# Peter Thiel: The AI Crisis, Europe’s Decline & the Battle for America **Channel:** MDMEETS - Essential Talks with Mathias Döpfner **Source:** https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B7yl7fEHeKM **Transcript page:** https://www.withtranscript.ai/video/B7yl7fEHeKM ## Chapters - 0:03 — Stagnation Thesis and AI Acceleration - 4:02 — AI Risk, Skepticism, and Global Competition - 12:10 — Democracy, Technology, and Moral Framing - 18:02 — Democracy, Polarization, and German Politics - 22:59 — Trump, Democrats, and Political Disruption - 33:21 — Argentina, Milei, and Economic Drift - 39:35 — Europe, China, and Germany's Future - 46:25 — German Roots and Contrarian Thinking - 53:47 — Longevity, Biology, and Eternal Life - 1:03:24 — Contrarian Truths and Closing Remarks ## Transcript **[0:03] Speaker A:** Herzlich willkommen in Berlin. Dankeschön. **[0:15] Speaker B:** Wir kommen nachher noch mal auf Deutschland zurück. Let's switch to English now. Peter, you have discussed a lot over the last years the problem that in your view the West did not deliver enough progress enough change in technology. Um you even spoke about stagnation. Uh, that is a topic uh and a term that almost nobody would use these days. It's pretty much the opposite. People are discussing is there too much acceleration? Is AI progressing too fast? So, what's what's your take? Did you change your mind or is it still not enough? **[0:55] Speaker A:** I've changed my mind um uh to some extent. Uh, let me first articulate the stagnation thesis which I started articulating 20 years ago or so uh and is is that uh it's always very hard to measure these things because there's so so many different dimensions of progress, so many different areas of technology and science and uh the the basic thesis uh was was that since the 1970s there had been a slowdown. There'd been progress in the world of bits in a computers, internet, mobile internet, software but not so much in the world of atoms and that most of the the most of the engineering fields that were um related to atoms were not even successful fields for people to study. Mechanical engineering, chemical engineering, you know, aero astro, nuclear engineering was already a bad idea by the 1980s. Uh, and that uh for a variety of reasons there had been this this this slowdown. **[1:48] Speaker A:** Uh, I thought um **[1:49] Speaker B:** I I believed that this um this not total stagnation but this this broad slowdown in progress uh was an important factor driving, you know, um a lot of things were going wrong in our society. Uh, you know, a lot of the politics have become more polarized because uh, you know, when when when there's a loser for every winner, it becomes this very zero-sum game and uh, you you sort of get a uh a much, you know, a much worse society. Uh, and of course there were some very deep reasons why, you know, I speculated this had happened, but yeah, big picture was that for for decades, um we had something something like stagnation. There was there was a way that the the internet, you know, was an important growth driver in the late '90s. I uh it was bigger than anything else, perhaps not big enough to to take our whole civilization to the next level. **[2:42] Speaker B:** And then I think perhaps um perhaps AI um is bigger than the internet and is at least has the potential to to reaccelerate growth with all the good and bad things that that that come with that. Uh, but yes, the the the way I would um the way I would defend the stagnation thesis is that uh now that now that we have AI, um people nobody disagrees with me that we were in stagnation for decades before. **[3:06] Speaker A:** Yeah, it has been proven in retrospect, definitely. So, um these days the perception of AI is swinging pretty much between euphoria and dystopia. Um and uh there was a lot of discussion over the last weeks about the collective warning that Dario Amodai, some old man, and Elon Musk presented and that was uh the monster could get out of control. What's your take on that? Is it, as some people are saying, mainly a tactical move, a marketing move, or a move in order to drive the expectations down with regard to big multi-trillion IPOs, or is it truly the fear that AI could get out of control and could overrule human intelligence and mankind? **[4:02] Speaker B:** Well, there there there many many different dimensions to the AI debates and and the problems and and yes, there are there are these scenarios that are maybe science fiction science fiction fantasy maybe that maybe they're somewhat more realistic where uh if you if you have a if you have something that in some sense is way smarter than any any human being you know, is there some way it can escape control? You know, and and have of course all kinds of um dystopian science fiction movies, you know, Matrix, Terminator, things like that. And uh you know, I I don't think the and I don't even know how you speak about probabilities of things like that happen. I don't think the probabilities are very high. On the other hand, if the probability is even 5 or 10%, that seems pretty bad. Uh so, there's some there's something about the the conversation that ends up um pushing people very hard in a in a sort of defensive, precautionary way. **[5:00] Speaker A:** If it's about proba- probabilities, there was recently an experiment to ask the six biggest LLMs, is there an extinction risk with regard to AI? And the predicted percentage was between 1 and 10%. Uh do you think uh it's just because the LLMs are based on human uh fears, human pessimism, or is it a real point? **[5:26] Speaker B:** Let Let us Let us for the sake of argument say that it is a real point. You know, I'm not you know, I I think it's hard to argue that probabilities are 0% something. Uh I do think um but but you shouldn't It It doesn't necessarily follow that you should always go slower and always go in the in the precautionary direction because if you do nothing, if there is no progress on any dimension, uh I don't think our societies work at all. And you know, I I've often said, you know, the middle class um in the US Europe they're they're the people who expect their children to do better than themselves and the sort of intergenerational progressive compact in our society was that there was you know progress from one generation to the next maybe economic progress material progress progress in health progress you know all sorts of softer social kinds of dimensions and and when that breaks down yeah I **[6:27] Speaker B:** I think the whole society starts to derange in very very strange ways and so so yes so there's there's a there's a picture that people implicitly have that the alternative to AI let's say a zero growth world where there's no progress at all will somehow be this you know peaceful social democratic society and I don't I don't think that's true so I I think yeah I think I think the alternative is also you know far from neutral I I also think there's you know there's some degree to which you can never just turn the clock back **[7:04] Speaker A:** And so **[7:05] Speaker B:** but then slowing it down is just unrealistic or how could it work I mean I don't get it if America is slowing down and China is accelerating we are just strengthening China but it's not it's solving anything **[7:18] Speaker A:** it's all it's all in theory you could slow it down if you had if you had genuine you know deep cooperation across the whole world and and then I but I think that would require like a you know one world government with real teeth real force and the sort of classical liberal part of me thinks that's almost you know that's a frying pan into fire it's a cure