jordan. **[6:20:49] Speaker B:** This was uh achieved in August 1970 meaning with sovereignty. Um the second point is that the evolutionary system like Albat in Iraq and C and even in Yemen and even uh with Hamas uh practically it built structure for the country that doesn't align with the society uh society not only in terms of the sex but also demography and uh the categories of society and when there was a collapse there was political vacuum. This is why construction is a construction of the cane airation of national unity. It's not question of money but political will to build the country. This is why I think yeah there is a big danger that the Asian is still suffering and there are still four lines and the lines uh have not been identified yet. But uh what collapsed is the altar. Meaning when Stalin and and Churchel sat together to divide the world, it was limited for the conflict. **[6:22:12] Speaker B:** I can share with you uh anecdote. Jav Assad in 1988 invited me and asked me a question because I had some relations with the Soviet Union. And he told me uh the Russians the Russians went to went west. How can we go west? So he was prepared to become a country in the liberal model. And I told him that the Syrian bourgeoisi cannot keep living on the rent year that the Soviet Union was presenting and the Gulf count is were providing. Even Gulf country is asking what show us what you do with the money. From that moment we have seen those regimes starting to be confined and to collapse. So Bashar al-Assad he he took over the reigns of regime that was already collapsing. So I believe that the main thing here is the internal situation is to build development and national ident national identity and as we uh continue in this dialogue and the issue of a construction action that you talked about **[6:23:31] Speaker B:** Dr. Bishop, is it possible for that to be an opportunity? We know that there is no country here that will give you uh something for E. But will that be an opportunity to build uh more stable and more autonomous counties? We know that when you are given, you should also give. So what will be the priorities that those counties will have to determine? You said you probably thought about that this session will be boring but uh we will be talking about lots of things. No. Um I I have an issue here about the national existence for Palestine and its impact on governance in Jordan Syria and Lebanon and Gaza and the occupied West Bank. Uh, one of the drivers of imbalance in Lebanon was the fear that Palestinian in Lebanon will lead to a change in the demographic structure in Lebanon. Then we had the civil war with the Palestinian presence of the significant presence of refugees, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. **[6:24:58] Speaker B:** And with my appreciation to what Dr. Sami said, uh we need to reach solution in this part. We're not talking about a model of social contact in an environment without conflicts and external factors that would have a direct impact. But we are talking about an element that is existing and we live with our country is have lots of interest linked with Isra. Israel also also should identify because we want to uh share the burden with you so that we can overcome challenges because we have the element of Palestinian in Lebanon that's linked to a final solution and in Syria also that's linked to final solution and also in Jordan that's linked to the final solution for Palestinians. So we need an isra partner that will stick to peaceful part to resolve the Palestinian issue in a way that will meet the needs of Palestinian in an independent country if you allow me. **[6:26:16] Speaker B:** uh because you were saying before there's no mood in Israel to accept two-state solutions but who says that many Arab countries that are committed strategically committed to peace and the the part was going very well but it's with the event of the 7th October that surprised us all I want to be fair we were not dealing with the NIS government that took seriously the Palestinian issue. We're talking about the last 10 years. But what I want to say this part we should head towards it for the Palestinian issue. We have two main reasons I believe for the turmoil. We have uh is which is uh the uh the way of governance in we have lots of attraction element and lots of people choosing the Iranian camp is that because they use the they use the lack of rights of pal Palestinian. Second, the need for uh partners which who choose a part for realization of Palestinian for state. **[6:27:35] Speaker B:** But you today I need an is partner that will commit to that part. You have hopes for government formed by court. I believe that any government formed within Israel should work strategically towards uh working on this part because the reason of the tension in the Asian which is impacting the levant and capacity to deal with Aan in the future and also the econ uh connectivity which has been shown as fragile as it is with Isra and US war with Iran and those who for us those we are in the middle uh we we get the missiles and uh his highness the king his majesty the king he came to Kuwait he went to Saudi Arabia and he wanted to say we siding with this count is together. The so and this changes should have taught all these count is who is the and who is the enemy. **[6:28:58] Speaker B:** Uh we want to conclude quickly. So connectivity and a construction from countries that have money and natural resources and they will not they will not be wasting their money even for investment. even for investment not as grants. So as investment uh and uh with the clear and insight I don't want to invest in Lebanon uh and to see that those investment will be used to uh hit Israel in the south or for Syria and then uh see that used on some conflicts inside Syria between those who support and those who are against and for Gaza and then find out that this will not lead to some sort of truth that will lead to political process for peace in the Asian. **[6:29:58] Speaker B:** Uh we have 10 more minutes left. So I will be waiting for your questions. Uh so for those who would like uh to uh send us their questions uh in this uh panel session uh you talk about the Palestinian conflict many points about the Palestinian conflict. If you take the history of the 11th and the changes that happened with the uhist movement from the end of the 19th century with the beginning of the 20th century and the establishment of Israel, the expulsion of Palestinian that was the uh with a view to solve a European problem. and this Sunnist movement and the establishment of Israel and all this conflict practically it was like the nuclear bomb that destroyed and changed the live event and it continues to do so. Second, the American capitulation to Isra. **[6:31:09] Speaker B:** This is what allowed the the Israeli right to **[6:31:18] Speaker B:** to be bold enough and do what it did in Gaza and others. Uh second uh there is a change that could come from the US because Isra known is not is US Isra and every demand of Isra was not discussed in the US. It was just handed over but uh this is over now. We know is disturbed by that. Now uh third is a subject that Iran and Isra and in in DHA forum two years ago uh we said we are they said we are against the two-state solutions but without two-state solution there will be no stability in the Levant in the Middle East peace with the uh the Jewish country no peace uh uh with for the issue Jerusalem and religious aspects of the issue of Jerusalem and the two-state solution and the ill and the ill peace is the main element for stability of the levant and the whole Asian and also the future of Israel. **[6:32:44] Speaker B:** I want to take a question uh before the end of the session. Question from Moda. **[6:32:51] Speaker A:** If you're talking about stability, you have to have jobs, jobs, jobs. You have to have innovation, technology, but that is based on security and stability. That's what happened in Europe after World War II. Definitely. **[6:33:15] Speaker B:** Definitely. **[6:33:15] Speaker A:** Absolutely. **[6:33:19] Speaker B:** So we are talking about the importance of having jobs uh technology and this is important for Asian that looks forward to stability. Who wants to make a comment? Uh **[6:33:37] Speaker A:** there are the requirements uh of and the requisites uh of predictability, peace, calm and security to be able to unleash the necessary funding and finances for innovation uh to expand the economies in a manner that can create more jobs in the GDPs of those countries and those systems. And this is why this all of this has to be basically predicated on a workable political formula that carries a lot of wisdom but that carries a lot of determination. Uh case in point the country that hosts us now. It's a country that basically has a vision, a futuristic vision and a very workable vision uh and that has generated both interests created jobs for its citizens and beyond to the huge expat community that that make their living in this particular country. uh within very safe and secure conditions and welcoming conditions. That's what we have to generally work for. **[6:34:30] Speaker A:** We hope to be able to export this to the region. **[6:34:33] Speaker B:** Dr. Samir, **[6:34:38] Speaker A:** if you want to talk about the