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The speaker reflects on the costs of war while emphasizing the UAE's national leadership, armed forces, and institutional resilience. The section argues that true strength comes from the interaction of all state capabilities.
and valuable lessons learned.The war has of course imposed costs, economic disruptions, security pressures, and its wider consequences will require sustained attention.We should neither underestimate these costs nor allow them to obscure the broader picture.For alongside these challenges, the UAE has demonstrated strategic, institutional and national strength of lasting significance.First and foremost, the crisis demonstrated the strength and determination of our national leadership.His Muhammad bin Zed al- Nayan, President of the UAE, is guiding the country through an unprecedented crisis with wisdom, clarity, and resolve, combining a realistic assessment of the dangers we are facing with the confidence and decisiveness necessary toprotect our national interest.His leadership throughout the war and the ensuing crisis earned recognition both at home and internationally, further reinforcing the respect and confidence the UAE enjoys among its partners.Equally important was the performance of our armed forces.Our military personnel and air defense systems demonstrated exceptional professionalism and effectiveness in defending our territory and protecting our people.
Their performance reflected decades of investment in defense capabilities, advanced technologies, training and strategic partnerships.But the deeper lesson is that national security must ultimately rest on a state's ability to defend itself.Partnerships are essential.Alliances and international cooperation remain indispensable yet the primary responsibility for protecting national sovereignty rests with the nation itself.
This experience has reinforced our conviction that self-reliance supported by credible credible partnerships must remain the foundations of our national defense strategy.Another source of strength was the performance of our institutions across federal and local governments, economic and financial institutions, security and public services, schools, hospitals, and essential infrastructure continued to function with remarkable effectiveness.People felt safe and protected.The UAE demonstrated that resilience is not simply a military concept.It is an institutional and societal capability developed over decades through sound governance, long-term investment, and the cultivation of public confidence.The ability of our institutions to maintain continuity and inspire confidence under extraordinary pressure was among the most significant achievements of this test.This collective performance leads to an important conclusion.The strength of the UAE lies not in any single institution or capability but in the relationship between all of these combined.
This chapter explains how deterrence and diplomacy work together in the UAE's security strategy. It also frames dialogue with Iran as a strategic necessity grounded in sovereignty and verifiable behavior.
The second important lesson concerns the relationship between deterrence and diplomacy.Faced with direct aggression, the UAE made the decisive choice to defend its territory, protect its sovereignty, and employ its deterrent capabilities.This decision was not taken lightly.It involved calculated risks, but it was both necessary and prudent.The UAE demonstrated that it was not the weak link in the regional security equation.It also established an important press principle.Aggression against the UAE carries a cost and any actor contemplating such aggression must take that reality into account.Credible deterrence is essential because national security cannot depend solely on the intentions or goodwill of others.But deterrence is not an end in itself.While its p purpose is to protect from and prevent further aggression, it is also essential to create credible conditions in which diplomacy can succeed.These principles are not contradictory.They reinforce one another.
We must also recognize a permanent reality of our region.Geography cannot be changed.Iran will remain our neighbor.The Gulf States and Iran fear strategic environment, maritime roots, economic interests, and security challenges that cannot be managed indefinitely through confrontation.Dialogue is therefore not a concession.It is a strategic necessity.But the dialogue that follows this war cannot simply reproduce the assumptions of the past.It must be grounded in respect for sovereignty, non-interference, and genuine recognition of the legit legitimate security interests of neighboring states.Trust once damaged cannot be restored through declarations alone.It must be rebuilt through conduct, credible commitments, and verifiable changes in behavior.The lessons straightforward.We do not face a choice between deterrence and diplomacy.We need both.
The speaker assesses the depth of Iran's internal and external challenges after the war. He argues the region must manage prolonged uncertainty through patience, realism, and political solutions.
This brings me to the nature of the Iranian crisis and its likely evolution.Iran today faces one of the most serious challenges in the history of the Islamic Republic.The consequences of the war extend far beyond the immediate military confrontation.They include pressure on Iran's leadership and decision making structures, uncertainty over its domestic political direction, severe economic constraints, the impact of the international sanctions and a fundamental dispute with the United States and the wider international community over itsnuclear program.The war has also weakened Iran's regional capabilities and challenged the assumptions underpinning its security strategy, the so-called forward defense doctrine.Taken together, these factors make a comprehensive political settlement difficult.We should therefore prepare for a long period of uncertainty in which neither decisive resolution, nor a stable regional order can be taken for granted.The challenge for the UAE and its neighbors is to manage this uncertainty without allowing it to escalate to dominate our future.
Our approach must combine patience, deterrence, diplomatic engagement, and strategic realism.It is important to recall that the UAE opposed the war from our outset and worked diplomatically and relentlessly to prevent the region from sliding into this conflict.Our assessment was guided by a fundamental understanding of the region.Wars begin through deliberate decisions, but their consequences rarely remain within the calculations of those who initiate them.For the UEE, the priority must remain the pursuit of political diplomatic solutions capable of producing a more sustainable regional balance.
This section reviews the value of international partnerships, especially with the United States and other allies. It also criticizes weak regional institutions and calls for stronger GCC coordination and collective responsibility.
It is perhaps too early to fully assess the impact of the US midterm elections on Washington's approach towards Iran.We remain hopeful, however, that the outcome will reinforce efforts to pursue diplomatic solutions that can ensure lasting peace and stability in the Gulf.Another lesson of the crisis concerns our international partnerships and the importance of regional solidarity.Crisis revealed the true value of friendships and relationships.The strategic relationship with the United States proved critically important during the conflict, particularly in supporting our defensive capabilities and protecting our national security.The war and its aftermath have once again demonstrated the importance of the longstanding defense and security cooperation between our two countries.We also recognize the support and solidarity extended by other partners including France, Israel, Greece, Syria, Egypt, India and others that provided assistance and expressed readiness to do so.Such support matters and deserves recognition.At the same time, moments of crisis offer an opportunity to assess the effectiveness of our international partnerships.
That assessment, however, must remain balanced and guided by long-term national interests rather than temporary emotions or immediate reactions.International relationships are complex.Their value cannot always be measured by a single event.However, significant, our responsibility is to preserve and strengthen the partnerships that serve the UAE while drawing practical lessons about their capabilities, limitations, and future development.The crisis also exposed once again the limited effectiveness of regional institutions.This is not a new observation.Similar weaknesses have been evident during previous regional crisis.Nevertheless, it should encourage serious reflection on how regional cooperation can become more practical, responsive, and relevant to the challenges we face.This is particularly important within the GCC.I believe Gulf solidarity and coordination during this crisis could have been stronger and more effective.Our region previously demonstrated greater capacity for collective action, notably during Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and periods of regional instability associated with the Arab uprising.
These experience experiences remind us that developed cooperation is most valuable when it moves beyond declarations of solidarity towards practical coordination and a shared strategic purpose.The events of this year should encourage a renewed and realistic examination of GCC effectiveness in light of the challenges ahead.This does not require uniformity on every issue.Differences among neighbors are natural.But it does require recognition that we must rebuild trust in our collective relationships in the government and the organization representing us.Since our security and prosperity are deeply interconnected, if our region is to achieve greater stability, the states must assume greater responsibility for shaping their own security environment through realistic capabilities and commitments.
The speaker outlines three priorities: strengthening the national development model, managing the regional crisis, and adapting to global transformation. He stresses that the war should not derail the UAE's economic openness and competitiveness.
Excellencies, distinguished guests, looking ahead, I believe the UAE must approach the next phase through three interconnected strategic priorities.The first is to continue strengthening our national development model that has brought the UAE its present success.The second is to manage the continuing crisis, regional crisis with effectiveness, patience and flexibility.And the third is to adapt to the profound transformations reshaping international the international system, the global economy and technology.These are not separate agendas.They are closely interconnected and success in each increasingly depends on the progress in the others.Let's begin with the national development project.Perhaps the most important principle guiding the UAE in the years ahead is that we must not allow the war to divert our path.The path that has made our country successful.The UE has built its position through economic diversification, competitiveness, openness, tolerance, effective institutions, the rule of law, and an expanding network of international partnerships.
These are not simply economic policies.They are the foundations of our national model.The war tested this model, but it it did not invalidate it.On the contrary, the resilience demonstrated during the crisis reinforces the importance of continuing along this path.Our task now is to recover what has been lost, restore confidence where it has been affected, and build on the achievements that preceded the conflict.We must preserve the UE's position as a leading regional center for investment, trade, finance, innovation, and international business.We must also maintain its attractiveness as a place where people from different backgrounds can live, work, invest, and build their futures with confidence.
This chapter focuses on defensive capability, diplomacy, and strategic resilience in the Gulf environment. It highlights infrastructure investments and the importance of freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.
Our objective must be to ensure that the The consequences of war do not weaken our economic model, but instead encourage us to make it more diversified, competitive, and resilient.The second strategic priority is effective management of our regional environment.We cannot allow the regional crisis to define our national future, but neither can we ignore its significance.We must manage it with determination and clear understanding that its consequences may persist for a long time.This requires continued investment in our defensive capabilities, the maintenance of credible deterrence and stronger international security partnerships.Also requires sustained diplomatic engagement with Iran and other regional and international actors.In the mean in the immediate term, some of the engagement may necessarily be transactional, focused on specific issues, practical arrangements and limited understandings.Over time, however, our our objective should be to move beyond crisis management towards a more strategic dialogue on the future of regional security.
The events that began on February 28th shattered important assumptions about the existing regional balance.Rebuilding a more sustainable order will require time and difficult choices.Yet Iran and the Gulf states retain a common interest in avoiding permanent confrontation and restoring a greater predictability to their relations.Another essential dimension of regional crisis management is strategic resilience.One of the clearest lessons of the war is the danger of excessive dependence on a single strategic route facility or supply chain vulnerable to disruption by the decisions of another state.The UE has long recognized this vulnerability and invested in infrastructure designed to reduce it.The oil pipeline to Fijira, the Baraka nuclear energy plant, the Tahad rail network are but examples of strategic foresight.Investments whose significance extend well beyond their immediate economic value.They strengthen national resilience, provide alternatives and reduce exposure to exter to external disruption.In the years ahead, we will accelerate this approach, ensuring that our infrastructure can function under pressure and our institutions can adapt rapidly to changing circumstances.
This is particularly relevant to the state of Hermas.This war has once again demonstrated the extraordinary importance of this waterway to the economies of the Gulf and the wider world.For the UAE, the principle is clear.We must uphold the established regime governing navigation through the Strait of Hormas and reject any attempt to impose unilateral arrangements that would grant Iran control over international maritime traffic.Freedom of navigation must never become an instrument of political coercion.The rights of passage through international straits must be respected and the security of commercial shipping must not depend on the political preferences of any single actor.At the same time, the UEE continues to strengthen its position as a reliable participant in global energy markets and a dependable partner in international trade.Our approach must combine the defense of established maritime principles with continued investment in alternatives that reduce vulnerabilities.
The speaker discusses shifts in the international system, the global economy, and technology. He argues that the UAE must diversify economically and invest in AI and innovation to remain influential.