that's worse than the disease and then of course you can you can have fake global government where government where have a lot of conferences discuss it you know a lot of you know somewhat empty uh statements that get put out and and then there's also of course a risk that it ends up being slowed down in the west and you know not in not in China you know the uh the Pope recently issued this um AI encyclical or you know, I I would characterize it **[8:12] Speaker A:** as an anti- AI encyclical. And um and again, this is you know, maybe it was too too harsh, but the rhetorical point I I have on it is that uh is the people, you know, the Communist Party of China is not going to listen to the Pope. There's a chance people in the US will. And so, in effect, the Pope's encyclical was working for the Communist Party. I'm not saying he's an agent of the communists, but he was at least uh acting as a useful idiot for uh for the CCP. **[8:39] Speaker B:** I spoke to two founders of big AI platforms, and both said that they have evidence that the Chinese are spreading anti- AI content, particularly through American social media platforms, but also elsewhere, in order to turn around the American sentiment towards more AI skepticism in order to increase their advantage. Do you see similar things? Is there any evidence for that? Do you believe that? What's your take? **[9:15] Speaker A:** I haven't studied it that carefully. I'm inclined to believe it. I'm also inclined to think that that's not the main factor driving it, that it's a it's mainly this is mainly what we're doing to ourselves. You know, there's a way there's a way um you know, there's a way I'm tempted to say that you know, Greta is working for the Chinese communists. And maybe maybe she is, but uh she's more of a problem we've created for for ourselves in the West. **[9:40] Speaker B:** But is Greta's influence on the American sentiment that big? I mean, I'm surprised I have to say. **[9:45] Speaker A:** I think she's past uh past her prime. But but yes, it's I I I think I think there are so many of these things that we're we're doing to ourselves. So, we should be you know, I'm I'm a very tough critic of China's uh you know, I think I think we need to take the uh you know, the the competition, the rivalry with China very seriously. Um and then also uh it's it's It's somewhat too easy to simply blame it on China. **[10:10] Speaker B:** Yeah, but then why is it so negative at the moment in the US? I mean, I really have the feeling that if we are talking to our European colleagues about AI, as long as they are enabled to learn and participate in the journey, they're actually pretty positive. In America, it's very different. People are raising posters and are protesting against AI. So, it is almost a very anti I mean, anti-cliche of being American. Yeah, usually America is perceived to be pro-technology, pro-progress. And in that case, it is a bit the other way around. So, the next election campaign could be to a degree even a campaign which political party is protecting their people better against AI. Why is there such an anti-AI sentiment in America? Do they know more about it than the Europeans or has the American mentality changed? What's happening? **[10:56] Speaker A:** Well, let me let me do the the pro-US version. **[10:59] Speaker B:** Okay. **[10:59] Speaker A:** That this is where the US is the place where AI is happening. And then Europe is We can debate how far behind it is. And in my telling, it's extremely far behind. **[11:11] Speaker B:** Yeah. **[11:11] Speaker A:** Um it's extremely hard to catch up. It's obviously still a very fluid situation. But to first order, there's a lot happening in the US. China is a is a fast follower. And then Europe is extremely far behind. So, it is It's not felt in Europe. You know, it's it's not even felt on the level of corporations. Um if I um if I if I look at something like one business that I am involved with for many years, Palantir, the sales to US corporations have accelerated tremendously in the last few years because there's an urgency to to get ahead of the curve and figure out how how companies, you know, need to be transformed in this new AI age. And there's still much, much less of that sense of urgency in in Europe, where you know, there's still this inertia. We can We can wait. We can, you know, don't don't do tomorrow what you can save for the day after. **[12:10] Speaker B:** Do you think in the long run is going to be good for democracy or bad? **[12:18] Speaker A:** It is um That's a that's a very big very big question. I I think I think the You know, I I think the big um the the place where our democracies are in trouble uh our our and I always prefer saying constitutional republics or you know, our our our **[12:40] Speaker B:** broadly liberal societies, broadly free societies are are in trouble **[12:44] Speaker A:** is uh is is that uh there's a way that we don't have a broad growth story of the future. There's there's a sense in which um uh people don't think things are getting better. Things have become more more zero-sum. I don't I don't think AI is the panacea for everything. Uh but I think without that, you know, uh you're you're just going to continue to have these sort of zero-sum parties on the extreme right and left getting around. **[13:12] Speaker B:** Should we perhaps stop to discuss whether AI is positive or negative? I mean, I think it is almost like like a knife. You know, you with a knife you can prepare the most uh wonderful food and have a great dinner. And with a knife you can kill a person. So, if you don't want killings, uh you uh criticize murder. But you don't criticize or you don't ban the knife. Uh so, why do we always moralize new technologies? I would say technologies are just neutral. You can use them for good and for bad causes. And it depends on us what we human beings are doing with it. **[13:49] Speaker A:** Yeah, so I'm going to get in trouble for what I'm about to say, but uh I I think we moralize we moralize way too much. And there's always a question uh I I like to ask what is the antonym of good. And the moral antonym is evil. The functional antonym is bad. A Ferrari is an evil car because it doesn't get many miles per gallon. The um a Trabbi is a bad car. It works It's less good than a golf cart, you know, the former East German car. And and and so um you know, if you were um if you're evil, you're at least competent. Um and if you're evil, you're not bad. And therefore you're actually Maybe you're actually kind of kind of good because you're at least getting something done. In In if you contrast of Faust books of Marlowe versus Goethe. In Marlowe's Faust, that was the 16th century Faust story, uh Faust is a fake scientist. **[14:50] Speaker A:** He's sort of like a magician, you know, sort of um a fake alchemist and um it's bad science. And he goes straight to hell. In Goethe's Faust, yeah, he has a pact with the devil and he sort of gets his knowledge by morally dubious means, but it always it's still always, you know, works out more more for the best. And Goethe's Faust uh gets redeemed. And you know, so I I I think it's better to be good than evil. I want to be very clear. But perhaps um but you know, I I prefer Goethe's Faust to Marlowe's Faust. And then the the moral question the moral question in our society is Yeah, we have we have all these good versus evil debates and we're just we're full of badness. It's most of the time those things are not they're not even evil. They're not even good. **[15:40] Speaker A:** They're just merely bad. And so if you're in a world where 99% of the businesses, companies, people, political