new level 10 years from now, what chance should we see now? Will the be to build counties or to end the conflict? When I talked about the internal situation, I was talking about the big elephant in the room um his excellency the former prime minister was talking about that big elephant all the day. So there are two elephants. Now we have the Palestinian issue and is the issue of security in the Asian and ideological uh issues. the the biggest there's a big elephant and the small elephant in terms of changes in my opinion the change that is happening even in Iran we did not allocate enough time to that but even Iran today with strategic vision of its situation there are some doubts from some think tanks about the importance like Dr. Paul said the importance of the proxies as a strategic deterrence for national security for air. **[6:35:53] Speaker A:** And the second change that is not seen it as it should be is that it cannot remain in a state in a state of war all the time. And and I can give an example. I have some Israeli friends very good friends. So I asked them where were you? They said in Europe they said why doing what? They said we're trying to get passports but this is not good. The whole project the the problem now is not only for Arabs but also for them country like this cannot stay in a in the state of war all the time. like one of the Israeli colleagues said they gave the perspective on some issues but there is a part where too much work needs to be done. So definitely what I want to say is that uh Syria has chosen a very important path but with lots of dangers because of governance and national contact and the only state capitalism in Lebanon also. **[6:37:06] Speaker A:** But there is hope that we can start to control the nationalism. There are some jihadist power uh in CA and the and not necessarily with the knowledge of government. So and and and it was not easy given what the Asian is witnessing. And I will ask the last question to Dr. Paul. Can we identify the fate of the Asian on the table of negotiation between and the US? I don't think so. Um part of the fate of Hezbollah and Hezbollah will have dark future. Maybe it will last for five years, 10 years will be maybe will be like like Ahmed man but the existence is over but maybe there will be some groups here and there for the 11th practically we have the Gulf Asian and the Turkey with Lebanon on and Jordan and this has its own dynamics and we see some development with Mecca agreement and 10 years ago there was animosity between Turkey and Saudi Arabia now there is doesn't **[6:38:41] Speaker A:** exist then we have Isra the problem with Isra Palestine was exacerbated because uh the there was uh some uh tensions and escalation. Now we look forward to a new Israeli government and the new American uh policy and to go back to the two-state solutions. We as country is in the Asian we need uh to collaborate with the new uh administration of the United States two years from now. so that we can uh lay out new policies for our Asian. I don't think that Aan will play big role in the 11th maybe in Babel Mandab. Uh I am optimistic about uh the mil the Middle East but I'm not very optimistic about the Israeli part because we have not seen real evolution. um and we can't blame and say this is what Nanyahu did or that person did but they need to go back to the strategic thinking to think about their own interest like uh and and and this now this **[6:40:05] Speaker A:** is the word that comes from above to end this uh session. So the challenge is not only a construction but to build promising future where there will be no more wars that will destroy this countries. Thank you Dr. Akisan. Thank you to the attendees. Thank you. **[6:40:37] Speaker A:** Ladies and gentlemen, the next panel will begin now. **[6:41:25] Speaker A:** Heat. Heat. **[6:41:32] Speaker A:** Heat **[6:41:45] Speaker B:** up here. **[6:42:16] Speaker A:** Heat. **[6:42:21] Speaker A:** Heat. **[6:42:37] Speaker B:** Heat. **[6:42:52] Speaker B:** Heat. **[6:43:03] Speaker B:** Heat. **[6:43:08] Speaker B:** Heat. **[6:43:44] Speaker B:** Ladies and gentlemen, Panel 11 entitled The Middle East between competing visions, new maps and alliances will start now. **[6:44:18] Speaker B:** Good evening everyone. Uh the Jordanian way no one is allowed to leave. So please sit down. Uh second before I thank you Dr. I have to say this is not fair. You have me a moderator after Chantal Saliba. How can I compete with her? No one can. Shantel is not listening. Anyway, **[6:44:40] Speaker A:** beauty and peace. **[6:44:46] Speaker B:** Uh good afternoon and uh again I going to echo every single uh moderator and participant in the entire sessions over the two days to thank you Dr. Sam and APC for this is outstanding session. I gathered the rationale and the logic of this conference trying to see out the Iran's war fallout and its impact on the global order and regional settings and obvious it has huge and profound impact and not only that but also changing the rules of power itself which actually dictates more to come in the strategic level. Now this session is the last session but probably it is the conclusion of all sessions and it is connected to the one we just finished on the Levant before one on Israel before on Iran and the first one on Hermus and the Gulf security. So all connected uh three key terms to lead our discussion gentlemen before I also welcome you by name. **[6:45:59] Speaker B:** uh may be very helpful to for us to demystify what this new Middle East and I start with illusion and then arrogance and then hijy. I think combination among them produce maps or help us navigate these maps. With no further ado, I am honored and delighted to welcome to this session, Ambassador Kharim Hag, Kharim Haj, the director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, CRI Stockholm, Aalen, and Major General, retired Amos. It's an honor having you, the president and founder of Mind Israel. I think everyone should mind Israel. Welcome. And Dr. Kellish Kat, research director at the SATA Foundation, Washington DC office. Well, I'll start with you, of course, Dr. Karim. And uh I'll give each one of you two to three minutes for your opening statements about the topic. So, you can take your time and say what you want to say and then we can take it deeper and deeper and deeper. **[6:47:22] Speaker B:** But I I would like to stress with you and start with you Dr. Kharim the idea of this newness of the Middle East. I'm puzzled and I think we've been talking about the new Middle East since Kundala Rice and I'm not sure if there's something in new or something happened since then. I can think of a few strategic if you wish game changers happened in the last decade. I don't want to go beyond and I start with the Abraham accord and I think that's a strategic game changer for sure and the second one will be October 7. So if you be so kind just share with us what do you think of this newness what's a new and what's the current structure that we are witnessing now in the Middle East. Floors is yours. **[6:48:17] Speaker A:** Thank you very much. Maybe just to add my word of thanks and appreciation to Dr. Sam for the opportunity to be in this event which I think has really demonstrated that it is a platform for constructive inclusive and insightful dialogue. So my appreciation and congratulations uh to to you. So Z to your question I think this is the right place to start. What is new or what can we say is new that we are seeing and when we talk about regional order I think one new thing that we are seeing is the transformation of the different concepts that we are seeing regarding regional order. So the the region now is being contested by three major projects for that that have proposed a concept of regional order. The first maybe to start is with the Israeli concept of regional order and I'm sure uh General Amos will speak to this. **[6:49:22] Speaker A:** Basically, Israel's approach has been based on the idea of forming a broad coalition between Israel and the moderate Arab states visav Iran and the assumption that the alignment of interests between Israel and these states would transcend the Palestinian issue or that the active use of force, beating the bad guys, would create a new reality in the region that would provide geo political space for the moderates to actually recognize and normalize uh with Israel. What's changed in the Israeli conception is what we've heard over the last uh two days of this conference. the shift to a more absolute mindset, you know, maximalist goals, the shift from deterring uh enemies to the destruction of capabilities, the shift towards an absolute sense of uh security with maximalist goals as we've seen in Gaza, as we've seen visav Iran, you know, bringing down the regime, even the destruction of the Iranian state and so on. **[6:50:29] Speaker A:** So the the real shift in the Israeli approach to regional security The second project of regional order was that espoused by Iran. **[6:50:41] Speaker B:** So Iran's concept of regional order has been based on a regional framework between Iran and the Gulf states based on the ex exclusion of the United States from the region. therefore providing an imbalance of power between Iran and the states of the GCC and of course based on Iranian coercion visav these states. With