This brings me to our third strategic priority, adapting to a changing world.The international system that emerged after 1945 is undergo going profound transformation rapidly.The institutions, alliances and assumptions that shaped international relations for generations are being challenged by shifts in power, economic competition, technological change, and increasingly divergent national interests.Differences between the United States and Europe over Ukraine are one indication of these wider changes.The weaknesses of international organizations have also become too evident to ignore.Traditional alliances remain important, but they are becoming more complex.Strategic relationships are increasingly shaped by the interplay of security interests, economic competition, technological dependencies and domestic political pressure.For a country such as the UEE, these developments require both continuity and adaptation.We must preserve our established strategic partnerships while developing the flexibility to navigate an international environment that's becoming more fragmented and competitive.The global economy is also changing.
An increasing share of economic activity and commercial opportunity is now Asian.Emerging markets and African economies are assuming a greater importance.Supply chains are being reorganized.Trade patterns are evolving and investment decisions are increasingly influenced by geopolitical considerations.The UE must remain at the forefront of these changes.Our international economic strategy should continue to to diversify markets, deepen partnerships and avoid excessive dependence on any single economic center.Our geography, our geography provides a natural advantage, but geography alone is not enough.We must continue investing in infrastructure, institutions, skills, and commercial relationships that transform geographic position into enduring economic influence.Alongside these geopolitical and geoeconomic shifts, we are witnessing a technological transformation whose consequences may ultimately prove even more profound.Artificial intelligence is rapidly becoming one of the defining forces of the 21st century.Its impact extends across defense and military technology, economic productivity, investment, government services, education, healthcare and the organization organizations within society.
It is also becoming a central arena of competition among the world's major powers.The United States and China are increasingly at the center of this technological contest contest while Europe faces significant challenges in maintaining its position for the UAE.The strategic implications are clear.We recognize the importance of artificial intelligence early and invested in the capabilities and partnerships necessary to participate in this transformation.Our ambition has never been simply to consume technologies developed elsewhere.We seek to become an active partner in their development, application and governance.This ambition must continue and must accelerate.The future distribution of global influence will be determined not only by geography and traditional forms of power but increasingly by technological capabilities and the capacity to innovate.
The address concludes by reaffirming the UAE's determination to shape its own future. It ends with thanks and a call for productive dialogue.
Ladies and gentlemen, the events of this year have reminded us that stability cannot be taken for granted, that sovereignty must be protected, and that national resilience is built long before a crisis begins.But they have also reaffirmed something fundamental about the UAE.our determination to shape our future rather than allow events to shape it for us.We emerge from this extraordinary test more confident in our leadership, more assured of our national capabilities and more conscious of both the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead.The greatest lesson of the crisis, perhaps the simplest.The UAE strength lies not only in its ability to withstand adversity, but in its determination to emerge stronger, more resilient, and better prepared for the future.We will continue to defend our sovereignty, strengthen our partnerships, and pursue peace and stability.Our confidence in the future rests not on an expectation that the world will become less challenging but on our determination and ability to meet those challenges.
Thank you for your kind attention.I wish you all a productive and successful Abu Dhabi strategic dialogue.I look forward to the valuable discussions and exchanges of perspectives that this important gathering will inspire.Thank you very much.
The moderator welcomes participants and introduces the annual Abu Dhabi Strategic Debate. The theme centers on the war with Iran and the new rules of power.
Thank you Dr.Anor Gargash.
Ladies and gentlemen, Dr.Alkiti, president of the Emirates Policy Center, will take the floor now.
We now invite Dr.Abdisam Kiti, President of the Emirates Policy Center to deliver her remarks.Dr.Uptam, the floor is yours.
Your excellencies, distinguished guests, may the peace and mercy and blessings of God be upon you all.I wish you a very good morning.It gives me a great pleasure to welcome you again today at the Abu Dhabi Strategic Debate which has become an annual platform where the Emirates Policy Center brings together political leaders, thinkers and experts to discuss developments and uhin the international and regional ordersand provide in-depth analysis and uh forward-looking perspectives in a manner that strengthens Abu Dhabi's contribution to strategic discussions on regional uh and international uh policies.
I would like to thank you all for joining us and for your participation and for accepting our invitation.I look forward to constructive discussions that raise to the significance of the moment facing our region and the wider world.Dear guests, our 13th debate is being held this year under the theme after the storm, the implications of the war with Iran and the new rules of power.When we chose this title several months ago, we asked ourselves,
would the storm have subsided by the time we gathered in Abu Dhabi today?Or
would we find ourselves in the midst midst of even severe more severe storms whether already underway or still to come.Choosing the title did not mean that we assumed that danger would have passed.The guns may fall silent while questions raised by the war remain unanswered.Who guarantees security?And what balance of power can endure?And what do alliances mean when the partners calculations diverge and the cost of commitments rise?Therefore, it's not enough to ask how will the war war end.We must also ask what kind of order will emerge in the in its aftermath and who will have a say in shaping its rules.These are the questions that we hope our debate this year will address.
This section frames the debate around alliances, balance of power, and the postwar order. It asks what kind of system will emerge and who will shape its rules.
Our discussions will focus on uh the trends in the current global strategic landscape, including the changes affecting our global security, strategic alliances, growing militarization, and the roles of major powers.We will also examine the challenges of instability in the Middle East against the backdrop of the war with Iran and its farreaching implications for the international order, gulp security, energy, maritime routes, and the future of the region.Ladies and gentlemen, the subject of this debate converge on a question that is not simply about how much power states possess.It is also about what they can achieve with that power and where its limits lie.Uh the war with Iran has raised new questions about the rules and limits of traditional alliances.Yet the widening range of risks affecting economies, technology,
maritime routes, and supply chains calls for more complex arrangements.These must go beyond confronting a common common adversary to protecting interests in which security and developments are closely intertwined.But having multiple partnerships does not in itself guarantee a wider range of op options.A state may have extensive relationships and still find that its freedom of action is limited at the moment of danger.The value of partnerships is tested when taking actions car carries a cost and when partners no longer share the same priorities.This is when a country's ability to make effective use of its relationships becomes critical as does clarity about responsibilities before the crisis occurs.This is closely linked to the calculations of the major powers.The US remains the predominant military and security power in the region.At the same time, Washington is reassessing the course of its commitments.It seeks to preserve its influence and protect its interests without being drawn into open-ended long-term involvement.
The use of force remains a political decision.Military superiority alone does not determine it.China meanwhile has expanding economic and strategic interests but remains more cautious about direct involvement in security matters.Its growing presence does not necessarily mean that it intends to take over the American role.It does however raise the question of how China might help preserve the stability on which its own interests demand.
The issue goes deeper than the transfer of leadership from one major power to another.There may be several centers of power while responsibility for preventing escalation and protecting shared interests remain contested.It is in this gap between capability and responsibility that the burdens of regional states are growing.So is the need to have a say in arrangements that directly affect their security.Therefore, we should not assume that reshaping the Middle East will automatically produce a more stable balance.
This process is unfolding amid competing interests and projects and without a framework that enjoys sufficient consensus.
It could instead prolong crisis and merely manage a fragmentation without the political will to establish rules for lasting security and just settlements.
The speaker examines U.S.-China rivalry, the limits of alliances, and the need for regional states to shape their own security environment. He emphasizes sovereignty, non-interference, and freedom of navigation.
Dear guests,
this competition is taking on further dimensions as the differences between the United States and China deepen in sensitive sectors from semiconductors and interferial intelligence to defense industries and supply chains.
Control over technology and over the terms governing access to it is becoming increasingly important.Alongside this is a competition over political narratives that justify policies and shape how adversaries and partners are perceived.Yet the global economy remains too interconnected to be divided by political decision alone into two closed blocks.States, governments, and companies will continue to weigh security requirements against the cost of separation.Economic pressures and electoral changes will also continue its influence on calculations behind this rivalry, however intense its ideological rhetoric becomes.In Europe, the war in Ukraine and changes in the transatlantic relations raise a different question about power.The challenge facing European countries goes beyond increasing the defense spending as it involves coordinating priorities, pooling industrial and technological capabilities and turning them into a sustainable strategic capacity.
Therefore, European strategic autonomy is a test of whether countries with differing differing interests and assessments of risk can make more coherent decisions together while the American partnership remains important to their security.This discussion also shows that the new era of warfare with all its advanced technologies still depends on the traditional foundations of power.Ammunition uh ammunition stockpiles, industrial capacity, logistics, energy, secure supply chains, and the ability of economies and societies to continue functioning under pressure all remain decisive.As for the countries of the region, they cannot puttheir security on hold while waiting for the balance among major powers to stabilize.However important their international partnerships may be, they also need national and regional capabilities to support those partnerships and to clear rules that govern the relations among them and protect them against recurring crisis.In our view, thinking about the future of the Gulf security requires us to define the principles that should govern relations with Iran.
We would remain neighbors and not all our disagreements will disappear.But these disagreements must not leave the region trapped in renewed confrontation when effort whenever efforts to a settlement fault.These principles begin with respective of state sovereignity and territorial integrity and the non-inference in internal affairs and the peaceful settlement of disputes and refining from the threat or use of force in a manner that violates the UN charter.These are mutual obligations.They are not privileges that one party may claim for itself while denying them to others.
Respecting these principles also means ending the use of armed groups to destabilize other states.It means also respecting the right of every state to choose its partnerships in accordance with its interests and international obligations.Iran has security interests that should be discussed, but those interests cannot be used as a pretext to dictate the choices of its neighbors or to transfer its confrontations with other parties onto their territory facilities and their interests.Nor should the security of the Gulf states become a secondary items in agreements reached without their participation.A regional arrangement cannot be sound if those who will bear its consequences have not have no part in shaping it.The dialogue that we need must produce commitments whose implementation can be verified and challenge of communications that function when incidents occur and mechanisms to address disputes before they become confrontations.At the heart of these principles is the freedom of navigation.
It is a shared international interest requiring responsibility in proportion to the extent of reliance on it.
This chapter turns to the UAE's direct experience of attack and resilience. It argues that openness must be protected through alternatives, preparedness, and the ability to resist coercion.
The freedom of uh of navigation and the right of passage through the street of hormones are not privileges that any state can grant or withdraw.nor are they bargaining chips to be traded for concessions on other issues.And developing ports and alternative routes is also important for reducing vulnerability and must not amount to accepting that passage through hormones can remain hostage hostage to threats.The Gulf States have an interest in stable relations with Iran that make cooperation possible and preserve the opportunities for development for the peoples of the region.What is required is the respect for sovereignity, security among neighbors and freedom of navigation to form the basis of managing disagreements, not a price to be per paid in order to end them.Your excellencies, from this perspective, the meaning of the Imirati compass becomes clear in our discussions today.Iranian attacks presented the UAE with a direct test.
How can a country that is open to the world protect its security while also preserving the standing and interests and trust that its openness has helped build?Defending sovereignty and protecting the society was a priority that allowed no hesitation.And at the same time, the UAE had to safeguard the foundations of a development project built over decades and to prevent the military threat from narrowing its horizons.The openness that gives a country part of its strength also exposes some of its interests to pressure.Protecting the openness requires a precise understanding of vulnerabilities and readiness to address them and the capacity to provide alternatives.But this strategic resilience does not mean tolerating aggressions or underestimating its dangers.It means retainingthe ability to protect national security without allowing the aggressors to dictate their country's future.Wars and crisis often lead countries to change how they see themselves and how they see the world.