leaders, business leaders are totally incompetent. Uh that's that's the problem we should actually be talking about. **[15:53] Speaker B:** Very few people would say about you that you are incompetent, but there are some people in a very polarized discussion that say you are evil. And if it is about you are being evil, it is about democracy and some people are portraying you as the anti-democrat and they are basically all referring to one quote from 2009 where you wrote I stopped believing that freedom uh, and democracy are compati- compatible. Can you explain why you wrote it, what you mean with it, and what your thinking today is about? And it's it's always here it's always very dangerous to write things. **[16:29] Speaker A:** I know it's very dangerous. I know what you're talking about. **[16:32] Speaker B:** uh, you know, the context was it was it was this article I quickly typed out one night. I um, I sent it to one of my colleagues. I asked him to did I write anything controversial in it that I should not have written. And um, no, nothing controversial in here at all. And then my the meta-level postmortem I had was the fact that I asked someone for a second opinion told me that I had probably needed to be more careful in my wording. I did issue a correction 2 weeks later. So, you can still go to the website where you know, I make it very clear that I'm not I don't think anyone's votes are going to be taken away. I don't think that democracy will will go anywhere. Uh, and that I was was what I was arguing for was a certain deep politicization, a de-intensification of of politics. **[17:15] Speaker B:** Um, the original article occurred in this in this sort of libertarian uh, Cato online journal. And uh, the the point of it was directed against, you know, libertarians who put too much faith in politics and wanted to change things change the world by by winning elections and doing things like that. And uh, you know, I thought you know, um, uh, these pure libertarian, pure classical liberal ideas, I believe in them. I don't think they're they're easy to win in a democracy. I didn't say anything that Montesquieu or you know, John Stuart Mill um, or any of these people wouldn't have said. But uh, but it was not you know, it is not a claim that democracy is going to go away or anything like that. **[18:02] Speaker A:** But isn't it that sometimes you simply have fun in being provocative and stimulating a debate? **[18:07] Speaker B:** Uh, I I I I I do I do like I I do like doing that. I don't I don't think that one I I think that one was more than that. It was more than that. than stimulating **[18:17] Speaker A:** So, so my reading of your personality is that you always try to push people. **[18:20] Speaker B:** Yeah. But but you care a lot about democracy. You So you would say you are not only not an anti-democrat, you are actually a person who thinks about how to strengthen how to save democracy. Are you worried that we are going a wrong path these days? Polarizing of societies and weak and weaker centrist leadership all around the world. Autocratic systems are basically achieving their goals pretty successfully and economy in China that is a kind of authoritarian state economy is prospering. So if we simply draw a line at the moment, democracy is not going particularly well. **[19:00] Speaker A:** Um sure, but I look I'm I'm not a I'm not a Hegelian. So we can always say there's a there's a way where history seems to be going. There's a certain trend. And then it's not morally good. In Hegel, whatever happens happens for the best. And and so yeah, I I think there is a trend against democracy. There's a trend where where these things are you know, are in some trouble. You know, what went wrong in Germany in the 1920s and 30s? It was It was two anti-democratic parties. It was the Nazis and the communists. In the 1932 election, those two parties got over 50% of the vote. And once over 50% of the people, you know, vote for parties that want to get rid of democracy, you know, it's it's almost too late. You're really in trouble. **[19:44] Speaker B:** We have a situation in Germany these days where you also have very strong parties on the very left and on the very right. In Berlin, the socialists won the election and Saxony-Anhalt, the smaller state, the very right-wing party AfD won the last election in a landslide. And more and more is shifting from the center to the extremes. Do you have any ideas what could be done in order to reverse that trend? Or is it a trend that cannot be reversed? **[20:14] Speaker A:** I I I I don't know what you would do if you ran for office. I don't think I would be a good politician. It's not what I would want to do. I you know, uh I and so I don't have great advice for the the political leaders the centrist political leaders in in these countries on I think they systematically underestimate the scale of the problem. You know, in in Great Britain, there have been seven prime ministers in the last 10 years. Nobody's had a plan for how to turn their societies around. They all think, you know, once I become prime minister, that's all I have to do. I have to figure out this this complicated internal intra-party, you know, complicated game to become prime minister and once once I do that, you know, I can figure out all these problems and then there are these these deep **[21:01] Speaker A:** structural problems. You know, in my in my again the the the technological stagnationist perspective I have is that there's not been enough progress. The societies have been fraying. The intergenerational compact has broken down and and this is what these things are reflections of. And maybe I don't think I don't think the extreme parties will will solve things, but we we need to take it seriously. So the Linke in in the Berlin elections have got 25% of the vote among 16 to 24-year-old voters it got 47% and that's you know, you know, eventually the young people are the people, you know, who will who will be deciding deciding things in in your society. That's a very bad trend and and you know, you know, I don't I don't I'm making the pro-Linke argument because you you know, you will not accuse me of being a sympathizer of the Linke or a communist or **[21:58] Speaker A:** anything. Well, what's the pro argument, Tali? Well, the pro argument is um you have to at least take the issues the young people are talking about seriously. So there's there's some problem in Berlin where the rents are too high and it's impossible to build houses or you know, the young generation finds it very hard to get ahead. It finds it very hard to be successful. There's a way that the Germany is a at Europe and some some in the United States they these are gerontocracies. Their run **[22:27] Speaker B:** They are run for old people. But to take the problem of seriously is definitely the right approach, but it also depends on the solutions. And the solutions that the Linke proposes here is to solve the rent problem by nationalizing real estate companies and to basically motivate society very much driven by anti-Semitism, pro-Islamism, and now it seems, if we look to the images of the party in the election night, also with the help of organized crimes. The clan chiefs. So, I think that's where taking things seriously **[22:59] Speaker A:** Well, well, they they don't have solutions. **[23:02] Speaker B:** Yeah. **[23:03] Speaker A:** Uh, but um, but all they need to do to win is to They can say, you know, and this is all always something I often say, too, is, you know, when you ask me what to do about the tech stagnation, my my simplistic answer is always, well, I don't have a comprehensive solution, but the first step