regards to the Mashk, it was based on a system of forward defense and deterrence through Iranian proxies. That clearly has changed and now Iran has had to shift more to a defensive posture closer to home and in order to provide deterrence it has had to turn the Arab Gulf into an arena of conflict. Maybe the final shift is with the US concept of security. So the United States has been traditionally a guarantor of security, providing a security umbrella over the states of the Gulf and encouraging Israel's integration into the region. **[6:51:49] Speaker B:** One very important shift that we've seen is the transformation of the United States from a security provider to a security disruptor in the region. And that I think the trans these transformations have been profound. maybe to your point that all of these transformations are new but they also have antecedance **[6:52:12] Speaker A:** right so this idea of changing the region by force we've seen this come up in Israeli thinking uh over time we've seen it in the 1982 invasion uh of Lebanon we've seen it you know when Netanyahu said that the invasion of Iraq in 2003 would be transformative for the region **[6:52:30] Speaker B:** right **[6:52:31] Speaker A:** the US when it did invade Iraq Iraq was a tremendous disruptive uh event. Iran providing forward defense of Iranian territory takes us back to the 1980s, the Iran Iraq war. So we've seen these transformations that are new but have anticedants in the past. **[6:52:52] Speaker B:** Well Kim, thank you very much. This is very precise, almost accurate and almost just to give myself some maneuvering place to challenge your thesis and to take it to Amos. But before that, Amos, you know, it is there's a widespread wisdom to blame everything on Israel, right? It's good to and it works and there are so many justifications to blame Israel for all kind of things happening in the region. So, and I read your article about Iran imperative in the foreign affairs and even your beautiful initiatives about the three seas, the Mediterranean, the red and the Gulf and of course you know how this relation between the US and Israel is good for everyone uh including the Arab countries and the Gulf. Now from where you coming how you see this newness the new thing in the Middle East and I I I think Iran would be your departing point of saying there is something new happened in the Middle East but **[6:53:57] Speaker B:** I I'll give it to you to tell us what you think. Thank you. **[6:54:02] Speaker A:** Okay. The term new Middle East was invented by a late human Paris in the **[6:54:11] Speaker B:** 1995. Yeah. 95. And he believes in it. He believes that territory is not important anymore. Missiles are not important anymore. And the future of the Middle East innovation, economy, cooperation, and so on and so forth. I used to brief President Perez from time to time and I have some uh reservation about his vision even though I like his vision but I say it is not connected to the other players in the Middle East and we have to work to make your vision happening but it will not be easy. Mhm. **[6:54:56] Speaker A:** And the president used to tell me that Amos, why you are so pessimist? The you know the optimist and the pessimist are dying the same but living differently. So I prefer to be a an optimist and this is a president Paris but let's look at the visions on the Middle East. Okay. Because there is no new Middle East. It's changing Middle East, evolving Middle East. **[6:55:25] Speaker B:** Good. There is the Iranian vision that Iran is the dominant force. **[6:55:30] Speaker A:** That's the hijan in my introduction **[6:55:32] Speaker B:** and they will control the historic Sunni areas. They will go all the way to the Levant, Syria, Lebanon, maybe the holy places. Israel will be off the map and they will be the dominant force in the Middle East. **[6:55:51] Speaker A:** Okay, **[6:55:52] Speaker B:** you cannot ignore this is a vision. the mukama vision. There is another vision of the giodist that the Sharia law will be the the law and the giodist they have no state for a very limited period. They have the Islamic state but they want all the Middle East to be the state was destroyed the Islamic state but the idea and the vision is still there on the social networks in some mosques in some areas. It is another vision. There is maybe the Turkish vision that political Islam will be together with Muslim Brotherhood the main force in the Middle East and if Turkey is not accepted to to Europe maybe they will revive the Turkish the Ottoman Empire. Uh and there is another vision which I think we are sharing with our old neighbors that we have peace with for many many years. Don't forget it. **[6:57:08] Speaker B:** Egypt, Jordan, that we can live together in peace even though we are not agreeing on everything and we try to solve some problems that are very difficult to solve and we share this vision with the United Arab Emirates. It's the vision of Shimon Perez of a different Middle East based on technology, based on innovation, based on peace, based on respect, mutual respect. This is the the vision that I think Israel believe in. I have to admit that the government of Israel in the last 40 four years, we're not aligned on this vision. 100% but Israel is not using force to change the Middle East. The attack on Israel on the 7th of October, this is what ignite the the last three years of war. **[6:58:12] Speaker A:** Okay? **[6:58:13] Speaker B:** Because Israel was addicted unfortunately to tranquility, to quiet and Israel let terror organization build a military on their border. **[6:58:25] Speaker A:** Okay. So if you trying to to argue that Israel after being addicted to tranquility is now addicted to a war. You are not so warm. But we hope that this will change very soon with another government. **[6:58:45] Speaker B:** Okay. Well, thank you very much. That's very helpful again. And yes, I like the word visions because probably only visions. I tried actually to equalize it with illusion because also this is something there's something in common but however since you mentioned the jihadist vision in the region I want also to remind you with the extreme far right Israelis of vision of a greater Israel that's also spreading in the media and in the maps. So I I think you know this is another v version of Israeli's vision of the region that we have to be aware of and that is the new map. **[6:59:26] Speaker B:** But I'll take this to our uh friend from Turkey, Professor Kellich. And you know it's interesting we're talking about still Arab world, Middle East and the Arab being at the heart of it and we're talking about visions of neighboring countries. We have Israel, we have Iran and now we have brother neighbor neighboring country Turkey. So is there a vision Turkish vision of the region? Of course uh Turkish before uh moving to Turkish vision let me answer your first question about the orders and then move to Turkeykey's vision and the first thing I think we have to pay to uh pay attention to the debates in the international system. It has always been an academic exercise for scholars to argue that there is a transformation in international system and now it's not an academic exercise. is the leaders around the world are saying that we are going through an transformation and there is a disorder and this disorder has significant ramifications to the Middle East and it is two ways number one what's happening around **[7:00:40] Speaker B:** the world lack of in international institutions their effectiveness UN security council etc is influencing what's happening in the Middle East and on the other hand what's happening in the Middle East is significantly challenged legitimacy of important international institutions and international norms. Right? What happened in Gaza significantly affected how the international institutions are perceived around the world. **[7:01:09] Speaker A:** So that's number one. Number two, what affects the order in the Middle East has something to do with the US foreign policy as well. And for the we can say more than two decades right now ups and downs in the US foreign policy and right now the impact of the domestic politics to US foreign policy is significantly affecting how the US sees the Middle East how US plans a policy in the Middle East and implements it. So this is the second thing and the third thing is about the region. I think there are multiple dynamics in the region. Number one, the regional powers are becoming much more assertive. Much more assertive doesn't mean that they are becoming much more assertive only militarily, diplomatically as well. They started to see that they need to have a policy of regional ownership. They need to own the problems in the Middle East in order to resolve them. **[7:02:10] Speaker A:** They need to cooperate together and they don't they shouldn't be focusing solely on the external actors to change the balance of power in the Middle East. They should be doing the power equilibrium but also crisis prevention c uh the trust building etc through diplomacy. So they are becoming much more assertive and they are getting much more self-confidence in shaping the politics in the region and also especially with the recent conflict what we are seeing is the countries are seeing that the security requirements of