But the war with Iran has not changed the Emirati compass, the pursuit of prosperity, deeper connections with the world, and the courage to embrace the economies and industries of the future have remained at the heart of the UAE'snational project.The assessment of risks have changed and the UAE has learned new lessons about protecting its security and its achievements.But its development vision has not retreated.Instead, there is now a greater awareness of what is required to protect it.We do not present the UAE experience as a readymade formula for others, but we believe it raises questions worthy of broader discussions across the Gulf and the Arab world.How can we protect our openness from becoming a source of weakness?And how can we turn our partnerships into an asset that strengthens our freedom to make decisions?How can we safeguard our society's right to development, even when we are forced into a confrontation they did not choose?
The real test for states is not whether they can avoid these storms.It is whether they can prevent a storm from changing its course.
The first panel is introduced under the theme of the UAE compass and strategic autonomy. The moderator frames the war as a test of the UAE model and its preparedness.
In conclusion, I would like to thank uh all of you my dear guests.
Thank you Dr.Now we'd like to invite the speakers to come to the stage for a photo.Moderators and speakers to join us on stage for a group photograph.
Ladies and gentlemen, now we will start the next panel.
Yes.Very good.Go.
Let's have lights.
Ladies and gentlemen, panel one entitled the UAE Compass Power, Resilience, and the Art of Strategic Autonomy will start now.
In the name of God the most compassionate, the most merciful.Good morning to this first panel session in today uh this uh panel session on the UAE compass power resilience and art to strategic autonomy.Before starting, I would like to welcome uh our guest Dr.Sam al Kuti, president of Emirates Policy Center, his excellency staff lieutenant general, pilot retired Ashad al-Sadi, former commander of the national defense college of the UAE, Mr.Muhammad Baharon, director general of the public Dubai public policy research center, and Mr.Muhammad Alhammedi, assistant president of the federation of Arab journalist and presenter of the political program Bill M on Sky News Arabia.UAE has for so long been known for its special model different from other models of the Asian but it's a model based on stability and development.And this model has faced significant challenges and unprecedented challenges this year uh with the the war that took place in the Asian.
So we would like to explore how the UAE dealt with this challenge which constituted uh a precedent for the UAE model.
Panelists discuss whether the UAE was ready for war and how its defense systems responded. They stress long-term planning, resilience, and the protection of the national model.
Uh Dr.Sam if we can start with you.Was the UAE ready for this challenge?Because it looked like everything in the UAE is based on stability and steadfastness.Uh the economic and development model, everything quiet stability in the Asian and all of a sudden uh something like an earthquake hit the Asian and we are facing this type of war and specifically the Gulf States.Yes, that's true.The UAE model would only function uh within a stable environment.Uh but uh this model is not only for a stable environment.The UAE understands that we are uh in Asian where there can be wars, conflicts and tension and instability.So it would be illogical to build your model uh in a stable environment.This is why UAE was ready for that.The law uh the the the line of Fuja was not the out of Fuja was not built only for the war and UAE for so long thought about alternatives to Homo state thinking what the homo states become disrupted.
What if uh if we can have strategic reserves of water in the Asian uh in the UAE?What if uh this question uh that we need to always have alternatives?So this is part of the strategic resilience that we can have not only the ability to take decisions and withstand the fallout but also to be able to have alternatives.Not only was
uh the experience of the pandemic of COVID taught the world what would happen uh when the supply chain disrupted.the UAE with its experience in uh ensuring uh domestic uh merchandise and building national uh capacities capable of uh launching projects and this keeps to uh rely on which used to rely on external components.So I can share with you this information from the director of disaster and emergency.He asked he asked do you know how long it takes for a missile when it is launched from air to the UAE?Uh everybody was expecting like 15 minutes.He said four minutes.in those four minutes uh the civil defense uh the police the military they are all ready.So the preparedness for defense was there and this was not h this did not happen overnight.It took decades and like I said this model of openness and there there can be some gaps and we need to think how to cover those gaps and how to build alternatives for for such exposure.
If we can talk about protection with his excellency staff, Lieutenant General Alah Ashad al Sadi and the UAE is can be uh can be resilient and uh it was not an easy expression but it was something afflicting thereality.The capability of the UAE Ahmed forces uh emerged stronger during the test.The UAE was one of the the countries most hit by the owns and the missiles in the Asian.Maybe uh uh some people heard about this but you as a pilot and I heard about the role of aviation uh in uh uh defending against those drones.So were they prepared for this type of attacks?Thank you.Um, of of course the wars are evolving and it's difficult to forecast exactly the type of uh threats and the details of the threats but uh the UAE has always been ready for such days because there are certain
facts of the operations seen for the expected threats and geopolitical situation.But building uh a defense uh uh system with such effectiveness has shown to the enemies and to the allies as well uh how capable we are.And with the forwardlooking vision of the UAE and its leadership and the defense ecosystem has allowed the country to build such ecosystem and regardless of the number of drones and missiles that hit the country.The the preparedness was very good and for the forecasting we we can't say it was not there.it was there but uh not with all the exact details that uh started how the way it started with those attacks against against the UAE and as we have seen uh it was uh of a level that allowedus to protect the model and this is what we look forward to to protect the model not the ordinary protection of a state but the protection of a model that has proved itself as a reality in the Asian
and the model for the world.
The discussion shifts to the difference between strategic autonomy and neutrality. Panelists argue that the UAE's approach is active engagement guided by national interest, not passive neutrality.
Uh it seems that the UAEA when it took the decision of uh mandatory equipment and enlistment uh why would the UAE compel its youngster to enlist while they have lots of opportunities of education?uh was the idea from that moment uh uh that one day uh maybe one day we will face such a problem so we should be prepared for that.
Yes.So of course the Asian where we are face continuous crisis and crisis has not stopped in the Asian given the importance the strategic importance and geopolitical importance of the Asian and also as a source of energy for therest of the world and also the political complexities and the Asian and uh cost cutting of interest of uh major powers and regional powers.This is why this Asian will remain an active hub for KCS and it requires uh continuous preparedness and proactive strategic thinking.We'll talk about the steps taken by the UAE for proactive preparedness.But let me ask you Mr.Bah one of the questions that I have prepared the difference between a strategic autonomy and uh and and being uh
and the neutrality.So some counties that dealt with the Iranian aggression in different ways, the Gulf counties did not deal with it in a unified way.some were counting on neutrality of a and so we're thinking about countering those attacks and so how does the UAE present a model of strategic autonomy and what is the different with the neutrality some countries choose to stayneutral but they were affected by the Indian aggression uh good morning uh I'm pleased pleased to be with you on the 13 edition of this debate.Uh I'm happy to be with you in this national and international momentum.Before answering your question, I would like to go back to the concept of the UAEA compass.This is an important uh title and what does it mean the UAEA compass?First of all, what is the compass?The compass is to identify direction and what is important in the direction is steadfastness.
So uh steadfastness in the UAE on values uh on principle this is the foundation of the compass and the 50 principles are uh the foundation of the compass and his excellency anash in his speech every sentence is linkedto one of those principles of the 50s uh in terms of neutrality and strategic autonomy there is A big difference between both neutrality is based on polarity.We have parties and we are neutral.We are not siding with one party or the other.We stand in a position that avoid being engaged with one or the other.But we we can be with and strategic autonomy is based on neutrality.And this this is such a networking and and the networking you can only have it if you are engaged with everyone.So we can be engaged with the Aan or with Israel or with the US with China or Russia or Ukraine.
This is a networking concept.We are not neutral.Neutral meaning that I don't care what about what you are doing.that uh I am concerned and what you're doing is affecting me and what is happening in the Asian if we are talking about neutrality Europe then should be neutral about this conflict it was not part of it butit was it has been affected and China also in Japan so and neutrality as a concept during the polarity time but now we are in a different in different times Mr.uh alhamdi as we are talking about neutrality and strategic autonomy a lot has been said that uh in these times the relationship of the UAE and particularly the UAE with the American ally uh has been tested uh andhas seen some fault lines but we can say strategic ally that affect that affects the UAE decision.
The panel examines the UAE's relationship with the United States and other partners during the war. It highlights military confidence, coalition-building, and the export of trust to other states.
How did the UAE build some margins for itself during this crisis while dealing with the big ally which is the US?Uh good morning.Uh and thank you to Emirates Policy Center for inviting me and uh I would like to welcome all the guests.Let me start with you Mr.Yousef with the idea of the UAE compass and then I will come back to the relation with the the US ally.Uh this has revealed that the UAE compass as strategic as it is in dealing with the whole situation.The UAE it's clear everyone knows it's a country of peace of coexistence a country that uh respects neighbors and open its doors to everyone.But during this war, the UAE has shown to everyone that it is determined and would not hesitate in protecting its sovereignty uh and uh security.And this compass has been worked on for decades in the UAE during this war was prepared for at least three decades.
And this army, the armed forces and the military preparedness would not have been possible if the compass was not clear since the end of the '90s.This is why we have seen that the UAE has managed to counter the Iranian attacks.You can imagine, Mr.Yousef that in the first week of that war till the 7th of March the UAE has been targeted by half of the attacks more than 3,000 missiles and drones by sticks missiles and targeted missiles.Half of those missiles were in the first week.Here comes the question why such intense attacks on the UAE and what was unan willing to target.Yeah.An was targeting active target icons of the UAE and also uh active and dynamic economic sites and assets.It looked like it was targeting also other countries in the Gulf.But there was a surprise that the Iranian was were not expecting that the UAE was prepared fully ready economically in terms of infrastructure and institutional preparedness to face such aggressions.
This is why I think that they got the Iranian got the message from the first week that we do have Bush Khalifa and MS Palace and five-star restaurants and luxury cars.But on the other hand, we have a strong army.We have ready armed forces.We have infrastructures ready for the most challenging challenges.Uh so uh this war maybe was one of the biggest challenges for the UAE since its establishment and the American ally and the other allies.I think the UAE paid attentions from the start of the war that it's important to revisit its relations and alliances with others.We have seen the closest allies were the furthest friends in those times and we have seen some count is geographically far away from us and also not very much and connected with us economically they were prepared and theystood with the UAE.This is why I think that the relation with the United States is strategic and will remain there.
uh it's one of the most important allies of the UAE and uh it has its position and its regional international calculation but the main lesson here that the UAE has it is that to ally on itself not toally on anyone else other than its own people and capabilities.Uh if you allow me to comment on this point.Yes, of course.Go ahead.Of course.Uh yes, you are the moderator.Uh we are talking about strategic autonomy.
Yes, the UAE has a partnership with major powers, but it also has the capability of uh independence in making its decision in line with its priorities.These partnerships are important but national priorities have been also been important in in the relation with the United States and
the major power.uh strategic autonomy does not mean that you should beon the same line with everyone uh uh whether it's a major power or uh minor power.What you should consider is your national interest.uh the relation with the US is important and so is with the Europe and the Asian but the most important thing is the interest of the UAE which comes first.Uh this is why the aviation that we have uh even the the Americans did not know that we were we were uh uh counteratt attacking those attacks and our priority was to defend our territory and society.This is what I wanted to ask.the question of unknown uh uh aviation.uh officially it was not announced that there was attacks uh by the UAE but to what extent uh were the uh self confident uh that the US was incapable of protecting its bases uh in Bahin in Jordan but
to be uh so self-confident to do such a thing to uh limit the attacks of AI and to push it to reconsider its attacks.So the position of the UAE was not 100% defensive but it could do other things.So where did uh such confidence come?Because uh engaging in such war is not easy.uh self-confidence is not this is not only self-confidence but it was actually complete uh confidence and complete conviction based on uh sight based on site reality I belong to the aviation and uh I witnessed the times of modernizationof aviation sector and I know exactly All the building of that took place in the minds and spirits of all the personnel of aviation such as pilots or uh milit personnel or administrators and leaders and knowing that theleadership is completely supporting them.the political leadership.And what we have is not only equipment and systems, but a comprehensive ecosystem in logistics and and connections and uh new systems that are capable of completing all the missions of defense and attacks.