is you have to talk about it. And so, you know, I I don't I don't know the exact debate in Berlin, but I could imagine the Linke is saying, okay, we don't know if our solution is exactly work, but we're at least talking about the problems. Nobody else is talking about them. **[23:29] Speaker B:** So, what's your take on the other side of the political spectrum, the AfD, Alternative für Deutschland, the far-right wing party? Is that an alternative for conservatism, or are you worried by that development? How do you see it? **[23:41] Speaker A:** Again, I I'm I'm hesitant to to to speak too much to the to the specific German politics, but yes, I think it reflects uh, it reflects these failures of of the centrist parties. If it reflects uh, failures of find to find a an economic future for for Germany um, that somehow is inclusive and broad and works for the society as a whole. I don't think I don't think they have great solutions. I don't think they know how to I don't know. I don't think they know how to balance the budget. Either the parties of the extreme left or extreme right. **[24:20] Speaker B:** You know, with the with the with the extreme right, there is another issue. It is about foreign policy. The foreign policy concept is basically pro-Putin, pro-China understanding uh, uh, and or being anti-Israel, being anti-Semitic in parts. So, uh **[24:36] Speaker A:** Well, my my um you know, my uh my paradoxical the paradoxical thing I told you earlier today is that uh I I think it's important for us to have debates about all three of those. And so, I think there can be a reasonable debate about Ukraine, a reasonable debate about China, a reasonable debate about Israel. And at the same time uh somehow I I I do think the AfD is is wrong on all three. And that's you can't be wrong on all three. **[25:07] Speaker B:** Let's switch to the United States. You were uh in 2016 uh supporting Donald Trump. Um 10 years later, uh how would you analyze his uh achievements? How would you analyze his failures? Uh Where do you stand today with regard to the last two years and then the first term of the president? **[25:33] Speaker A:** Um man, my my my fast all answer is you should ask me in 10 years or so. And uh we'll we'll see in 10 years how it how it all works out. Uh I still think um that uh it it's in many ways uh it reflected a failure of the um of the establishment to deal with these long-term problems the US had, with these growth problems with um you know, some of the challenges of globalization, um you know, with um you know, with the endless entanglements the US had in the Middle East that had not really worked all that well. Uh and um and then and then of course uh there you know, there all these all these things that uh you know, you wish they'd have pointed more competent people. You know, the um I think the the two administrations kind of made opposite mistakes. **[26:24] Speaker A:** You know, the first administration um brought in all these people who couldn't agree and it was just all this internal fighting. Um the second administration, um I think um uh had all these they overcorrected for the mistake of the first term with all these loyalty tests. You got sort of um you know, an administration staffed by um not very smart uh but very loyal people. And so that So that there are all sorts of ways it's um it's uh it can it can be criticized. I don't um but but it also again, it reflected a way that uh that uh things things had reached a certain exhaustion on um and certainly on the Republican side uh and I I worry in the United States that um the kind of ex- exhaustion with the Republican establishment that happened with the Bush family that happened in in 2016, um we're about to see with the sort of Clinton-Obama center-left establishment. **[27:25] Speaker A:** And uh in the the last three elections in 2016, Tru- Trump, the sort of anti-establishment person, won the Republican primary. Hillary, the establishment person, you know, barely beat Bernie Sanders. Maybe And and then and then you know again, the establishment won in 2020. In 2024, I don't know if they'll be able to do it in '28. And and the Democratic Party is the more important party. That is the establishment party in the US. The Republican Party is always a little bit the anti-establishment. So if the if if um the Democratic Socialists take over the Democratic Party, that's a much bigger deal. And uh that is like, I don't know, the end of America. **[28:03] Speaker B:** I remember very well uh lunch that we had in 2016 when I asked you, "Why do you support Trump?" And you basically said, "Because the existing party and the existing leadership is so dysfunctional, it just needs disruption." And that was an interesting thing that I could understand very well. What do you say now, 10 years later? We need disruption again? **[28:27] Speaker A:** Uh Um I I Well, I I I don't want disruption of the Democratic Socialist variety. That That seems That seems catastrophic. But But I work But again, if I do it not morally, not normatively, just on a descriptive level, I worry that the disturb establishment Democratic Party has has failed as badly as the establishment Republicans. And so we are going to get this disruption and there is there is a risk that the US will shift very far to the left. That's That's That's the real disruption we're going to get. So you belong to those who say I don't think it's good. The Democratic Socialists of America are a real option. They are a real danger. You once said it's the most kind of energetic and in a way the most successful political movement these days. And so it's it's you it's it's young. You know, it's it's it's like pop culture in a way. **[29:24] Speaker A:** The history on it was it was I looked this up the other day, but it it was it was The Democratic Socialists got created in 1982 as a sort of a fusion of these very fringe socialist groups and sort of the members pay things like 5,000 people. This is very small fringe thing. And in the 2016 campaign, a legacy of the Bernie Sanders candidacy is the membership of the Democratic Socialists of the sort of cadre of the vanguard ballooned from 5,000 to 50,000. The median age went from 66 to 33. And so it was this it was this old socialist people thing to a young revolutionary thing. And and yes, it has it has a certain amount of energy. It has it has a certain amount of charisma. You know, the again, the the establishment Democrats, they're all lame. They can't say anything. I mean, the same problem with the SPD CDU people in in Germany. **[30:21] Speaker B:** You were an early supporter of JD Vance. You worked with him. You basically saw something in him that other people didn't see then. Can you describe what it was and why you supported him? **[30:40] Speaker A:** I I was I don't I'm always hesitant to overrate, you know, overrate my my role in these things. I um I probably always have a very soft spot for smart people. So, I thought he was thoughtful, open-minded, um charismatic, and uh you know, he was he was working for uh one of the venture funds I had helped start called Mithril and then wanted to write this book on the side and I I encouraged him to do that. It became this best-seller in 2016. Uh and I helped him out financially when he ran for Senate in 20 2022. Uh but I think uh I I'm always hesitant to answer this question because I think it just detracts from his from his achievement in in many ways. **[31:26] Speaker B:** Now, um the Republicans will make a decision sooner or later. The names about uh the the potential candidates that I heard most often are uh J.D. Vance uh and Marco Rubio. Um who do you think would be the better