the countries are very much interconnected. Right. **[7:02:55] Speaker B:** What happens in one part of the region significantly affects the global economy, regional economy, generates different type of insecurities in the region. So Turkey is a country that has been neighboring multiple different conflicts not only in the Middle East. When you look at the borders of Turkey, the war between Ukraine and Russia, the conflict with Iran, the war in Iraq that happened uh two decades ago which had ramifications today, the Syrian conflict. So Turkey as a result of all of these conflicts around its region realized that this policy of establishing a regional security architecture will be key for this. And this regional security architecture which I can uh delve into second round maybe have different mechanism. It's not only about the alliances. It is about crisis prevention. It's about multilateral diplomacy. It's also about strengthening economic cooperation among these states. And it it has also a role in it should have a role in deterring regional destabilizers to destabilize the politics and the security in the region. **[7:04:17] Speaker A:** Well, Kish, thank you very much. This is very good. But again, it speaks to what must be and should be done in order to secure the region. But I think we are far away from there. You know we understand international relations the logic of strategic interactions and states behavior. There are certain imperatives for any state to do. At the most at the top of these imperatives is security and how states perceive its own security within the region that is insecure. In Garu, you alluded to the idea that the major thing of the architect of the security in the region is provided for and guaranteed by the US with certain players. I think we're now rewriting the rules of that game in terms of the concept of the Americans security as a provider as American security provider and governments and also a new emerging players. I want you while answering this also to take in concentrations a vision from within what the Egyptians think, what Egypt think of the region and its own security and role. **[7:05:30] Speaker A:** Well, the Gulf countries we've been hearing Anor Gash talking about we have to rethink the Arab national security concept at all and we have to revise the uh GCC kind of works and in the Levant there are a lot of you know competing visions Syria Jordan and and what is happening there security threats etc. uh and also there is the idea of balancing balancing acts we have to balance against I don't know who and this is important and you know um I don't have to mention Mecca agreement right so what do you think of what I said **[7:06:09] Speaker B:** yeah so maybe to pick off uh from the the point that Kilich made so I think he's absolutely right you know as you're seeing this reassessment on the part of the United States as an external security provider. What you are seeing is a lot more activism from the region, activism in terms of mediating conflicts, activism in terms of emerging security frameworks and Egypt has certainly been part of that. You know, the Egypt's role in the mediation of the war in Gaza, uh Egypt's participation in the emerging security arrangements. Now we are seeing in the Gulf the the very clear connection made by the Egyptian leadership linking Egyptian security to Gulf security its readiness to deploy forces to Saudi Arabia to uh to uh provide security assistance in the face of the uh Houthi threat. And this is one of many examples. I mean, you're you're seeing countries that seek to stabilize conflicts, seek seek to provide mediation for conflict settlements, countries are trying to provide for security however they can, wherever they can, **[7:07:25] Speaker A:** right? What you are not seeing and this I think gets to your point in none of these visions that I mentioned and in none of the activism that we're seeing in the region **[7:07:36] Speaker B:** we don't see a project for a stable inclusive regional order right so if we look to trying to describe what does that mean right so that means a number of pillars I mean four pillars uh specifically **[7:07:54] Speaker A:** one is a stable balance of power which yes countries are seeking to realign in order to **[7:08:01] Speaker B:** realignment right **[7:08:02] Speaker A:** try and and achieve that balance two is a regional settlement of the major conflict divides uh in the Middle East or in the absence of a settlement an understanding of how to manage those conflict divides. Third I think which is very important is a framework for some sort of inclusive political dialogue. Now in different regions that has taken many forms. It could take the form of a formal intergovernmental uh association such as in ASEAN. In other contexts it could take the form of a dialogue process but with everybody at the table. And maybe lastly, one overlooked element of regional order is the principles that we all align behind which provide legitimacy for that order. So the principles of mutual acceptance, common security for all states in the region, the peaceful resolution of disputes, the end of occupation, the respect for sovereignty and the territorial integrity of of states. **[7:09:13] Speaker A:** If we look at each of these pillars, none of them are prevailing in the region today, which is why you mentioned we are quite a ways away from reaching that vision. **[7:09:25] Speaker A:** But what we don't see is in these different regional concepts for security, we are looking at exclusively security frameworks that reside on the concept of us versus them. It's not nowhere near what we should have, which is an inclusive regional order that may not give us peace, but will give us a sense of stability to build a more secure region moving forward. **[7:09:54] Speaker B:** Well, this is beautiful, Karim. Thank you very much. again. Look, I'm a hardcore realist and I love what you say, but not too much because the idea is, you know, building this inclusive, stable order is an outcome of so many dynamics taking place between powers to balance against each other and and therefore when I think of the possible potential future or end end of a process of making this I look at the Middle East as in two things. First, it is an order in making and a region in transition. Which means conflict is the language. Conflict is the currency and every country, every state will bring its own in order to ensure its place in the new system, new order because it's transition. So by your permission, I'll take this throw it in here and I'll take it to Amos and tell you the following. **[7:11:10] Speaker B:** You said Israel never wanted or did not want to change the region by force, but after October 7 probably that that security doctrine has changed and we've seen Netanyahu's government trying actually by force to change borders and D to guarantee their own security their own way buffer zones I'm talking about whether in Gaza now in the West Bank and in Syria and in Lebanon. Now referring to what Karim Zankish was saying and if there's a vision in Israel to a region that and and you promote integration right regional integration how Israel would imagine a region that Israel will be integrated in given all of these policies that Israel is doing first and also given the issue of the Palestinian uh self-determination. So h how you can explain that to us? **[7:12:06] Speaker A:** Yeah, let me deal with this myth one by one. **[7:12:11] Speaker B:** Okay, **[7:12:11] Speaker A:** these are myths for you. **[7:12:13] Speaker B:** It's it's a the fact that Israel is want to change the Middle East by force is wrong. **[7:12:20] Speaker A:** Is wrong. **[7:12:21] Speaker B:** I I already mentioned the 7th of October which ignite the war and who join on the 8th Balah. and who join on the nine all the proxies from Syria from Iraq and then the Houthis and then on April Iran **[7:12:40] Speaker A:** right **[7:12:40] Speaker B:** so don't blame Israel for defending itself **[7:12:43] Speaker A:** wait **[7:12:44] Speaker B:** and Israel haven't started this war **[7:12:46] Speaker A:** wait Amus don't blame Israel he says this is for you and now it's up for you to make your judgment **[7:12:53] Speaker B:** this is number one **[7:12:54] Speaker A:** number one **[7:12:55] Speaker B:** as I said Israel want integration Israel want peace **[7:12:59] Speaker A:** okay **[7:13:00] Speaker B:** and Israel proved that it can be a partner for peace with Egypt, with Jordan, with the UAE, with Baharin, with Morocco. **[7:13:10] Speaker A:** It can be going to another area as well. And now come to the heart of the problem. Unlike what you think, it is not Palestine. Let's say, let's say that the miracle will happen, okay? And we solve the Israeli Palestinian issue. how it will change the the Middle East problems in Iran. Will it save change the regime in Iran? Will it change the missiles that flying from from the Houthis to Riyad or to Abu Dhabi? Will it change the civil war in Libya? So with all due respect, nobody in this room want to serve the Israeli Palestinian more than me. But I'm not naive to think that this will make a new Middle East. **[7:14:04] Speaker B:** Okay, **[7:14:04] Speaker A:** I have a better idea. Change the regime in Iran and the Middle East will be seen much better in Yemen, in