So such full confidence stems from uh capabilities that are here besides of course the partnerships and the relations that we have and uh we can't say that we can get rid of those partnerships but we have capabilities uhto remain fully capable of attacking the enemies also.But this position was like a catalyst for other countries.We have seen in counties like Kuwait and the UAE with its military uh uh policies has incentivized other Gulf counties and has supported them.It's like exporting the confidence.Yes.Exporting the confidence.So yes, we exported such confidence to obtain more partnerships and to boost reliable partnership and build new partnerships with a common uh and forwardlooking vision.
This section focuses on social cohesion, continuity of services, and the role of residents in sustaining the UAE. It also discusses how the war tested the economy and business confidence.
Uh Dr.answered my question but I will come back to you again.uh during those days uh and uh with such uh resilience if we look at the the the domestic coalition in the UAE some from outside were thinking that Dubai will be economically impacted but they did not notice thatAbu Dhabi is siding with it and supporting it.We have seen that a long time before.But how important was it?Because there was some attempts to harm that relations between them and we have heard about some rumors that uh maybe economically the emirate will be affected and nobody will support Dubai.So what happened during the crisis?Uh you look uh one of the ambassadors uh stopped by and uh few months uh later he was in Iran.Uh I asked him the question why did Ian uh target the UAE with most of its attacks?
Uh he told me something that I knew but I wanted to get some confirmation.He said he also asked that question to one of the members of IRGC.Why do you target the UAE?He said we want to destroy that model.He said uh this model is a a pressure exerts pressure on us.This is why we don't have stability and prosperity and development like is the case for the UAE.So destroying this model uh for theian also who goes there uh it will allow them when they come back here and then uh they they start asking question why can't they have the same prosperity and development in Iran.Let me go back now to your question.There is a saying uh there's an expression of his highness sheh Muhammad bin Zed that uh all those living in the UAE are immatiz so the UAE did not only protect UAE citizen but it protected all those uh
living in the UAE.So uh that uh this the trust from uh inside society from UAE citizen and from residents and talking about resilience we have seen uh the the missiles in the skies and we were receiving warnings in the in themessages and one hour later you will see people walking in the streets in restaurants going to work and because they are feeling safety because if there was no trust that this government is capable of protecting them and uhensuring discontinuity uh they would not have done that because there was no uh food disruption, no medical disruptions.uh hospitals kept working and a remote work was launched.for those who don't want to uh take ISK and there are uh many ambassadors who can confirm that and they have seen the facilities that were provided to their own citizens who wanted to exit the country and this
came from the credibility of the UAE because the UAE protected everyone uh to uh build on this Mr.her own visit by the president of the UAE, Sheh Muhammad Vin Zay to Dubai Mall at a time when there was a media criticism of Dubai.What was the objective of that?I think this is related to the question you asked Dr.Sam.If we use resilience here, it will be relevant because resilience means the uh the capacity to continue.So the capacity to uh continue is the new counter attack.So you can respond to the attack.Now you can attack but you will not destroy, you will not change the model.This has become the new model of uh dete
continuity of life and the continuity of the model with Dubai Mall and that visit of Dubai Mall was a big important message that we are with you and I want to comment on the strategic coalition with United Statesand uh why you asking about the strategic coalition with the US why not asking about the strategic relation with Kua.Why not the the relation with France, with Italy, with Egypt?Kua is far away from us by 7,000 kilometers and came to defend the UAE.Why did it do that?We don't have agreement like the one we have of joint defense with the Arab League.We don't have defense agreement like with the the Gulf states in 2000 signed in 2000 in Manama.So this uh joint interest has become a sort of deterrence.It's like a network model.So we start changing the rules even for international election and its hierarchy and the joint uh safety.
At the beginning it was regional safety for the neighbor in counties only but now what is joint is international and not only.So these are uh rules that are changing quietly without uh big uh international wars like uh the the first world war or the second world war or the ashan evolution that link led to the uh polarism polarities theso quietly we have seen with a small state that the new model uh of uh the international and interconnections uh and all this has been tested in difficult circumstances such as wars and we have seen the result ofthat Mr.Muhammadi if you want to comment again on the relation with the US and can give you the chance but let us talk in terms of economic partnership.Despite what has happened, DOAE managed to export petrol either through Habshan or it invented a new way for uh petrol vessels, smaller vessel that cause homos safely and then transported to other bigger vessels in the Arabian Sea and
the UAE.
Panelists assess the impact of the war on trade, tourism, and investment. They argue that the UAE remained attractive because life and services continued despite the crisis.
we can say uh managed to provide its partners with energy and did not give up on them.To what extent do you think that economic partnership and the trade partnership can be affected during such war?Uh particularly that the UAE now is relying a lot on AI which requires ensuring energy and stability.Uh did the UAE lose some of its trade partners because of this war?This is an important question and today the uh economic aspects in this war was very clear and it's and it was the reason for this attacks of the AN of the Gulf count is to impact the Gulf economyand the world economy in general.But uh what she Muhammad van Ashid said yesterday that the the volume of UAE economy has reached three trillion for this year.So this is an indicator that the UAE if we want to talk about resilience in dealing with different changes and handling surprises those that are unexpected and this one was one of those highly unexpected surprises.
We understand that theian regime is aggressive and we have been dealing with it for more than 40 years and we tried to mitigate the the danger but theian regime it's missiles they started targeting the Asian so the economicsituation in the UAE is now much better than it was uh before the war in terms of the oil exports we found out we found new solutions and the UAE E as a country is prepared and uh whatwas noticeable for us as media professional is that since the first week of the war uh government meetings of the UAE government were taking place to be prepared for what will come what will happen after in the nextdays of the war.So uh yes the tourism sector has been affected, the illstate sector has been affected and other sectors such as entertainment has also been affected.But uh the the main uh economy managed to uh keep moving and to start its movement again and the economic situation of the UAE.
I think it's the better in the Asian and it managed to recover quickly.We can ask Mr.Baja about the traffic jam in Dubai.At sometimes we felt happy that uh um And but then people came back uh and we have we we see now also a jam in Abu Dhabi.Let let me say something here
in the uh businessman club uh businessman club the family business for businessmen.uh before meeting them, I had the zoom meeting uh with the chairman of that club and uh he was talking and said uh we thought they are 200 members uh businessmen.Uh he said that uh with this war going on and uh we have our head office in Dubai uh should we come back to the country or should we move our business somewhere else?He said uh this was uh at the the beginning of the war and in the middle of the war we kept observing the situation but we said the services and life did not stop in this country and theeconomy is still going on although not as it was before but uh we managed to keep our business going on and then we decided this country has managed to protect itself and to protect people living in it.
It can protect our businesses.
The conversation turns to weapons manufacturing, drones, and the future of warfare. The panel stresses proactive defense industries and the importance of exhibitions like IDEX.
Uh now your excellency staff Lieutenant General Alashard, we know that wars can be the opportunity to uh explore new weapons in the UAE.decision was issued about building uh specific area for weapon manufacturing with a focus on the owns.uh according to your understanding uh what is the experience of the UAE in terms of weaponry uh defense uh and the edge particularly are we heading to a new uh world war with the owns we see uh Ukraineis launching dailyto Russia so what will be the future of the wars now regarding the defense sector Uh it started uh very early but in the last years uh we it took a different dimension with a focus on technologies andthe requirements for modern wars and also the other aspect linked to achieving uh defense sovereignty and uh self uh independence and protecting uh defense capabilities of the country defense industries for the country and the Asian and those defense
industry that has seen the light recently is a proactive step and it's very important and it cannot be uh separated from other elements in terms of economic diversification of the country given the geopolic ical uh situation of theUAE and uh its relation with the supply chain and it completes them.But in terms of defense, it has been proved in the last war that there was some focus on depletion or attrition and having such defense uh industry is a proactive management of attrition and what we can call theuh erosion of defense industries.So defense industry is working effectively with those details uh in terms of wars.But uh in terms of focus on the owns, the own has proven its effectiveness in conducting lots of military missions given the nature of uh the population of the country and demographic factors.the UAE may need uh more of that compared to other countries in the Asian uh the trade commercial and defense uh elements.
So taking into account different element that all uh come together to achieve uh the highest interests of the country.uh in a nutshell if you can answer because everyone asking this question every day we hear about new technologies uh uh for uh uh countering the own the Ukrainian issued what is called uh the fly the fly thatcan attack the own and intercept it when can we see such weapons because I like I have like I said ash and Ukraine is a strange model as they exchange the owns in handles on a daily basis.When can we see those new weapons that will intercept the owns and when will that will come into full operation?Uh I hope that you will not see that in wars but maybe just in exhibition.We have IDEX is an excellent platform to showcase the latest defense technologies and this exhibition is an important part of the comprehensive defense ecosystem because it allows us to build defense partnerships and it builds on building task and
presenting the latest technologies in terms of development.ment of equipment and military weapons.This is something that go backs a long time and it has witnessed more momentum since the second world war but it has always evolved and there's always something new and something that can be surprising and surprises is oneof the principles of military operations.
Panelists debate how the UAE should respond to possible U.S.-Iran understandings. They argue that Gulf interests must not be sidelined in any regional arrangement.
Mr.Hamadi, if we can now ask you, we are waiting now for the American decision regarding how to deal with Aan in the next stage.uh in your opinion in case there are some understanding uh between uh America and AI and how can the UAE uh act in terms of its policies to build its policies with the surrounding countries in the Gulf andwith the US because what we hear from some understanding uh between the US and Aan has some negative mentions of straight of homes and supervision.of the state of homes.This is important for the UAE.As we talk about the UAE is building for itself some uh margin of maneuver in collaboration with the American ally.Uh how can the UAE act in your opinion?There's no doubt that uh this war gave the UAE a different uh uh vision for handling uh different uh data.
The other thing is that I think the UAE like other countries of the Asian is prepared for anything that would be uh urgent and unexpected and new in the Asian and UAE has showcased its policies and strategies indealing uh with regional international changes.It allies on itself.it's uh it's being prepared for all possible scenarios.Uh so it's dealing with that uh starting from its own national interest and protecting the whole Asian.Of course the those understandings are uh expected the theory of uh uh of conspiracy is expected but the UAE with each step it takes is a well informed step from all aspects and all the expected scenarios.This is why the elation of the US, with the US, with Israel, with other countries of the world, even with AAN uh the UAE call back its ambassador from Aan since the first week.
But relations are still on.The UAE believes in dialogue, believes that we need to reach an agreement.At the same time, it believes that it sovereignty mains headline.So the idea that the other calculations in the Asian and the other agreements that could and the Asian could not be part of it.I think uh this is one of the scenarios on the table but also the allied counties they should remember that there are interest for the counties of the Gulf and the UAE.Uh that should not be overlooked.maybe the uh the agreement with the under Obama and the other administration.I think uh they made the mistake when they did not uh consider the other countries of the Asian as partners.So uh the current administration has a different opinion and the country is of the Asian now has proved that they are important for the whole world that the Gulf uh and its security is not important only for the
Gulf but for the whole world and that it can have an impact on security of all other countries and that individual decisions or inter personal interest of Some parties should not be taken while ignoring the interest of countiesin terms of uh security state of homos and other elements.