candidate in order to increase the likelihood that the Republicans would win the next election? **[31:53] Speaker A:** Um well, I I am I am still I'm still a Vance partisan. Uh I I worry that it will be very hard for either candidate to win. And so, um I don't know. My my pessimistic thought is that that's the wrong question. **[32:09] Speaker B:** So, the right the question would be **[32:11] Speaker A:** is who's going to be the Democratic **[32:12] Speaker B:** If the Democrats **[32:13] Speaker A:** No, who's going to be the Democratic candidate? That's that's the right question. **[32:15] Speaker B:** And would it be a center uh left centrist candidate of the Democrats who would provide them with a better chances or would it be uh a DSA candidate? **[32:26] Speaker A:** Um well, the obviously, in a close election, a center-left candidate is probably better. Um if it's not a close election, it probably doesn't matter. And um and I think there's a decent chance that um it will not even be close. If the Republicans get wiped out in the midterms this fall, then uh the Democrats will think that they will win no matter what in 2028. And therefore um they probably will not be, you know, as as strong a firewall against uh demo They won't pull out all the stops to prevent a democratic socialist from winning. So, I I think the Democrats will do well enough in the midterms in uh in you know, a month and a half that um they will be indifferent to a center-left versus far-left presidential candidate. And then it's a completely open field, completely open question. **[33:21] Speaker A:** And uh yeah, I I had uh you know, I had this I had this discussion debate with Fukuyama, you know, the end of history. And he did you know, he doesn't fully believe his theories anymore, but uh but uh when when I told him that, you know, there was a good chance, you know, democratic socialist would win in 2028, he responded with absolute confidence, "No way. Can never happen." And I I don't think history is set like that. **[33:44] Speaker B:** So, you think from a today's perspective, that's the most likely outcome? **[33:47] Speaker A:** Not not the most likely, but let's say it's a 50% chance. **[33:50] Speaker B:** That's pretty high. **[33:51] Speaker A:** That's pretty high. **[33:54] Speaker B:** You're uh a fan of Milei because he's a disruptor, I assume. Can you describe a little bit what we, what Western societies what America, but also what Europe could and should learn from Javier Milei? **[34:13] Speaker A:** Well, I think we're I think we're all fascinated by Argentina because uh we worry that um their past is our future, where you had sort of this I don't know. It's not zero growth or decline, but sub-par growth for for a century. It's a complicated history of what went wrong. You know, it's obviously the Peronist history with this very charismatic leader who had a lot of bad ideas. There were there were ways um you know, uh, and then and then there were ways that, uh, um, it it it took a long time, you know, in in 1900, 1920, riches in Argentine was still a common expression. That's that's sort of gone out of out of usage. So, the and then yeah, it's an it's an open question whether Milei will will succeed in turning Argentina around, you know, um, whether he will get reelected a year from now. **[35:06] Speaker A:** Uh, I still think he will because people sort of understand that this is you know, it's it's it's so existential and you you just can't go back. The the problem for all of us is is there any way we can learn from the history of Argentina? So, it won't take us, you know, 100 years of decline to get there. You know, the I don't you know, I I I don't like I don't like the accelerationist, uh, Leninist idea, you know, which is more Vladimir Lenin, that the worst things get the better they get because the closer you get to revolution. Uh, and and then at the same time, you know, that the sense I always have in the US and Europe is people are upset, pessimistic, angry. It's it's never enough to lead to positive change and instead we just have this drift where, you know, you you worry things have to get a lot worse before they turn around. **[35:56] Speaker B:** But if you had to make a bet today, do you think we are close to a turning point because what we are seeing now in America, in Europe, in the West, uh, the stumbling centrists, governments, the pretty successful autocrats, uh, that this is a healthy warning call and we will, uh, recover, we will, uh, reinvent ourselves, or do you think that's basically the beginning of the end and, uh, the beginning of a new world order where the autocratic systems are going to prevail? **[36:27] Speaker A:** But, you know, I I I think you should always try to think of these things much more concretely, less abstractly. So, let me just flip it around as a question to you. You know, will people get rid of Merz in Germany? It's like a complete total failure. Anyway you cut it. And then I don't know, there's there's a decent argument nothing will happen to him for another 3 years because, you know, everybody else thinks they won't do any better. And so, so yes, there's there's no direct answer that you think it's more likely that we are going to deteriorate further. I'm not I'm not sure, but it's it's it's sort of an open question. It's like it's it's amazing how, you know, how robust the merge thing seems to be relative to how bad it seems to be. So, um, so I don't know. Yeah, I That's That's probably my my intuition is that things will will keep drifting for for a long way because the the people who replace him don't really have, you know, they don't really have answers to these problems. **[37:27] Speaker A:** If you frame the macroeconomic problems, again, sort of a boring macroeconomic version is we have we have very large welfare states. The taxes feel pretty high to me. And And then we have very big deficits. And maybe the deficits would be sustainable if you had 0% interest rates. The interest rates are no longer zero. And so, there's sort of a compounding runaway deficit problem. And And you have basically three choices. Do you massively cut spending, which is the Malay answer? Do you Do you massively hike taxes, which is basically completely shut down our societies and all growth? Or do you keep going with the deficits and kick the can down the road? And for close to 20 years, the answer's been number three. Ever since the 2008 crisis, we've just been borrowing more and more money. And then, my my intuition is we're Yeah, close to point where that ends. **[38:26] Speaker A:** And then, you're going to be pushed to a very non-centrist solution of either socialist levels of taxation or or some really tough really tough austerity measures. And you know, the the best idea Merz has is just borrow and more. Why do you care so much about politics? I well I don't I don't know if I I don't I think about it probably too much. I uh it's I mean I'm not I'm not a politician. It's but it **[39:01] Speaker B:** It permeates into becoming a politician. Never never never never. I'm not **[39:05] Speaker A:** 100% excluded. **[39:06] Speaker B:** I look I'm not sure I'm perfectly self-aware or anything like this, but I'm self-aware enough to know that I I'm not electable. And and um But but it permeates our society. It it is sort of like I don't know it's it's both toxic, but it's the air we breathe. And so so I don't know if I have a schizophrenic view on it. I think about it a lot and then I try to compartmentalize and ignore it as much as possible. **[39:35] Speaker A:** What's your take on the kind of bigger geopolitical picture? Where should Europe be? As a discussion