the Gulf, in Iraq, in Syria, in Lebanon, everywhere. Okay. **[7:14:19] Speaker B:** Okay. **[7:14:20] Speaker A:** And **[7:14:20] Speaker B:** Okay. Doesn't mean I agree, but I'm listening. **[7:14:23] Speaker A:** No, there are a couple of myths that we have to correct. **[7:14:26] Speaker B:** Okay. And I looking forward to another Israeli government that will be able to take the military achievements **[7:14:39] Speaker A:** that Israel have done since the the terrible day of the 7th of October which was a defeat which was a a massacre which the terrorists kill babies in front of their parents. They kill grandmothers in front of their grandchild, right? They rape the the the girls. This will not have happened again because Israel will have a a bigger margin of of defense. But it is not to justify anything of territorial expansion. **[7:15:18] Speaker B:** Okay. Israel has to to preempt when we see terrorists on our borders. But we don't want any peace of Lebanon, of Syria, of Jordan, of Egypt. Okay. **[7:15:28] Speaker A:** It's hard sell. It's hard sell almost what you're saying. **[7:15:31] Speaker B:** It's not hard sell. It's easy unless you all the day listening to El Jazzer. Okay. **[7:15:37] Speaker A:** I don't listen to Alazer. I don't like it. is I hope the next government of Israel will be able to convince those who believe in stability, who believe in peace that it has a lot to offer without threatening its neighbor. **[7:15:54] Speaker A:** on the other hand will have higher margin of of defense visav the terrorist on our borders or anybody who want to have a nuclear weapon to do what he in the open saying **[7:16:11] Speaker B:** okay **[7:16:12] Speaker A:** nobody is going to say that he want to erase Egypt from the map but the Iranians are saying in the open death that's to Israel deaths to America and We are now listening to our enemies **[7:16:28] Speaker B:** because the mistake was not to listen to them before the 7th of October. **[7:16:33] Speaker A:** You going to give me one minute to **[7:16:34] Speaker B:** No, give me another another **[7:16:37] Speaker A:** idea. **[7:16:37] Speaker B:** Another minute. **[7:16:38] Speaker A:** Okay. **[7:16:39] Speaker B:** Not about Israel, **[7:16:40] Speaker A:** about Jordan. **[7:16:42] Speaker B:** No. **[7:16:42] Speaker A:** Okay. **[7:16:43] Speaker B:** About the the fact that the new Middle East is also shaped by the rest of the war. **[7:16:51] Speaker A:** Okay. by the great power competition, by the development of technology. You know, some people think that anyway the whole human civilization is going to be destroyed by AI. So, it it doesn't matter if it's a Turk or Egyptian or Israeli. So there is huge factors that will affect the future Middle East that has nothing to do with the Palestinians, the Iranians or the Israelis. **[7:17:23] Speaker B:** Okay. **[7:17:24] Speaker A:** And the fact that the great power competition is happening also in the Middle East is very interesting because some people in America think that they can withdraw from the Middle East, disengage from the Middle East. **[7:17:40] Speaker B:** Correct. But in the same time they are with competition with China and they know that if they will withdraw from the Middle East, China will feel developed. **[7:17:51] Speaker A:** Thank you Amos. No, that I understand and thank thank you for bringing that. Yes, the international dimension of reshaping the Middle East, redrawing in new map peace. It is actually essential. It is deterr. It's not only about the internal local dynamics among within states in the region but also as Dr. Dr. Karim at the very beginning uh referred to this is the international system and also Dr. K I I want to take this to you because Amos says you look you're mistaken everyone here is mistaken the problem is not Israel policies on Palestine the problem is the regime in Iran change the regime all Middle East problems will be solved just you know by itself automatically and don't don't get it wrong they're not expansionist there is no Israelis dreams or even capability actually to go and occupy the Middle East. They want peace. They want integrated but they are threatened by the Iranians. **[7:18:50] Speaker A:** And if the Iranians gone and the Turks now think that Israel is coming after them and the Turks will confront them. So how you react to that? **[7:18:58] Speaker B:** So Z, you said you are realist here, right? You are realist here. So if you believe that a regime change in a country can significantly alter its foreign policy, **[7:19:08] Speaker A:** I don't believe anything else. **[7:19:09] Speaker B:** You don't believe that. So that is that is the answer. You're giving the answer by yourself, right? A regime change may not be the solution. **[7:19:17] Speaker A:** This has been tried before and it didn't bring any good. And to believe that there is only one culprit here is wrong, right? It depends on where you look at it. Of course, if you look at from the dimension of Israel, it may look like that. But if you look at from the other Middle Eastern countries, ignoring Palestinian question and thinking that without resolution of the Palestinian question, we can still have peace, stability, confidence building and mutual trust in the region in order to stabilize the policy, economy and geopolitics is mistaken. And I want to emphasize one more thing before uh ending my comment here. Number one, when we are thinking about even realistically when we are thinking about the uh future of the Middle East or what's happening right now with the alignments and everything, one of the most significant problem is mutual trust **[7:20:20] Speaker A:** and building trust because of that for the security architecture is key and the things that ambassador mentioned about the alliances policy coordination and a crisis thing is not crisis management issue is not mutually exclusive. When we look at that there can be a layer of complimentary network of partnership. We can have the collective defense agreement like that mech agreement is trying to create. A second layer can be something like R4 or maybe it will increase the R5 or R six in the future that would create a policy coordination and the key is to provide the third circle as well. And the third circle will be for the non-member states or countries that remain outside that prefer to remain outside of it to prevent crisis escalation. **[7:21:21] Speaker B:** Okay. or any kind of deconliction that would lead to any kind of political disagreements or disputes to lead to armed conflicts. **[7:21:33] Speaker B:** Well, thank you very much and uh my dear panelists, I would like from all of you just to prepare kind of final thoughts in in a few minutes uh as as a closing so we engage actually the audience more in this session uh because I think it is very important to learn from the people uh in in the room. uh and uh to shorten it. Um Ambassador Karim, you know, the fallout of the Iran war, do we know it and how that is impacting shaping the region? And if there is new rules to this new security architecture, who set the rules and if you to nominate some players of the region to be like those who are setting the rules and playing the game, what countries would be for you? and also reflect on what Ben said please in one minute. I'm joking. **[7:22:29] Speaker A:** Yeah. So we see the fallout. **[7:22:33] Speaker B:** Okay. **[7:22:33] Speaker A:** I mean the the fallout is a multiffront regional conflict that has targeted civilians that has targeted critical infrastructure that has set the region back economically, geopolitically, strategically. We see that in the Gulf. We see that in Israel Palestine. We see that in the Levant as we've heard uh in the last uh session, **[7:22:58] Speaker B:** right? **[7:22:59] Speaker A:** Who sets the rules? There are no rules which is exactly why we find the the the rules are being contested, right? So who sets the rules is actually part of the conflict. And maybe just to rather than talk about the rules try and unpack the logic here. So okay getting to you know a realist mindset. So what do we see that is maybe again new uh but at the same time not so new in the region. We see and this is where I agree with General Yadlin. We see the the Israeli Palestinian conflict producing extreme violence. October 7th, yes, was an instance of extreme violence. What happened in the aftermath was an instance of extreme violence that former Israeli prime ministers have called uh uh war crimes that Holocaust scholars have called genocide, right? That international organizations are actually looking at in terms of litigating the crime of genocide. **[7:24:13] Speaker A:** It is extreme violence. We've seen the wreckage that is has been produced in Gaza and now in the West Bank. We see the trauma in Israel. I think the general is absolutely right. And we see what a continuation of this logic can produce in all of these arenas in Israel Palestine in the Levant in the Gulf. we see the region headed towards more militarization. So if you look at you know the the figures that we produce at CRI you know so the region in 2025 spent almost $220 billion right which is over the last 10 years represents a 36% increase in the level of **[7:25:01] Speaker B:** 13% **[7:25:02] Speaker A:** 36% **[7:25:03] Speaker B:** 