The discussion returns to whether the UAE should revise its foreign policy after the war. Speakers emphasize that values remain steady, but partnerships and military ties should be reviewed.
Mr.Bahon, do you think that there is a need to revisit the uh foreign policy the original foreign policy after the end of this war uh specifically with some neighbors?I always look at the issue from the the perspective of values of the UAE.Did those values change?No, they did not.The bomb was in did not change and the 50s initiative and safety and security is a value in the 50s principle.Those values did not change.The idea of engagement did not change.If you have uh ASM network the the Asian where there is no coverage that will be like a dead coverage.If we have no engagement with an will have a dead coverage.So evaluation is very important of everything we do and I think every five years there is a evaluation of the plan and our strategy could also be amended but the values are steadfast.
Uh I I would like to go back to the uh idea of uh weapon in manufacturing.We spoke about the owns the UAEA in 2014 launched a PI called the owns for good for civilian use of the owns.So the investment in that had an impact on all the military industry is including the space industry is and that had some civilians civilian use and that allow also investment in capabilities uh his excellency the lieutenant general didnot talk much but he's one of the new founders of those leaders in national defense.It's the investment in people and so we can hear me remember what his the late she zed said and this country is for us and for everyone else who will be living on it.So when a looks at the interconnected interest or each country has national interest but the interwined interest is is what it's peace the United States has its interest has its interest and Gulf state has their interest and we
have our own interest maybe they are not aligned but there would be some intertwined points where we need to invest So uh quickly uh uh Lieutenant General Rashad after this war do you think that after this war therewill be some diversification of military partnership like for uh South Korea there was no agreements with them but there are countries with which we have agreements but they were not up to the level we were expecting.So do you expect some change in military partnership and military manufacturing and purchase of weapons from other countries and training with other countries in terms of uh defense policies.This is based on uh specific pillars that has proved uh its success.Changing partnership uh is not always on the table but we can view those partnerships and this is natural and it happens on a regular basis and this happens during crisis and during uh political uh transformation and military transformation.
The UAE is uh very uh resilient and very open to a new partnership and the alliable partnership because uh the last conflict has proved the necessity of viewing those partnerships.
This chapter critiques the weakness of regional organizations and the difficulty of collective action. It also describes the media campaign against the UAE as part of the war itself.
Uh Dr.Uh Sam, if I can ask you this question.Uh if we if you can be uh very frank here.Uh we heard a lot that the UAE is uh thinking about uh the fate of the Gulf Council counties and the League of Arab states and they all during thatis because actually the the kasis has revealed lots ofthings and uh exposed lots of challenges.Do you think that the UAE will continue on its part regardless of what the the League of Arab States and GCC uh council would try to present for the Asian even if there are some differences like Mr.Muhammad said the UAE has some steadfast principles such as working within international organization is important.If they are uh inefficient, this is another issue.Uh yes uh there was uh some uh collective failure of the Gulf work and Arab work and this was unfortunate during the crisis.
But uh we have seen other crisis in the Asian and I can say that uh the Gulf count is council at least it was calling for uh an urgent uh uh summit.uh so because this was the first time a war happened and uh the and this was this did not happen uh in the Asian of the Gulf which has witnessed many wars.So this was also a shock not only for the government but also for us.we were waiting for a meeting uh and believing uh in joint Gulf work and Arabian work.I don't think uh this is something the UAE will deviate away from.But we have problem with this organization is that the willpower of count is you need a collective decision.This is based on the willpower of countries because they may not always agree and it takes time and the challenge here doesn't the UAE feel that there is an attempt to uh fight its model or to isolate it
and let us stay with the group even if it takes our own decision uh instead of taking some challenges even if what you're saying uh is is possible.The UAE even if alone managed to succeed and during the crisis there was cooperation not inside the Gulf Council but between the UAE and other countries in terms of uh exchange of intelligence and helping some Gulf counties.So the Gulf joint work did not stop uh in terms of relation between counties.I'm talking uh about the organization.The problem not with the organization itself but the coord the nation was hard for the league of Arab states.Uh the problem is that all those uh countries have different opinions and if you want to align them on one opinion that's difficult.There are different perspective also about Iran even at the level of the secretary general of the league of Arab states who is supposed to know the cause of the Arab counties and to stand with the Gulf counties.
He understand the work of the Arabian counties and the dangers it's facing from the neighboring counties and then he was siding with this is something we also found in our meetings with uh major other major power not Americathat they they look they consider that the US and Israel attacked Iran.uh we accepted uh that as premises but uh Ian also attacked the Gulf counties without the Gulf counties starting those attacks and they offered the securityities to the Gulf counties that uh they will our Gulf count is andgave guarantees that um and excellency the minister Lana Saba was there uh two weeks before the war and she spoke and gave him assurances that there will be no attacks from our counties but we were the first toreceive those attacks.Uh in terms of uh the media, the UAE was targeted by a very big uh media uh campaign.
Uh was that also considered as uh a war uh from the media and uh people saying there's no food left in the UAE and the banks shut down and uh other areas have been blown up.uh we have seen that uh uh uh and the the Iranian the Iranian media managed to infiltrate medias of different countries and impact the media.Uh so the issue of media yes was part of the war and half of that war was a media war.
The panel discusses misinformation, social media attacks, and the resilience of daily life in the UAE. It closes with examples showing how residents and citizens alike felt protected.
If there was missiles on the owns targeting our countries, but there was a media uh campaign which was systematic and it was like planned in advance and from the first day we have seen that the goal was uhuh to uh make everyone think that the UAE is facing a huge and will collapse and we have seen in social media B Khalifa collapsing and airports burning and people escaping.So, uh the scene was very tragic and that was deliberate.The goal was clear and Mr.Ysef from our observation from the after the first week after the Iranian regime was convinced that its missiles attacks would not achieve their goals.they started focusing more on media campaign but by uh intimidating people uh inside the UAE and but also other Gulf countries.But since there is a big uh percentage of foreign foreigners living in the UAE and trying to push them to leave the UAE and making them feel that their lives is at risk.
how uh media was used and AI was used uh and fabricated videos were used and videos of events that took place in in other places shown as if it happened in Dubai.So we should be careful that in any future warfare we should pay attention to media.Media is very important.you could be uh the uh victorious in reality but in media you are the loser or you are affected.So to conclude my idea lots of uh you people contacted us uh my lots of my friend were called in and asking if we are doing well because what you see in the media and social media in particularthat this country is finished.So this is why uh the uh I I think the Iranians are very good in those media campaigns uh and those also who have uh different agenda against the UAE and that's the Gulf countries.
But today uh uh we are in the first weeks of November after eight weeks of the war we can say that those attacks did not achieve their goals and our country is safe now.uh quickly have a few questions left.Uh but uh allow me uh to uh take a question from uh Stalin Johnson because he wants to take the floor.Uh I would like to ask a question about strategic autonomy in the UAE and the social dimension for the residents of the UAE.what is their all in terms of uh the strategic autonomy uh uh h how do they contribute to that?
Um M stalling thank you for your question.Uh I would like to mention the the difference between the K that took place in 2008 and the war uh the crisis of the deaths.Uh we have seen displacement uh from some nationalities leaving the country but it was a global crisis that affected the UAE and other counties.We have seen uh big exodus.So the UAE was one of the mostly affected country in the Gulf.But uh with the war we have not seen the same level of exodus.Uh although the UAE was mostly affected.Uh so we have seen those incident looking at the UAE as if it was their own country.You have seen some big uh companies that left the country but small and medium businesses uh which are uh uh the foundation for the middle class they stayed in the country.If you allow me to comment on this also uh maybe what we have seen in this war uh was something to be proud of in the UAE.
uh we don't consider the residents as a passing guest but they are part of this the social fabric of the cancer.This is why his highness Muhammad bin Z when he talks about the UAE people he doesn't talk only about UAE citizen but the whole the whole people all the people living in the country this is why we haveseen that those who were contributing and defending the UAE during this war most of them were the residents and in social media we have seen foreigners from all nationalities they were talking and conveying the message to the restof the world that the UAE is doing very well.Uh so much so that those who were not convinced they were thinking that the UAE has paid those so that they can uh say that but the UAE did not and we are proud to see that those foreigners
they are part of the society and this is a success for the UAE.I would like to conclude uh with uh uh an incident that took place uh at the beginning of the war.There was an Iranian tourist with his wife.his wife was pregnant and uh when uh the attack started and uh there was a miscarage and that the pregnant woman was taken to the hospital and uh because of the war he didn't know who to call sohe called the emergency number and they said we'll send you the ambulance to take you to hospital he said but I am aian they said to him no problem.You are in our country and we need to protect everyone including the Iranians.So they took him to the hospital.The wife was treated and then came the bill.The bill was a big amount and he said I don't have money and uh I can't use my credit cards and they told him we will take care of the cost.
this uh person has shown that in a video and how that happened and how the Imiratis dealt with him.So he told this story although he is Ian.So this shows us how the residents feel because what they get is the same that UAE national we did not exclude anyone from the protection.Uh so we have exceeded the time for the session.And uh thank you very much uh to the speakers in this uh uh panel session Dr.Sam could be excellency staff Lieutenant General Pilot Ashad als Mr.Muhammad Bahon Mr.Muhammad Alhamdi and uh everyone with his own name and titles will take a photo and then there will be a B and those who could not ask a question they can ask in the B.Thank you.
The second panel opens with a broad discussion of global leadership and the shifting balance between the United States and China. The moderator frames the debate around order, power, and leadership.
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Ladies and gentlemen, panel two entitled Who rules the world now?The great debate on order, power, and leadership will start now.
Good morning.Welcome to the second panel.Who rules the world now?A very provocative topic.The great debate on order, power, and leadership.We're going to zoom out a little bit from the the the previous panel's focus on the Gulf and the UA in particular and look at how the international dynamics especially the US China competition plays out in the Gulf.A topic that those of us who live here uh never tire of talking about it's really the probably one of the biggest topics of the day.Uh for for 80 years the question who leads has always had a very clear answer.It doesn't anymore.Uh the US still has the capacity uh to to to lead globally, but appears less willing to pay the costs.Um given last week's midterm elections, I think we're all reading the tea leaves to see how this plays out.
But my best guess is that domestic political affairs are probably going to dominate the agenda in Washington for the next two years leading up to the next general election.Meanwhile, China seems to have the capacity, but hasn't necessarily shown the will.As somebody who watches China very closely, I think Beijing is also quite focused on domestic, political and and economic affairs and a very challenging regional um environment.Meanwhile, a range of alternative frameworks for order are coalescing, including this this idea of a middle power coalition, which perhaps explains why we have a Canadian moderator here today.Um, but the big question for us on the panel is what's coming, what are we going into?And we have a great group, a distinguished group of panelists.Um, to to address this, I'm just going to give the bullet point uh introductions.You can refer to the agenda to to see everybody's credentials virtually.
We have uh Dennis Du um who's being a great sport, staying up uh until I believe 2 am.Right now Dana is the re director of research at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy in Washington DC.Here on the stage with me is uh Charles Copchin, professor of international affairs at Georgetown University.Um we have um Wong Hua the founder and president of the center for China and globalization.Mingha Jao, professor and deputy director of the center for American studies at Fuan University.and Brian Wong, who is the founding director of Hong Kong Global Governance Hub.