about European sovereignty politically, but particularly also with regard to AI and the economy. The two big players are America and China basically in all areas, not only with regard to AI. One is a very autocratic authoritarian country, the other one is a democratic country. The authoritarian country is pretty perfect. The democratic country is pretty imperfect. So 10 years down the road who is going to win that race? Not only the arms race in AI, but in the broader context also the the the race of of systems. Um and where should Europe be? Neutral, as I said, on China's side as a colony or a reliable ally of America? Um I think it would be best for Europe to be a reliable ally. Uh I I always want to push back very hard on these sort of uh ways that this often gets framed as a sort of moral equivalence between the US and China. **[40:54] Speaker A:** That does I I always find that uh um very very offensive. Um but let me let me make the um let me make a slightly different point. I you know, I think from an from an American perspective, um more important than whether Europe is a super close ally or a I don't know a somewhat allied but very independent thinking place is um it's um it's in America's interest for Europe to get its act together and for Europe to be you know, to be um to be more functional um get its economy going, to be to be a part of of building the future as it um um and uh and then the the question is how how to do that. Um there are probably in in various sectors if um if if Europe can build up its own industry uh or it can even um you know, um become world world leading industry in some things, uh that'd be very **[41:57] Speaker A:** good. If it's if it's further behind then um then probably they should be they should find ways to to work with America much more closely. So, let me let me concretize with uh you know, I don't know there was this um in the late '60s you had the Concorde program which was sort of a British French you know, not exactly free market plan. Um you know, supersonic aviation started in the US with Chuck Yeager breaking the sound barrier in 1947. But uh Europe was behind but you could get your act together and you could catch up and overtake the US and uh and you know, the supersonic aviation industry you know, was was a European leading industry. Um and so that's not a free market thing but that's something that uh that I think the US um should be fine with support of that that was uh Europe doing something. **[42:50] Speaker A:** And then the um and then the other hand you had something like uh the French Minitel program of the 1990s where the internet was supposed to be French. And uh it ended up you were behind and you just you know, dug yourself into a deeper and deeper ditch. And so uh so if you ask the question about AI in uh 2026 is it is it like the Concorde or is it like Minitel? And um and then this is And if if we were honest, my my assessment is that it's it's further Europe's further behind than Minitel was. **[43:26] Speaker B:** Unfortunately, I I agree. The question is why is that and how likely is it that we can change it? What is your analysis? Why is it? And do you have any ideas what Europe, what Germany should do in order to get back to the map and get its act together? **[43:52] Speaker A:** are always overdetermined and much harder to answer. Um but let me let me on a on a very you know, one of the one of the things in Germany that people always talk about in this entrepreneurship context is that um there's a fear of failure. That um people have risk aversion and things like And then uh the And maybe that's true, but the dimension I want to always push back on is perhaps there's also a fear of success. That um if you have something that works, you're not going to you know, you're not going to scale it to this um extreme degree like an Elon Musk and then Mark Zuckerberg. And uh you know, at some point you'll sell the company or you'll exit or or or or some something like that. And uh And so what's what's very, you know, striking is that uh is how few, you know, great new companies have been have been built um you know, in in Germany um in the last in the last number **[44:51] Speaker A:** of decades. Here's here's a stat that I I I looked up and this is again it's one one particular dimension to look at but if you look at the 50 wealthiest people in the US and most and most of money comes from you know particular companies. Um only 12 are a Gen X or younger so people born 1965 or later so it's you know it's also pretty much dominated by old people who have had more time to compound their wealth. Germany it's actually more distributed it's um there 20 of the 50 people are Gen X or younger of the of the 50 wealthiest people in Germany. But here's the difference in the US nine out of 12 of those people made their own money. In Germany all 20 of those 20 inherited it not a single person did something new made made some new money built built a large new scalable company and then of course this look I'm just looking at this very **[45:46] Speaker A:** extreme but you know each of those people they created thousands of I don't know millionaires in their companies tens of thousands of other jobs they added to the economy in in in lots of different ways and they're sort of there used to be you know there used to be this ability in Germany to build great new business there was the middle strand there were also you know much larger companies that got built in the late 19th early 20th even after 1945 period and then it's it's really something about that has really broken down since since 1995 and the that's sort of I don't have an answer to that but that would that would be the kind of question I would I would I would try to think about really hard. **[46:25] Speaker B:** Tonight you are going to receive the Axel Springer Award. And when I informed you about that you said something very remarkable. Uh you said thank you. I always tried over the last decades to get Germany out of my mind. Intellectually I did quite well but I didn't get it out of my heart. Why not? What's still so German about you being born in Frankfurt am Main in 1967? Living now for almost all your life in America. Why is there still this emotional affiliation to Germany? **[47:11] Speaker A:** Well, I I I would be strange if there weren't. I think it would be much more strange if there weren't. **[47:17] Speaker B:** But you left Germany when you were 1 year year old. So you don't have any memories. You don't have any cultural **[47:22] Speaker A:** were here. You know, I was that there was sort of uh in some ways I grew up I went to Yeah, I went to English-speaking schools in America, but uh spoke German at home. So I really I grew up between the zwischen zwei Welten. And uh and so yes, there's there's there's a there's there's a um Yeah, there's a there's a part where it's sort of understandable as all these reasons things have have have gone gone somewhat wrong, but it's it's also very important for us to find a way to turn Germany around. It's it's at the heart of Europe. In some ways Europe is still, you know, at the core of of of Western civilization. So if there's a crisis of **[48:07] Speaker B:** So sorry about that. This is an appointment of the West. There's a crisis in Europe and and Germany. **[48:11] Speaker A:** you are shifting back to intellectual **[48:13] Speaker B:** I know I know I know I know I know **[48:13] Speaker A:** We were talking about feelings. We were talking about So what do you love about Germany? What what is it? I mean, the past of Germany is difficult. We spoke about the present and the future that's also quite difficult. So what do you love