36% **[7:25:03] Speaker A:** over the last decade. You don't have to be, you know, very uh insightful to extend that trajectory to see where the region is going in terms of militarization. If you add to that the sophistication of military capabilities, you know, deep strike capabilities, artificial intelligence, drones, hypersonics, standoff missiles. We are looking at the conflict landscape changing, becoming more existential as as we've seen. We are looking at the military context changing, becoming highly unstable and disruptive. And so if we don't get to a pathway where we can have a more stable regional order, this is what we are seeing now in terms of your question. This is the outcome. Right. But this is also the future. **[7:26:00] Speaker B:** Well, what a future, Ambassador Karim. And you're right. I mean, if this is the logic, then that is the outcomes. Now, uh, in the same token, I'm I'm bringing to you almost one more time. And as you see, uh, so changing the regime in Iran is not necessarily the only problem that will solve all other related problems. uh but based also on that and reacting to it if you to redraw the maps in the region in terms of alignments. So what kind of paths maps you see given your understanding and just looking at the region not as Israeli or from Israeli perspective as a general and scholar and person of interested in that and second as Israeli. So what are the competing paths and maps in the region? I think that the alliance in the Middle East can be much more towards what the vision I presented in my first opening remarks. **[7:27:03] Speaker B:** A a vision of stability, of trust, of trying to solve conflict, to avoid conflict and solve them diplomatically and know what are solvable and what is not solvable. In in the case of the Middle East, I will point again and again, the problem is Iran. The problem is Iran. And even here in the Gulf, they were not sure. But now they know that the problem is Iran. So **[7:27:39] Speaker A:** maps, give me maps. **[7:27:41] Speaker B:** I give you a very good map. **[7:27:43] Speaker A:** Okay. **[7:27:44] Speaker B:** The the basic peace agreement between Israel and Jordan and the Abraham Accord is the the lines that we should follow. And in the Israeli Egyptian peace agreement, there was a Palestinian chapter and the Abrahamic accord also spoke about Palestine. One of the reasons Senoir attacked Israel is he wanted to spoil the normalization between Israel and the Saudis. And I think Turkey will join as well if an Israeli government will try to build trust with the Palestinians to try and solve the problem which is very difficult. **[7:28:37] Speaker B:** I don't have time to tell you the joke that **[7:28:39] Speaker A:** well joke always has time. So go **[7:28:42] Speaker B:** you know Putin came to Almighty and and ask him when Ukraine will be mine. Say not in your term. And then aliu ali came to almighty and say when Iran will be the dominant force in the Middle East and Almighty said not in your terror. And then the Israeli prime minister came and asked when we will solve the problem with the Palestinians and almighty say not in my terror. So we have to try and I'm going along the lines that my friend from Turkey uh draw **[7:29:35] Speaker A:** okay **[7:29:36] Speaker B:** uh conflict resolution conflict uh avoiding trying to have to identify what are the the benefits of cooperation development water energy artificial intelligence. **[7:29:53] Speaker A:** Okay. And I I we will look very much to find the Palestinians that we can do peace with. **[7:30:02] Speaker B:** Okay, **[7:30:02] Speaker A:** we have Hamas in Gaza group of terrorist that not recognize Israel. **[7:30:08] Speaker B:** Okay, **[7:30:08] Speaker A:** and the right of Israel and we see in Ramallah and ask your friends here in the UAE what they think about Abu Mazik corruption and capability to reach peace. **[7:30:19] Speaker B:** Amos, I know that. We know that. Everyone knows that we're talking about maps and thanks for excellent joke. I think you need a different version of Almighty that he can do things while he's alive. Now, Kellish, I take it to you. Uh and look would you think talking about maps that this in Mecca agreement although it's a UDI initiative is it even possible and plausible to think of it as a Turkish attempt to start the rebalancing and paving its role in the region. Would you say this agreement is like **[7:31:01] Speaker A:** rebalancing against whom? **[7:31:02] Speaker B:** Say it again. **[7:31:03] Speaker A:** Rebalancing against whom? I didn't get it. **[7:31:06] Speaker B:** Against Israel for sure and against Abraham accords and against any other alliances. **[7:31:13] Speaker A:** Do you think so? I think I think it is you know like the that kind of uh Turkey has been in the region for long enough to understand that those kind of blockings will not bring any good for the region. Because of that from the very beginning Turkey made sure that this agreement is not against the third parties. The agreement is done in order to generate the trust, prevent any kind of conflict among these parties so that they can cooperate because most significant impediment against cooperation in the region has always been about the mutual trust among the major powers in the region. So the agreement intended not against the common threats but for the common interest. And if those countries can work together and if the members expand it can include it can be a more inclusive a large group of countries that aims to provide stability, peace and prosperity of the region. **[7:32:16] Speaker A:** And it is important to understand that we are now talking about and this is the problem unfortunately we are facing when we study Middle East it's all about the conflicts and there has been different type of issues that has been threatening the people in the region economic problems generational problems climate problems infrastructural problems after all these conflicts and we have never discussed this issue because each and every time we have a Middle East panel, it would be about geopolitics. It would be about conflicts and the best way to provide that sustained cooperation is institutionalized cooperation. And here is the thing if it you know like there has been a lot of debates when the mech agreement would it be something like NATO would it be something like European Union maybe it would be both of them right because in order to provide sustained economic cooperation the most significant thing is to provide safety and security of the routes provide the connectivity diversify connectivities in the region etc. **[7:33:26] Speaker A:** So before that alignment or agreement, it wouldn't be even possible to generate that form of cooperation that would create a regional economic integration process. **[7:33:39] Speaker B:** Thank you very much. **[7:33:40] Speaker B:** This is beautiful. Now I'm going to leave two two ideas with you while we're taking uh questions. What would you think that shapes states behavior in the region? It is identity slash ideology in terms of nationalism or others or pure strategic logic of state behavior. I'll come back to you on that but take any questions and I think I have one from my friend Hani Fuki. **[7:34:09] Speaker A:** Uh thank you very much. Um my question is to the panelists and it's about the premise uh that's implicit in the theme of this session. Uh in physics there is a concept called the Newton's law of motion that for every action there's a reaction that's equal and opposite. uh the US elections have in my view produced um a a reaction uh and uh it may have uh some serious and long-term implications and my question is to the panelists is can you speculate uh to any uh action or reaction to the events of the last year in this region? **[7:34:57] Speaker B:** Thank you. Uh I'll take this for now. anyone would like to answer it. I'll start with you Karim and reflect on identity/st strategic logic. **[7:35:08] Speaker A:** So maybe to connect your question with with H's uh comment. So how do states identify or what what drives their actions visa v the emerging regional context? And I think it goes back to much of what we've been saying earlier is that precisely because the conflicts are now being framed in existential terms when you see this in Israel Palestine. I mean the revival of the narrative of the Holocaust on the Israeli side, the revival of the NECBA on the the Palestinian side, **[7:35:42] Speaker B:** you know, the framing the conflict with Iran in existential terms. I mean as you know to quote you general you know destroying the Iranian regime that is an existential objective right **[7:35:54] Speaker A:** the regime it's not the nation **[7:35:57] Speaker B:** well **[7:35:57] Speaker A:** they want to destroy the Israeli nation **[7:36:00] Speaker B:** and and we'll get to you the the proud and the important nation of Iran will change its regime **[7:36:10] Speaker A:** and I'll give you **[7:36:10] Speaker B:** we don't want to destroy anybody **[7:36:12] Speaker A:** okay **[7:36:13] Speaker B:** and I carry on carrying **[7:36:14] Speaker A:** no and no and I think that's very interesting because we've heard different articulations of the rationale of the conflict coming from the Israeli side regime change certainly degrading the Iranian state you