So, I'm going to start with the big question.I'm going to give all of the panelists a chance to to to address this and I'll start with you, Dana.Um, what's going on in the world?What are we moving into?Are we moving into some kind of um new broadly recognized leadership?Are we coming into a a balance of power dynamic?Are we coming into a power vacuum?What does the world look like uh for those making decisions?Um Dana, any thoughts?
The first speaker argues that the United States is in a corrective moment and that no clear replacement for U.S. leadership exists. He predicts more ad hoc, issue-based coalitions rather than stable new blocs.
is that United States going throughAmerican
war
was
victory look like.They are the resources in this war and they feel the impact of this war at home.
very in the United States.And with that, I think administration has spoken very
upheld a post that worked better for others than it worked for the United States and Americans at home.And again, I think we're in a corrective moment here in the United States where elements of that strategy, whether it's using the American economy for tariffs in a way that has not worked in Americans feel has backfired.Uh Trump administration approaches to Russia and Ukraine to the war with Iran.Their uh inability to resolve other conflicts in in the Middle East.All of this is what the American role should be going forward I think is very much up for debate.And the perception of American retreat, I think, is changing how uh different uh groups look at the United States and try to resolve issues, address conflicts or set up alternative structures.And we're in that moment right now.Uh for me, there is uh no consensus about an alternative or or a replacement for US leadership.
Instead, what we're seeing is not new alliances, but alignment, very issue based.So, there might be alignments like the Quinch or the Quad for Sudan.There was a specific grouping for the Hamas Israel conflict.There's a different grouping for Lebanon in the framework.There are active mediators related to the Iran war.We can go on and on.And then there are issue based programings whether it's looking at critical minerals supply chains um other other issues uh and I think this is what we're going to see for some time uh which is just ad hoc orboutique uh groupings constellations based on the issue of the day but they're not leading to new or alternative arrangements or replacements for the United States at this time.
This section presents the world as being in an interregnum shaped by power shifts and technology. It also questions China's grand strategy and the lack of global public goods.
Excellent.Well, we'll just go down the line.Charles, do you have any thoughts on what we're looking at now?Yeah, I mean I I think we're in a historical inflection point, an an interregnum between one period of history and a another period of history that has not yet begun to take shape.And I think the main drivers of history that have put us into this inflection point are a redistribution of global power on a scale that we have not seen really in a couple hundred years in the sense thatthe western world, northern Europe, North America, Japan, other liberal democracies have been a prepoundonderant coalition since the early 19th century.Those days are coming to an end simply because power is again shifting from west to east and north to south.And the other source of change and disruption is technology.The onset of the digital era, the degree to which that has undermined the social contract of the industrial era.
Uh, and that to me is the main reason that the United States and many other liberal democracies are living through an unprecedented period of political dysfunction.Right?Governments are unable to deliver to their citizens.And so, every time there's an election, the citizens say, "Let's throw the bums out and try someone new."That's exactly what happened last week.And so I think you have a situation in which the world's leading power, the United States, has the sources uh of uh material strength needed to provide order, but it doesn't know its own mind.It's kind of lost its way.It has become politically fractured.And that's why every time power changes hands in Washington, you see a major change in American strategy, which leaves the rest of the world wondering what comes next, feeling a certain level of of whiplash, and understandably going outand practicing multi-alignment, defersifying your portfolio.
And then you have the other major power in the world, China, which strikes me as a country that has in some ways more coherent government than the United States.But as far as I can tell, and maybe my colleagues here can respond to this, knows more what they don't want than what they do want.Right?What they don't want is a world governed by the United States.What they don't want is uniolarity.They want multipolarity.But when I look at a Chinese grand strategy, I see a country that is motivated by the desire to kind of trip up the United States.Why is China supporting Russia in a bald act of aggression against Ukraine?Where was China during the recent conflicts and instability here in the Gulf?If there's any country that has the ability to exercise leverage over Thran, it's China.Why doesn't it do so?
Uh my sense is because it doesn't mind tripping up the United States, but it strikes me as it this is a moment when we need more leadership, more public goods, and and nobody's really providing it.So, I do think that we're going to be living through a a bumpy period now for the foreseeable future.
The panel discusses the U.S. midterm elections and warns against overinterpreting them. The speaker emphasizes deeper political fractures and continued volatility in American foreign policy.
And I would end my opening remarks with just a cautionary word about what just happened in the United States
because I think we should not over interpret the midterms.Uh a as a as a Democrat, as somebody who didn't support President Trump, I'm I'm quite pleased with the outcome and it does suggest the system is working.Democracy held.The United States just had a free and fair election.the American people held accountable a president who was failing to deliver on his promises.But we're not about to go back to a country that resembles the America of the 20th century or the early 21st century.And that's because of the deeper political fractures that will continue in the United States.And do I think that we're about to see Donald Trump moderate, learn the lessons from the midterm?Probably not.He may well double down.We may end up seeing America first on steroids because a wounded Trump is a dangerous Trump.uh and as a consequence uh I think that that countries should basically stay the course that they've been on which is work with the United States when you can push back against the United States when you must play
the long game.Ride the Trump administration out because I do think that for the next couple of years the US is going to be in a bumpy political state.Yeah, I think we're all at risk of of trying to read too much into these midterm results.Um, I think here a lot of people look at it and think, well, this is clearly a vote on the war in Iran.And I'm pretty sure almost nobody in the US was voting on this war.I think people were voting on on economic issues.And just to your point about the polarization, to see the results in say Mississippi where it's at one point it was down to like 40 odd votes really shows how polarized the the electorate really is.Um there's a lot in that I think uh that addresses the the view from or how things might look from Beijing.
A Chinese panelist argues that the world has reached a new equilibrium and that China is helping provide global public goods. He presents China as a stabilizing force through economic globalization and diplomacy.
So I'd love to hear how what uh you know how you see order shaping up but also maybe if you can address some of uh Charles's points.
Yes.Great.Uh thank EPC for the invitation.This is great event.Uh I just arrived this morning from Beijing but I think this is really impressive.What I think the topic actually is well chosen and I also I I I I conquer some of the points the previous speaker has made.But I do think that we are reached a new equilibrium now because uh you you look at what US uh you know when the second world war was finished they count about more than half of the world GDPnow probably a quarter of that but but basically the global south is rising and they count about half of global GDP now and half of the global population and China is leading on that.So, so what I what I see is that uh we are we are trying to avoid this heiti trap.My friend Graham Madison has been saying that destined for war.
I wrote a book for him and basically said let's escape heidi's trap and uh and then that's what the president she was telling President Trump every time they meet let's avoid his trap.Now we talk about kingburgger trap basically is that when one when one when when two powers uh you know one one power rising when the other power you know keeping its influence then maybe there's a lack of globalpublic goods but what I think uh we see the new equilibria we see achieved the mutually assured disruption on both side now and that's probably force into a prison dilemma to think about how we can achieve the mutuallyassured construction function.So basically uh I I see the China pursued economic uh globalization still continuously you know China is uh having all kind of a economic uh mechanism RC the largest free trade agreement China wants to join CBTP China has
actually China Arab summit China African Latin American Central Asia AEN summit it's all economic focused and of course on top of that China has below so I You can see you know China really attaches great importance to thisbread and butter for the global uh public goods.Uh whereas I think there's a there's over securization militarization uh going on and that's actually dangerous and then I'm very pleased to see the midterm election.Basically the American public has say no you know no war on Iran.Let's let's let's finish that.So I think you know China is is is doing this economic integration in e economic development which is the key for for the for the global south and for the world and then that's probably will coming back forthis common sense you let's need a bread and butter not gun and powder so what I think coming back to Charles's question I I think that China is trying to be more helpful for example China donates over 20%
of UN budget now and paid on time not as US you not not not paying on time.China when when US is pulling out of a WH, China donated 500 million US dollars to WHO to really you know keep that organization working.And of course China is the largest peacekeeping setting country of the P5 at the United Nations.So I think you know China is still trying to keep all those uh uh uh uh uh you know gaps that has been left there.But of course uh China wasn't that aggressive always in the front but China is quiet to do things.For example, at this uh upcoming apex summit in Shenzhen, I propose actually to put him why not we have a uh you know a trilateral meeting there to talk about all the global issues and that is happening now.Basically I was at the VA I proposed that idea but it was greatly responded and uh and and so China is doing that and China is sending his envoy for for Middle East for Gulf for for Ukraine for
uh Africa you know and uh and meeting all the all the all the parties players involved.So I think China is quietly doing things behind rather than in the front.But I do think that if uh I see the remaining legacy for President Trump is to really fulfill his promise to be the president of peace.I mean he has actually calm down Gaza but hopefully he can calm down Russian Ukraine conflict and calm down the Iranian uh US Israel conflict and if he's doing that he needs China and China can be really helpful.So, so I think with the guarantee that China can provide with the peacekeeping force, China public can send with global south countries, Indian, Pakistan, uh, South Africa, Brazil, you know, we may have to see a world of morestabilizing power arising from global south that's meant by multipolar war that's meant a new equilibria established.
This chapter continues the argument that the world is moving toward coexistence rather than convergence. Another panelist clarifies China's position on Russia and Iran while describing U.S. retrenchment.
So in that new contest, we cannot really we cannot converge.I mean like US always say oh you join WT you should converge to become one of us.No, now they realize okay we cannot converge but let's coexist peacefully.So, so we can tolerate different models, different styles but maybe we should uh do it together.So I think China will become a stabilizing force for the world.If they pursue this economic globalization, if they contribute over 30% of GDP growth for the world and if we if you if become the largest trading nation with 140 countries, I'm sure they're going to gradually fill the vacuumuh for stabilizing the economy.And if we stabilize the economy, everybody's intertwined and it's difficult to launch a war like what we see the US Iranian example.It's very difficult to to fight a war you know if if things are so tightly concentrated.
So I think China probably also you know I I was in uh Munich security uh conference leader meeting in New Delhi.I was talking to Shia Shenko maybe China and India China is the largest partner economic partner trading partner of Gar state.India is the largest diaspora sending country of this part if if if if Indian China can work together and also maybe trying to stabilize the region that's possibility as well.So we'll see you know of course US still have a lot of leadership role to play China support that but China also can help to stabilize the world with all the conflicts and trouble in the world.
Thank you Mingha.What do you think?
Wow.Thank you so much.Very good morning to everyone.It's greater to say the closer uh ties between China, UAE and actually last week I gave a lecture to a group of uh ministers from UAE in Beijing and uh this very important to say the strengthening China UAEpartnership in this very turbulent world.several points.Um, Professor Capchen said China support Russia and Iran.Well, I think I need make some clarification.China does not give any military support to Russia and Iran.And actually Ukraine Russia war is the mistake strategic mistake made by Russian President Putin.The Iran war is the strategic mistake made by US President Donald Trump.China is managing the dile the uh consequences of rose conflicts.Last week actually I was invited by Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to attend a meeting with Mr.Ali Kam Khani.Ali Khani is the deputy secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Committee.
But uh in the la last minute that meeting was cancelled because Ali Khani need to get back to Iran because of Iran is very concerned with the possible military attack of US in the aftermath of mid uh midtermelection.So everybody is concerned with uh Donald Trump's decision.
The discussion turns to strategic stability between the U.S. and China and the need for responsible statecraft. It also highlights the growing importance of AI-related security risks.