about Germany? **[48:25] Speaker B:** It's just It's just part I I'm always I'm always bad at answering this question. It's just It's just part part of my part of who I am. **[48:31] Speaker A:** Okay. **[48:32] Speaker B:** Tonight we will have two of your co-founders, uh Alex Karp uh from Palantir and Max Levchin with whom you founded PayPal. Um so **[48:47] Speaker B:** Alex Karp also has this very very strong affiliation to Germany. Um with Max it's a different history. He's from Ukraine, but in any case, there's a European element in it. Do you think that these two guys played such an important role for you in your business life, but also in your personal development as friends because there is this common European denominator or doesn't that play a role? **[49:17] Speaker A:** It's probably part of it. It's It's uh I don't want to overdo it. Uh I I you know, I think there were sort of there there are way there are way that um a lot of the founders of these tech companies I think of of as both insiders and outsiders. And so, uh you know, um Alex and I both were insiders who went to the elite Stanford Law School and then uh you know, you know, I was in some ways an outsider to America. Alex is is um Jewish where you always have a little bit of that as as as part of the background. And uh and it was somehow Sorry, you **[49:57] Speaker B:** I didn't get it. You He's Jewish and but it has nothing to do with his background. **[50:02] Speaker A:** but it's it's a little bit of the outsider. There's an outsider part. **[50:05] Speaker B:** Okay. I see. **[50:05] Speaker A:** And an insider. I always I always say that these found the founders have have both the outsider and insider dynamic. And there was, you know, there was a way um you know, Max was this super achieving straight-A student. This odd incredibly um incredibly uh charismatic person, but then also kind of grew up on the you know, um I mean, left the Ukraine when he was 16 years old and they grew up in a poor part of Chicago and then it was, you know, so it was it was this, you know, it was just an incredible drive. **[50:40] Speaker B:** Being an outsider can really be an advantage in in I think in your case **[50:46] Speaker A:** Well, I I think it's it's it's it's it's it's always I wouldn't say it's both though. It's it's it's it's it's this outsider insider combination. **[50:52] Speaker B:** Yeah. **[50:53] Speaker A:** People always exaggerate that. They exaggerate the outsider piece because that's always, you know, it's in a way you're sort of playing the underdog and stuff like that. And there's also some part where, you know, I grew up in Silicon Valley. Very few people did that. **[51:05] Speaker B:** Okay, let's assume in this perfect mix of being an insider and an outsider, you have developed an over-proportional degree of contrarianism. You love to contradict. I think for me, the word no is the foundation of freedom and democracy. So, I also love to say no, but I think in your case, it's almost kind of an automatic impulse. Yeah, if there is as soon as there is a consensus or people get close to a consensus, you say the opposite. **[51:31] Speaker A:** All right. So, so so just say no. **[51:33] Speaker B:** No. **[51:33] Speaker A:** Okay. Done. **[51:34] Speaker B:** No, I I I I think that uh uh I I don't think the point is to be contrarian for its own sake. I think I think uh because then you just look at the consensus and put a minus sign in front of it. And that's not that interesting. Uh you know, I think I think the real goal is always to try to think for oneself. **[51:54] Speaker A:** Mhm. **[51:55] Speaker B:** And that's you know, that's what I that's what I that's what I try to do. I I I don't I uh I don't think of it as just this you know, reflexibly negative thing. **[52:06] Speaker A:** How have you been able to develop that intrinsic strength to listen to your own compass and not being influenced so much by zeitgeist, by consensus, by the juste milieu? Um do you have any explanation why you've been able to develop that superpower? **[52:33] Speaker B:** You know, uh I'm always again, I'm always bad at the self-psychoanalysis, but I I you know, I I I'm probably like interested in a lot of different things. And so, it's like big picture, history, and politics, and economics, and science fiction, and the future, and psychology. So, all these different things. And uh and uh it's always um I don't know, this is this is sort of not a in late modernity, we're supposed to be narrow specialists. It's the Adam is the pin factory in Adam Smith where you have 100 people working in a pin factory and everyone specialized in one narrow area and somehow very efficient for people to be super specialized but you you lose sight of the the big picture and I've always I've always wondered how does everything fit together you know how do how do how do we make sense of all these things um and I maybe it's just sort **[53:34] Speaker B:** of a I don't know a Renaissance dilettante type thing that I'm rationalizing but I tell myself there has to be room for at least one generalist in a world where everyone's hyper specialized. **[53:47] Speaker A:** And that and that's Renaissance spirit of having many interests and many fields of activity where are the areas of passion and interest that have no professional no pragmatic no business rationale that are purely kind of private personal irrational. **[54:14] Speaker A:** Don't tell me that you don't have it at all. **[54:16] Speaker B:** I don't I you know I I I probably still play way too much chess on the internet all the time. **[54:23] Speaker A:** Mhm. **[54:24] Speaker B:** And this was you know this was uh you know I was a scholastic chess player and uh it's this I don't know it's this very beautiful somewhat dangerously addictive **[54:38] Speaker A:** Mhm. **[54:39] Speaker B:** um somewhat dangerously addictive game um it's probably not equivalent to all of reality which is what I at various points of delusion in my teenage years like to say that everything in the world **[54:51] Speaker A:** Mhm. **[54:51] Speaker B:** um you know if you didn't play chess you didn't understand reality it's probably too too extreme a thing to say **[54:57] Speaker A:** Mhm. **[54:58] Speaker B:** but but I know I I know there are there all sorts of all sorts of questions that don't don't connect directly. You know I think I think I think a lot of these political questions um you know, uh they're important. Um they frustratingly feel largely outside of our power. And so you know I I think they're important. I think they do somehow relate to business um in many ways um it might be healthier. It might be more uh profitable not to think about them and and to just focus on on on a particular business. **[55:35] Speaker A:** You have now uh four pretty young kids. To which degree did they change your life or is there anything that you already learned from them? By watching them? **[55:47] Speaker B:** It's um it's always um it's always thinking about um I it really changes your time horizons on on the future, you know, and it is um if we're in this, you know, if we're in this accelerating technological world or in this crazy world where we don't know how the world's going to make it till 2030 or 2035. You know, if you're sort of if you're in this you know, world of only adults, um you can sort of pretend that you're just thinking about it year to year, but I don't know my my my um my oldest daughter will be 81 years old in 2100. And so yeah, you you start to wonder what you know, what will the 22nd century be like. **[56:38] Speaker A:** Talking about time horizons, I mean, one of the areas that