know different variations of this but overall I agree with you right but at the end of the day this is an existential framing now the reaction to to get to Hie's point right the reaction will be extreme right and so we see the extreme reaction being played out in Israel, Palestine, in the Gulf on the part of uh Iran, you know, defining the objectives also in maximalist terms and changing the strategic picture, you know, the control over the straight of Hormuz, taking the conflict to the Gulf, turning the Gulf into an arena. And maybe just a concluding thought here, you know, whenever we have this existential framing, it always ends up worse. **[7:37:12] Speaker A:** So we only need to look at, you know, the situation in the Israeli Palestinian conflict in Iran. Everything we've been saying over the last two days, a regime that is more hardline, the nuclear program going underground, so we know less about what is happening with the nuclear program, the control over the Strait of Hormuz, externalizing the conflict to the Gulf States, it always ends worse. **[7:37:39] Speaker B:** Absolutely. So this is the reaction we get when we leave conflicts unressed and they are framed in existential terms. **[7:37:48] Speaker A:** No, thank you. Yes, existential is zerome and suicidal. So absolutely agree. Amos, your turn now. Yeah, philosophically there is the issue of action and reaction, but there is the issue of non-action appeasement that bring you something like World War II and belong to a people that pay a very high price. Six million people were clean. This is, by the way, a genocide. not what is happening in Gaza when Hamas is hiding and shielding itself behind his civilians. So no genocide in Gaza but genocide in Europe in the 40s because of non-action. **[7:38:37] Speaker B:** Okay. So the art the art of strategy and diplomacy and leadership is to understand when you have to act and when you have to be worried of no acting because the the consequences may be even worse than before you act. This is the wisdom that leaders need to find. **[7:39:00] Speaker A:** So so what motivates Israel? identity, existential perception or strategic logic of states. **[7:39:09] Speaker B:** Israel is living in a trauma of existential sweat. **[7:39:14] Speaker A:** Yeah. This is dangerous **[7:39:17] Speaker B:** and they they are listening all the time to what is transmitted in Thran, in Qatar, in in the Palestinian what they are educating about is is to kill Israelis. It's happening unfortunately now in Syria. Look at the the new education system in Syria. They teach him to consider jihadist. **[7:39:43] Speaker A:** Okay, so I didn't read that. This is the main problem of Israel. However, we understand we are a small country. **[7:39:50] Speaker B:** Okay, **[7:39:50] Speaker A:** and we want to live in peace with our neighbors. So **[7:39:54] Speaker B:** it's it's once again the wisdom of a leader to see when he need to act because there is existential threat **[7:40:04] Speaker A:** or when he need to take some risk and reach an agreement with the with its former enemies. **[7:40:13] Speaker B:** But I think begging and Sadat proved look we have five wars with Egypt. **[7:40:20] Speaker A:** Yeah. And at the end of the day, amazing leader called Ano Sadat came to Jerusalem and say no more war, no more blighting. In one speech, it changed the Israeli opinion. **[7:40:34] Speaker B:** Brilliant. I agree. Fully agree. **[7:40:36] Speaker A:** Those who were not willing to give one cime of Sinai gave him all sign. **[7:40:43] Speaker B:** I see. Leaders do matter. Leaders change the course of history. No doubt. Kell **[7:40:49] Speaker A:** uh I think what you said about identity and economy and interest are not mutually inclusive exclusive. We have always seen that when there is an economic problem in a country we see the rise of nationalism. We see the trade protectionism by the government which led which also lead to a social transformation which far-right groups would emerge anti-immigrant, anti-refugee, xenophobia or anything. Right? So this is something that is like a spiral that repeats itself. Unfortunately when you face one of those problems, one of those challenges, the others will come. The questions about the question about the comment about the US was something that complements my argument about how the domestic politics in US can significantly alter the foreign policy. When we look at what happened in the midterm elections, right, as the vice president mentioned, the the war in Iran, the economic dimension that come to us as a result of that war and the US policy towards Israel, **[7:41:51] Speaker A:** the three things that he mentioned and when we look at the exit polls, we see them as significant issues. And the question is would United States change its foreign policy in accordance with that public you know like the demand or election result and if we expect every election to make that kind of pro transformation in US foreign policy which would affect our lives in the region that would be waiting for you know like the another president to come and change expecting durability expecting coherence, expecting consistency from the US foreign policy at this point in the region is unrealistic unfortunately given the dynamics in US domestic politics because of that that regional ownership is the most significant thing that we in the countries in the region should take that responsibility **[7:42:49] Speaker B:** whether it you call it burden sharing whether it is burden shifting Americans would like it. **[7:42:54] Speaker A:** Well, this is this is great. I started with uh illusion, arrogance and hijgemony or dominance. Then I take the existential mindset and I'll take the leaders do matter and I'll take all international politics are local to end up this panel. Thank you very much panelist and thank you audience for being here **[7:43:22] Speaker B:** and thank you Dr. for this wonderful conference. **[7:44:33] Speaker B:** Ladies and gentlemen, we conclude the ADSD procedure. with closing remarks by EPC President Dr. Dr. The floor is all yours. **[7:44:57] Speaker B:** Ladies and gentlemen, over two days and in 11 sessions uh with more than 50 speakers uh males and females uh from the leading politicians and strategic experts uh and intellectuals and decision makers from different parts of the world. um Abu Dhabi strategic debate uh disc and the theme after the storm the iron war fallout and the new r of power the discuss the impacts of the impacts of such fallout on the international order and the regional order of the Middle East and as usual at the end of each debate I'm going to summarize in this speech the most important issue and strategies discuss discussed at the 13th debate. Uh the keynote speech of Dr. Ana Gash talked about the lessons learned from the Indian attacks against the Gulf counties and uh from which the UAE was hit the most and what that experience revealed uh in terms of the all of the UAE and **[7:46:30] Speaker B:** the Asian in general and what that means for uh the choices that the UAE and the other countries and the Asian should take in the coming years. And he highlighted that the war was a test for the capabilities of the country in terms of defense and survival. And the performance of UAE armed forces was remarkable and very professional in defending UAE territory and its citizens and its resident. and Kaisers has showcased uh the strength of the leadership of the UAE and was uh appreciated by different leaders of the world. And one of the most important lessons of the last war is that uh we have no other no to choose not to choose between diplomacy and deterrence but we choose both and that the main priority of the UAE is to continue uh its national model which allowed it to achieve success in progress. in the first sessions the UAE compass uh power resilience and the art of strategic autonomy. **[7:47:52] Speaker B:** uh the speakers agree that the model of the UAE if it it managed to uh prosper and in a turbulent even in a turbulent uh environment full of crisis and conflicts which means that the UAE has been planning proactively for dangers and threats and building resilience and the the UAE understood the importance of overcoming uh weaknesses and exposures because destroying the UAE model one was one of the goals of the Iranian attacks and the ability to continue was one of the main element of strategic deterrence in the second session who will rule the world and big debate about the regime and the power. The speakers mentioned that the United States is no longer the country that leads the world and that the midterm elections will have impacts on the all of the United States globally and at the international order highlighting that what China is playing as a competitive power to United states on the international level in terms of what it represents with the with the middle powers emerging middle powers in the international order. **[7:49:36] Speaker B:** In the third session, the west confronting itself power without consensus in an age of faction. uh discussions was about the crisis across the Atlantic in light of the challenge added by Trump administration in weakening those relationships and managing the conflicts between United States and Europe and the speakers mentioned the need for Europe to uh deepen its unity