So I think I want to emphasize we are witnessing US retrenchment.US retrenchment could be assertive evidenced by US military operations in Venezuela in Iran and we are seeing chaotic retrenchment.So I think for Beijing it's very challenging to how to manage this transitioning uh moment.Chinese President Xiinping proposed a new best word for Chinese foreign policy that is quite important.What China wants an equal and orderly multipolarity.Equal and orderly multipolarity.Canadian Prime Minister Connie talk about the rupture moment of international order.Beijing is very very concerned with the very chaotic turbulent transitioning moment from US-led hegemonic order to a multipolar world.Second thing, the strategic stability between China US.It's very good for Donald Trump and Xiinping to have a four meetings this year.But I think this kind of strategic stability is based on mutual vulnerabilities rather than goodwill from both sides.
China has rare earth's card.The US has AI chips card.So the challenge for Beijing is how to operationalize strategic stability between China and US and institutionalize strategic stability.We want new US president in 2029 would also accept this new framing of strategic stability between US China.Third point, how to navigate this strategic reordering moment.Two things very important.We need to think about responsible statecraftraft.Don't make strategic disastrous mistakes like Russia Ukraine conflict at US Iran war.Second thing give space to UAE among other countries multi vector alignment multi vector alignment don't force those countries take sides the last point is about strategic resilience I was in so this Sunday attending US China AI dialogue wellin terms of the AI we are seeing a bipolarity US China US China bipolarity in AI.So this countries, those countries they have great responsibility in managing AI related disruption and how to tackle attacks on AIDC, how to handle AI agents attack, how to enrich AI safety mechanism.
I think we have a lot of work to do.That's up there.
A panelist broadens the discussion beyond the U.S. and China to include India, Vietnam, Kazakhstan, and the UAE. He argues that middle powers can shape global governance and act as agenda setters.
Well, that segus nic to Brian who has quite an AI focus.
Thank you, Shaklam.The old world is dying and the new world struggles to be born.Now is the time for monsters.As Antonio Grampsy wrote from a jail in Italy in the 1930s, he was a critical Marxist.But I'd like to add that maybe now is not just a time for monsters, but also for realists.And the fact of the matter is the world and the global geopolitical order is more than just two powers.The US and China on which we've heard extensively and exhaustively over the past couple of wonderful speeches from my learned colleagues.I'd like to posit that there's a couple of other countries and indeed underguring strategies that have adopted that worthy of our attention.The first of them of course is India.Whether it be its neighborhood first policy or from act west and look east.The emphasis upon a more strategically autonomous and internationally visible Indian foreign policy has been made crystallized and concretized by the past two decades of development.
And indeed India rapidly and significantly increased its imports of Russian oil after the Russian invasion of Ukraine which is an independent sovereign state mind you.And yet concurrently, India is also of course actively engaging the European Union and has just concluded one of the largest ever trade deals in its history with the Europe and also Western partners.Yes, it is a member of the Quad and yet it is also engaging with China following on from the wonderful leadership meets at Kazan in 24, Tienin and 25 and of course most recently the brick summit in Delhiin 26.The Indian story speaks to the fact that when we think of great power rivalries and strategies, and I was speaking about this with Jonathan earlier on, we have a tendency to just think through a lens of China andthe US.But let's not forget that the most populous country in the world today is not China, it's India.
And India has a most certain preeminent role to play in shaping the global geopolitical contours and strategic flows as well.The second example is Vietnam, a neighboring country to China that clearly has very very deeply seated and historically rooted tensions with China in the 1979 war, South China Sea disputes, island installations, you name it.And yet, what exactly was a general secretary of Vietnam, Dolam doing when he was visiting China?He took the highspeed rail from Beijing in Guangshi.That's a 12-hour plus train ride.And why exactly did he do so?because he wanted to signal to his fellow counterparts and also competites that whilst Vietnam is an important strategic partner to the US and vice versa that they've just upgraded their relationship to comprehensive strategic partnership you know 18 monthsago Vietnam is also keen to tap into Chinese capital and technology for in infrastructural development and also investments as well and these are forms of multi-alignment in practice as we speak today which will only become more doain as
the AI rivalry heats up the third country I'd look towards here is Kazakhstan which of forced emerged from the shadows and the horrors of Soviet rule, right?And had historically been dependent upon the the Russians nevertheless for the provision of security and military support under CSTTO and also other comparable arrangements.And yet under the current president who speaks fluent Mandarin as a senior and seasoned former diplomat, he's been pushing the country to engage with the Japanese, with the Chinese, with the Europeans, and the Americans.And let's not forget Kazakhstan possesses or controls roughly 43% of the world's global uranium production each year.And additionally also has access to what could well be the second largest rare earth's mineral deposits in a world provided that successful harnessing and also exploitation is in fact feasible.In an era of AI and critical raw minerals and choke points, it is countries like Kazakhstan, Vietnam and also India that have an important seat at the table.
So I think we should think beyond just looking at Beijing and Washington all these others powers that are relevant to the conversation as well.And I'll end with one following observation.We heard Mark Carney speech at Davos last year and of course he got a lot of praise for talking about middle powers and standing up to the tremendous president who's done a fantastic fantastic job.But let's not forget that middle power agency and the art and sciences he wrote of and spoke of has long been practiced by many countries including this very country of only 11.7 million people and yet has managed toposition itself the UAE has a deaf interpreter whisperer agenda setter and norm maintainer.That is the power of those who see more to the world than just two sides and see the world beyond the two poles in question.Thank you very much.
The moderator reflects on the agency of smaller states and the uncertainty created by great power politics. He then returns to the question of China's growing assertiveness.
Okay, it looks like you're getting some votes, Brian.Um, and thank you for that intervention.For those of us who aren't from great powers, it's it's it's always helpful to uh remind the rest of the world that, you know, the rest of us do have some agency.But at the same time, I think of uh obviously our prime minister Carney is getting a lot of attention these days.But I think of another Canadian prime minister, Pier Trudeau, who who described being America's neighbor many decades ago as it's like sleeping next to an elephant.And even if the elephant doesn't mean to smush you, if it rolls over, you're in trouble.And I think that's a problem a lot of us smaller countries, middle powers, small states, whatever configurations we use, um we are dealing in a in a in a in an era where great powers have an unusual weight
that we're not really sure what direction they're taking.And from this first round, it was interesting.We have Charles describing a US that's kind of getting tugged in both directions from from election swings which leaves the rest of us in this position of how do you how do you how do you plan you knowevery two years every four years and then from the Chinese side I thought Han you had some very interesting points uh describing a China that is a complimentary actor which I think that was the the big part ofChinese narratives especially after the belt and road initiative was rolled out in 2013.the AI, the AIB, the BRRI, these were all described as ways to buttress uh an order that was under pretty severe tens pressure.But we've seen, you know, really since China's released the global development initiative, global security, global civilization, and now global governance initiative, Beijing seems increasingly confident in presenting alternatives, not necessarily complimentary, but saying we have different views of how
global order could work.And on the one hand, I think you you mentioned the global south.I think a lot of countries find this appealing.Global governance reform or or alternative voices is very appealing.But then to to your point, Charles, there there are a lot of tensions with, you know, the so-called crink alignment where even if China's not directly supporting Russia militarily, it is supporting it economically.And in this, it's giving it the tools to to prolong this war.So, it is I think we're all I guess the rest of us in this position where we have to think what do we do with this great power narcissism that we're that we're dealing with.I'd like to bring you back into it, Dana, because you've you've had some some experience at the practitioner level um working in the DoD in the last administration.How does it look from that perspective?
this this this tension where China is becoming more um confident slash assertive in places where it didn't necessarily play a very large role even 101 15 years ago.
This section argues that China has not yet translated economic weight into strategic effect. It contrasts U.S. military integration in the Middle East with China's limited security role.
It's an important question, but I I feel compelled to just respond to some of what I heard from my fellow panelists.And it's interesting that in what the narrative about GDP growth or different economic or critical mineral um deposits uh h does confer a certain seat at the table.But what I am not seeing yet in the messy workout of what a post US-led rulesbased intern international order looks like is any middle power or China use that economic weight or its desire to have a complimentary roleor its contributions to the UN to strategic effect.So I agree with Charles we are at an inflection moment to me the world looks like it's only getting messier there's a proliferation of conflicts we have a huge debate right now over who will lead the UN thenext UN secretary general which I think is quite emblematic of the messiness of the of the of the international order and its workout.
But there are more humanitarian crises.There are more conflicts everywhere.Uh all of the different constellations of middle power mediators have yet to actually transition any of these conflicts into meaningful sustainable political processes that could actually save lives and stabilize areas.There are plenty of postwar and postconlict areas where you would want to see peacekeepers or something even outside of the UN system step in and we have not seen that not from Beijing leadership.We've certainly seen attempts from the American side.We haven't seen the EU be able to step in.We haven't even seen groups of governments within the Middle East be able to address conflicts within the Middle East.And so um the idea that GDP confers a certain um agency in how messy the international order is right now I think needs to be re-examined and so for me from a military perspective what I think is unique
about uh this moment in time and since my specialty is the Middle East I would say there's a disparity between US military leadership and capacity and what's happening at the political or the strategic level so what do Imean by that this uh both last year Actually, since October 7th, we've had multiple uh instances of interstate war.So, this year, 2026, the US and Israel war against Iran is actually the fourth iteration of interstate war we've had in the Middle East.The first was April 2024 when Iran launched a ballistic cruise, missile, and drone attack against Israel.and the United States put together an international multinational air defense coalition that featured uh Arab states from within the region, European militaries, Israeli military and the American military all working together to defend the sovereign airspace of the entireregion.And note in that where I would think that China or others outside of the Middle East have an interest in not seeing Iran being able to indiscriminately launch missiles or drones across the region was absent from that military
grouping.We then had another one in October of 2025.There was a four or 24.There was the 12-day war last year.And then this year we've seen uh indiscriminate attacks against Gulf countries for a war that they did not choose and did not support.And here again it's an interesting case study to me of where the United States and China should want to work together to mitigate the attacks against civilian infrastructure, energy infrastructure, desalination facilities, civilian hotels all in the Gulf.China also I would think would have an interest in this case in maritime security and that is a clear place where you would want international consensus together and there have been uh historical examples in recent decades of allcountries working together on these basic foundational things like freedom of navigation and we haven't seen those but at the military level the United States in the Middle East still remains that backbone of integration where countries can work together
and have actually intercepted up to 88 to 90% of Iranian attacks.And during all of that work at the military and operational level, China actually has provided the uh precursor chemicals for solid rocket fuel for Iran's ballistic missile program.It has most likely provided access for the Iranians to access certain uh pieces of intelligence.satellite intelligence to improve their targeting.And obviously, China facilitates Iran's sanctions invasion, which has allowed the regime to survive, enrich itself, and continue exporting terror and indiscriminate attacks against civilians across the Middle East.And so, this is an interesting case study.I want to associate myself with Charles's uh points earlier where you actually hope that the the countries of the Middle East would want and welcome more Chinese active mediation and engagement to deescalate and we haven't seen it atthis period of time and so still I think a lot of militaries outside of the public sphere want to work with the United States because of the superiority of air and missile defense radar surveillance etc.