you're particularly interested in and also investing in is health, longevity. Why is that apart from a good investment case? I mean, uh I'm also having a high degree of interest because I'm hypochondriac. I don't know what your motivation is. Is it only the business rational or is there also a kind of personal motivation of something that we all have more or less a fear of death? **[57:10] Speaker B:** Yeah, fear of death, fear of getting old. All all all all these all these things. Um you know, I But you know, I I I always push back on It's it's it's odd to me that this is not more widely shared and that this isn't, you know, uh can't be articulated more widely. And And because this was the, you know, I don't know, the optimism of early modernity, 17th 18th century, was that, you know, science would relieve man's estate. Hobbes said, you know, in the state of nature, life was nasty, brutish, and short. And it was it was supposed to make it longer and maybe, you know, maybe indefinitely longer. And I don't know. Um people like Condorcet or um Francis Bacon, Benjamin Franklin, they thought they thought you could cure the you could cure all diseases. And uh and it's it's it's just this shocking uh social decline that we we we've we've given up on that. **[58:12] Speaker B:** Uh you know, people don't even think we can cure Alzheimer's. Why why can't we why can't we at least try to do that? **[58:20] Speaker A:** For me, the discussion about progress has always two sides. Almost every progress in technology or wherever has a flip side and a downside. In the case of health, I just don't see it. I think it is for me the only area where progress is only positive. For centuries scientific progress, progress in medicine has improved not only the lifespan but the quality of our life, enjoyment of our life, everything. So, in that spirit, could you share with me the most optimistic, the most visionary case about longevity. What can be achieved? Eternal life? Um 150 years? **[59:14] Speaker A:** Um it's it's not it's not clear why it shouldn't be you know, it's not clear there are any natural limits. We still have not you know, there are there all sorts of reasons people have become more pessimistic because you know, it's it's it certain things have been very hard to cure. Nixon declared war on cancer in '71, said it'd be cured in 5 years. It's after 55 years years later there's been some progress, but it's you know, it's it's very far from very far from a cure. **[59:47] Speaker B:** accelerating it now bit by ton. **[59:49] Speaker A:** And then you but then there's always a question, um you know, are um I don't know, you know, it's it's it is badly simplifying things, but um if if you think of biological processes as sort of irreversible and um information computational processes as fundamentally reversible. It you know, if you could understand biology as an information science um then um then in theory you could find a way to um traverse all these you know, all these processes and uh um and that's and then that's you know, like you know, compu- computers can live forever. **[1:00:33] Speaker B:** But is it then more in this physical sense that we really reverse the process of aging of our body and with that achieve um a longer lifespan or even uh eternal life? Or is it rather in the sense that we at a certain point are able to download our brain and our consciousness? **[1:00:52] Speaker A:** Well, I I again I'm a little bit on the different I I have a very I have a very physical uh I may be Christian informed view where uh um I wouldn't find it acceptable to be uploaded in a computer program that simulated me. I don't I don't think it would be me. **[1:01:09] Speaker B:** Mhm. **[1:01:09] Speaker A:** So, I I tend to think our identities very very wrapped up in our um in our in our physical selves. Um and then but yeah, I know I think the I know the the full Christian vision of this was of course that you were going to have an eternal body and um and it would also you know, it would also be your soul be transformed. Um you know, it was a one of my one of my um uh one of my friends is is 80-year-old mathematician and uh uh he once joked to me and I he didn't know whether there was an afterlife, but he hoped that there wouldn't be because he didn't want to run into his ex-wife. And um and so uh so I do think that uh you know, in some ways yeah, eternal eternal life is very desirable and then um Christianity always aimed for even more. **[1:01:56] Speaker A:** But the the point with transhumanism and Christianity is um you know, it's it's not that transhumanism is too weird and too extreme from a from a real Christian point of view, it's that it didn't go far enough. **[1:02:08] Speaker B:** But let's assume that we would achieve eternal life. Is it really desirable or would we be extremely bored because everything is unlimited? Why being ambitious? **[1:02:18] Speaker A:** Um I I think the answer to all those things is better than the alternative. **[1:02:25] Speaker B:** Okay. Um so **[1:02:28] Speaker A:** I don't think I would be bored. **[1:02:30] Speaker B:** Good. Yeah. **[1:02:31] Speaker A:** Yeah. I agree. So what is then the concrete thing, the concrete innovation, invention or investment that you have seen over the kind of last month or week or years with regard to longevity that makes you most optimistic. Can you share the craziest thing with us? **[1:02:47] Speaker B:** I I I I I keep um I keep investing in in these biotech areas. It is it is surprisingly difficult. It's there are all sorts of reasons. There are there challenges, but uh but if I um if I if I wanted to focus on a single one, it it would be really trying to do something about um about dementia, about um you know, finding a way to slow or or um reverse um declines in people's brains. And that would be and that's that's the one that uh uh that um I want to find a way to tackle in the years ahead. **[1:03:24] Speaker A:** Peter, to conclude, I would love to ask you a question that you ask you almost uh every candidate you're talking to before you hire her or him or people that you find uh interesting. Tell me a truth that you believe in that almost nobody else agrees with. **[1:03:46] Speaker B:** I'm giving you a lot today already. Uh let's see. Let me just give me 1 second. **[1:03:51] Speaker A:** Take your time. **[1:03:55] Speaker A:** In any case, it's nice that to see that it is also a tough question for you. **[1:04:03] Speaker B:** There's a There's always a meta level version of this where there are all sorts of things that you think um uh are very that nobody believes in. Um and then you realize actually a lot of people almost do and so maybe it's contrarian. And then we can sort of debate which which which which is the contrarian one. So um when I started giving these speeches about the Antichrist um 3 years ago, I thought this was an extremely unconventional view that was very far outside the zone. And so I would have said that that that's an answer. And uh now I would say um and but then yeah, most people would say yeah, that's a really crazy thing to talk about. Um I would now say that it's actually um it's not contrarian. That most people think something like the Antichrist is right around the corner. **[1:04:58] Speaker B:** That we have incipient totalitarianism throughout the world. And uh and so it was less contrarian than I thought. But then the the meta level truth is um I think um everybody thinks everybody says that the Antichrist is a crazy idea and the reality is they actually secretly agree with me. **[1:05:20] Speaker A:** Peter, thank you very much for the conversation. **[1:05:22] Speaker B:** Thank you.