because division inside the European Union make stability, strategic stability of Europe difficult and that it's important for Europe to cooperate with China as international actors while maintaining uh their uh independence in that relationship and making sure that it will not be with uh also with the United States. But also they spoke about the need to structure the NATO and to change the whole of Europe within that. In the fourth session after beyond the AI, the transformation of warfare and the next strategic shock, the the panel examined the all of recent technologies on defense strategies and the implication of the ongoing influence in the war and **[7:51:14] Speaker B:** Ukraine and Russia was one of the cases we can learn from and build on for innovation and for thinking out of the box in defense and small states and um middle-size states thinking gradually about obtaining defense technologies and in the case of the UAE building trust and credibility and maintaining strategic autonomy is an important uh uh structure in the uh defense. defense system for the UAE in the UAE approach of defense technologies of different types. In the fifth session, the Pacific Chess Board of Ambition, America, China and Asia's new age game. This speaker spoke about the continuity of the competition between uh United States and China in the Indo-Pacific Asian without expecting change changes in the policy of the US in the Asian uh before the end of Trump term and they mentioned the need for building alliances in the Asian. At the same time, there are attempts by countries of Asian Asian to uh to have more uh uh alliances in the Asian mentioning what the war of the for energy security between Asia and the Gulf count is which **[7:52:55] Speaker B:** makes it important for Asian uh powers to enhance uh um navigation security in the Gulf region. In the sixth uh session uh who will secure the Gulf from strategic exposure to collective security discussion focused on whether Gulf country is a on identifying the the common threats or the enemy and answers were different. Some consider there is a different approach for handling the alien neighbor and all others who consider that the biggest threats come from Iran and cyber attacks. Now something to worry about because uh we need a cyber uh for the Gulf and the speakers agreed that defense and diplomacy deterrence and development are Gulf priorities that are comprehensive unlike Aan uh which deploys uh its effort for military confrontation. In the seventh panel between the homos gandle and the competition of Middle East and connectivity uh speaker said that while Gulf countries are seeking to expand the pipelines and the outs and the always and seap ports to mitigate **[7:54:31] Speaker B:** the impacts of uh disruption by Aan of navigation in Hos that such logistical out will allow connectivity in the Asian and expand trade and investment between the Asians and that the crisis of homos and in freedom of navigation in Babel Mandab will be an opportunity to revive the project of economic corridor between India east and Europe despite the geopolitical challenges in the eighth uh session uh new Iran and old Aan regime transformation and the future of the Islamic Republic. The speakers mentioned that the war and uh the economic pressure uh did not allow to see the decision sources on which the Iranian state focused in its modern concept and opened the door for competition between political forces and military forces in Iran. That is not and pinned by one offense. And while the Indian regime was suffering from crisis of legitimacy, the impact of the war and the blockade and hence that crisis and naturally this would have an impact on uh the pending issues between international community and the **[7:56:02] Speaker B:** new. We can see the emergence of the ethnical ethical oppos ethnical opposition from the Kesish and the Baluchi with the diminish of the dominance of the Iranian states on the border in Kant is and the ninth session is after the war security integration and and the making of the Middle East by make by with perspective of Israel, for the Asian, the Iran and the world. And from Iranian perspective, the only solution to change Iran is to invade Iran with ground armed forces. But nobody in the US wants that. And Iran does not want to make concessions. And from the dialogue of the speakers, it looks clear that Isra wants the Asian to change before we ask Isra to uh conduct substantial changes in its approach towards Gaza and the West Bank and the Palestinian state and also for the neighbors of Israel and its integration in the Asian. **[7:57:18] Speaker B:** In the opinion of Israel, they tried everything but did not gain the trust and security and the 10th session the new Aabent states for line and the politics of econ showcase that the ABLE has seen uh deep changes in the last two years particularly in Syria and Lebanon with efforts and ill steps to rebuild the states. and again sovereignty. However, these countries are facing real challenges uh in uh building national identity and continuing governance and economic reforms and stability in the Arab level is linked to the conflict between Iran and the United States and Israel and the part of the conflict Palestino is the 11th session. discussed uh the Middle East between competitive uh perspective and regional interaction in the new Middle East and the nature of polarization that started emerging in light of the Indian war in light of the continued vision for the future **[7:58:46] Speaker B:** of the Asian. The reality is that we have a changing Middle East and not a new Middle East. In this changing Middle East, the powers try to maintain relations of cooperation despite the growing issues of divergence. Ladies and gentlemen, this was a quick summary of uh the points highlighted in uh the 13 Abu Dhabi Sajic debate, ideas and insights linked to uh strategies and changes uh linked to the war of an on the international order and the regional order of the Middle East. And as much as the sessions of the debate highlighted the different angles, at the same time it is lots of questions that need much more uh research and those remain open for discussion in the future. In conclusion, I would like uh to thank all the speakers uh who uh shared with us their insights uh and expectations. I would like to thank also the moderators uh who did lots of efforts uh in moderating those sessions and I would also like to express my thanks to all the attendees the guests and I would like also to **[8:00:29] Speaker B:** thank his excellency Dr. Ana Gash, the diplomatic advisor to his highness, the president of the UAE, who honored us with the keynote speech at the forum. And I would like to thank uh the media outlets that covered the sessions of the debate and in particular Sky News AIA and the national newspaper our media uh partners. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude and pride of uh Abu Dhabi or IMAT policy center team which started months ago in preparing for this debate in all the logistical aspects. Uh and I would like to thank uh the young men and women uh volunteers uh who helped us uh and did not complain and they worked very hard during the days of the debate. Thank you for your participation and engagement and I hope uh to meet you again in the next Abu Dhabi strategic debate, the 14th one next year here in the beautiful capital Abu Dhabi, the capital of Isilians. **[8:02:00] Speaker B:** Until then, I wish you uh success and may the peace and blessing of God be upon you. And uh I invite you uh to wait uh for the the final video. Please stay with us for one minute to watch it. **[8:02:39] Speaker B:** Come to me. **[8:02:51] Speaker B:** I believe Gulf solidarity and coordination during this crisis could have been stronger and more effective. Our region has previously demonstrated greater capacity for collective action, notably during Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and periods of regional instability associated with the Arab uprising. **[8:03:28] Speaker A:** foreign **[8:03:53] Speaker A:** speech. **[8:04:02] Speaker A:** is clear that if you have a United States that is less committed to European defense and understands itself no longer as a firstline responder as it did uh with a trip wire concept during the Cold War uh but as a as a as a last resort responder. **[8:04:25] Speaker B:** You know strategy. **[8:04:46] Speaker B:** So in that new context we cannot really we cannot converge. I mean like us always say oh you join Dr. Ty you should converge to become one of us. Oh, now they realize okay we cannot convert but let's coexist peacefully. **[8:05:01] Speaker A:** Today there is geotech technology is playing a significantly bigger role in redefining the geopolitical uh landscape and definitely the the the setup of warfare. **[8:05:17] Speaker B:** I think Asia is going to set the boundaries of this competition in some sense. I don't think the powers in Asia are just going to be responding to what's happening amongst the big two rather they are going to be deciding how the big two arrange their ambitions in this continent **[8:05:36] Speaker B:** virus virus and the whole wipiber malware Wiper malware. **[8:06:15] Speaker B:** I invite the team of Emirates policy center and volunteers to come to the stage for a go photo.