And even though there is uh definitely global competition in armed sales and these sorts of things right now the United States I think has a very critical role to play.What we're going to see, I think, going forward, and this is a real risk, is a divergence between the military relationships and at the political and the strategic level, and a lot of that is because the United Stateschanges every two to four years.And just like Charles said, uh, where the strategy is, the foreign policy has very much swung, uh, aggressively from administration to administration.And I agree with him.I don't think that we're going to see a major correction in the conduct of US foreign policy in the next two years because the system of American government provides primacy to the president in the execution of foreign policy.But there certainly is a very active debate about how Americans see their role in the world and I think that's going to play out beyond the upcoming presidential cycle.
And the question then is as Americans work out what their political or strategic approach to the world is going to be, will there at least be commitment for maintaining that foundation, that military backbone that actually has enabled mostof the countries in the Middle East to uh get through what has been an absolutely tumultuous, heartbreaking year.
The panel explores whether China should take on a larger security role in the Gulf. Speakers discuss China's caution, regional interests, and the possibility of acting as a guarantor or enabler.
I I'm I'm listening to you D and I'm thinking about um Hang and and Ming Jao's earlier points about about China and my reading of Chinese policy foreign policy is is largely that China is deeply preoccupied with pressuresat home which really shapes a lot of Chinese government's decision- making you know with a tremendous disparity of of of resources and wealth between the inland and the coastal cities and young people and aging people and and economeconomy that's that's under strain.Um, so I've always read this as a China has a preference for stability, you know, in and and as a a great trading country, it its preference is for for regions to be stable as much as that's possible
uh to support Chinese businesses and expat citizens.Um but at the same time I think a lot of folks in here in the Gulf have been wondering you know where China gets so much energy does so much business one of the things that doesn't get recognizedis just the tremendous volume of contracting for Chinese S so suees that are operating in the Gulf and these vision um development agendas.So there is kind of a tension between China's need for stability and and the geopolitic leadership that requires a bigger uh helping hand that we haven't really seen.So I just leave either of you guys if if you can address that.How do we how how can we kind of see this tension for a region like the Gulf?
Okay.I think 13 years ago I joined trip in Israel with professor Charles Capchen.After that trip, my takeaway was that China should keep very safe distance from this region because this region's security landscape, security situation is terribly complex.That's certain years ago.But now my idea is that we Chinese need to face up to this very very tough test in the aftermath of US Iran war.We need to seriously make plan action plans for enhancing China's security role in this region.The first thing is about its interest based.Jonathan, you talk about China's stakes in the regional security.We want to keep openness of homes straight.It's so damaging for Chinese business in the aftermath US Iran war.Second thing, we need no better the pursuits, the goals of regional players.What what do you want China to do in terms of security affairs?
The third factor, we need be cautious about the potential response from the US among other western countries.So how US would resist the increasing security influence in this region?So it's a very complex game.Why China is so cautious and measured?I think we have to address no how deficits in playing security role in this kind of region.We need domestic developmental challenges as Jonathan said and also China is playing kind of mediator role.In recent years, we broke the peace agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran.But unfortunately, this progress was installed because the lack of China's security presence in this region.But we can be security enabler given our manufacturing strengths.you know the draw warfare AI enabled warfare and how to enhance the defense capabilities of regional countries.We need to think about that last word.We could be guaranter guaranter.But how to guarantee the possible security arrangement, the possible newly, you know, um uh newly regional security architecture, MA alliance, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Turkey, you know, quadrilateral security dialogue.
how to be enabler for this kind of a newly, you know, security arrangement that's hard test for Beijing.
The discussion returns to China's internal strength and its potential to stabilize the global economy. The speakers emphasize coexistence, strategic balance, and the need for U.S.-China dialogue.
Yeah.Well, I I think that uh you know the the the year of of of uni uni polaro world power that says everything that that really is gone and what I think you are absolutely right Jonathan we have toconcentrate on the domestic issues and the China public is the only country now still keep a 4.5 or 5% GDP growth and then they have the 70% of global speed railways 70% of global 5G system one of thelargest AI country that's still not crashed not not really have a bubble, you know, only a fraction of what US spent, but really have a lot of AI plus AI uh uh enabling and AI driving uh uh innovationgoing on.So, so I think you know China is really become a stabilizer if they do do it well internally and that we project the stability for the war and just look at what happened to the Iran US conflict.
the oil price uh coming down up and down but China has already half of the China's price the oil the the power is already uh uh solar power installation is already larger than the thermal power installation China stabilizedthe global power uh price market and energy market that's a great contribution to the stability and the other thing I I'd like to say is that of course we have many Gulf countries you have US base and everythingbut this time we cannot escape this uh you know kind countries conflict from Iran from Houthis from everyone you know so you see uh it's it's not wise to put eggs in one basket now it's really had todiversify and China project that kind of economic power and then so in the long run people have to think even China doesn't send troops and doesn't send any uh uh warships but China has just been there be a
guaranter be a supporter be a facilitator
that's going to be enormously important in the future And then you can see uh there's no winning of the war now basically with the modern technology with AI with drones.We already see that and and and that's what water to do for the President Trump of this Iranian war.So, so I think the way is to go that you have a new equilibrium, new strategic balance achieved, new deterrence achieved then we can work out we have to coexist you know we have to
and then peacefully uh rather than I take you you take me because we have to realize we are all human species we all have to work for the climate change for the all the disasters we facing pandemic AIthreats we got to work as a one rather rather than separately.So both US and China, I'm glad they're having four summit this year.They're going to push forward for more better understanding and that kind of new strategic stability will stay uh I'm sure even after Trump.So that's what I I project.
Panelists debate China's reliability, the role of military bases, and the rise of ad hoc coalitions. They conclude that middle powers like the UAE can help push major powers toward cooperation.
I'm going to give Brian and then Charles a chance to respond.Um what you can't see in the audience is there's a very scary clock that's facing us and it's counting down much quicker than it initially was because our panel has to wrap up a little early.So, as Brian and Charles um give their points, I I'll just ask if anybody has questions, um I'll try to get to them as quickly as we can.
Brian,
thank you.As a citizen of the world, I too would like to see China play a more responsible and proactive role in mediating and facilitating all of these fantastic outcomes we talked about there.But I just have a couple of questions, you know, in all honesty.And the first is on military capacity.The US has over 750 military bases in 80 countries or regions in the world.China has one in Djibouti.So the the idea that China could step in and play the role as a security provider in the region strike me as as best you know perhaps a tad distant from the present reality even though maybe in 10to 20 years time who knows what's going to happen to the world.Secondly, you know there's a difference between professed neutrality and perceived neutrality.I don't dispute the fact that Beijing has been adamant about declaring its neutrality visa visa war in Ukraine, the war against Iran or what's going on right now within Israel uh vis Gaza.
But the trouble is, you know, declaring neutrality does not mean others would see you as neutral.And it's imperative that Beijing take a leaf or two out of the books of say Delhi you know and and even other countries middle powers when it comes to positioning themselves more depthly as genuine interpreters and facilitators ofpeace as opposed to being perceived as aligning with one side or the other which is I'm sure not in the interest of leadership to the extent they care about international perceptions.And finally on trade and business and investments which Jonathan touched upon very briefly there you know just anecdotally I had an Indonesian billionaire complain to me the other day that whilst historically China had been the biggest export marketsof the pineapples these days the Chinese exporting pineapples they're exporting salmon they're exporting all of these goods that Southeast Asia and Japan and all these other countries used to produce with higher quality and lower prices to these regions
and that means that the deficits are getting worse domestic manufacturers interests are under challenge.I'm not saying this is a bad thing or net.I'm just saying these are challenges that Beijing, I hope with the right wisdom and right people in charge would think carefully and seriously about in tackling and ensuring that one day China could indeed become a global governance pillarand provider for the world in due course.That's what I would say.
Yeah.Three quick points.Uh the first is I I think the conversation here has gone in a in a positive direction in the sense that we all seem to agree that China needs to transition from being an economic player and and Huadescribed that quite well to a country that starts providing more public goods in other areas.And that's because right now we're living in a world in which the gap between the demand for global governance and the supply of it is huge.And so whether it is here I in the in the Gulf region or whether it's in Ukraine or whether it's in in Africa, I do think that the United States and China can find ways to work together uhrather than see this as a zero zero someum competition.
A second point I want to pick up on a on a comment that Dana made in her initial remarks.We're now headed into a period in which ad hoc coalitions of the willing are going to be the diplomatic venues of choice.Right?That these fixed structures that were left over from the cold war are degrading.Uh I think it's it is a very positive development that President Trump is going to sit down with Xiinping and Vladimir Putin.These kinds of conversations across ideological and geopolitical dividing lines have been far too infrequent.Uh and I don't know if anything will come out of this meeting, but it will be the first time in history that an American president has sat down with the head of China and the head of Russia.That's a conversation that needs to happen.I give Trump credit for breaking the ice and making it more politically paddable.
And I hope that something comes out of that meeting on Iran or on Ukraine or on AI or maybe even the beginnings of a conversation on arms control because these are the conversations that need to play take place.Finally, I do think this more fluid landscape in which coalitions of the willing rather than fixed alliances become the norm does create a lot of agency for middle powers including the UAE.Uh and I do think as my colleagues have talked about that we're we're headed into a multi-alignment world.
Yes.
In which the UAE, this part of the world, India, Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, many many countries are now playing the field because they can.One day they're working in Washington, one day they're working with Beijing.And and that that's as it should be.Uh, one cautionary word though, I do think that this kind of new agency should be used in the service of trying to push China and the United States in the right direction.
And this would be my one critical comment about Mark Carney and it kind of picks up on where I think you were heading about the elephant.China, Canada ain't going nowhere, right?And so I do understand why Mark Carney talks about moving away and we can't rely on the United States anymore.But I also think that in some ways the Europeans are are playing Trump right.
Work with him as much as possible.Stand up to him only when you have to keep that relationship intact.Save it for the next American government.And so I I I do think that that the middle powers have an important role to play here, have new agency, but it shouldn't be against anybody.It should be providing public goods and pushing China and the United States in a more constructive cooperative direction.
Audience members ask for advice on dealing with U.S. politics and challenge China on its regional role. The responses stress direct dialogue, bipartisan engagement, and the importance of speaking to American socioeconomic concerns.
From your lips to God's ears, I see the first question.Abdul Khalik Abdullah, I don't see where you are, but uh the mic is yours.
Right there.Thank you, Felton, and thanks for the panelist.I have uh I guess two quick questions.One for our American colleagues and the other for our Chinese panelists here.As for uh Donna in Washington and uh Dr.Copchin, can you please give us at least two good, sound, honest to God advice for the UAE as to how to handle the results of the midterm election in America?How should we deal with mostly Democratic Congress?Please give us just two good sound advice on that, please.coming from Washington.As for our friend from China, uh I was in China just a week ago.I met with a lot of uh your expert and one takeaway from the visits and the meetings is that China is not a very reliable.China talks a lot about America being an unreliable but what we found out our disappointment China is not defending its vital interest in the region it's not using whatever leverage it has over takan to stop its control over
uh uh hormones straight of hormones it's not using its whatever leverage it has over an to stop being a force of unstability.So I think you know as a rising power China is becoming or becoming or or coming across as being very unreliable.Uh is there anything that you would want to comment on this?Thank you very much.
Thanks Abdalik.I see Alber's got a question as well.So we'll try to fit all three in and then we can wrap it up.
me.
Yep.
Okay.Well, thank you very much for this very interesting uh panel.But I have just a quick question in in uh because of the of the time.So there's I won't I won't have any introduction.I'll ask my question directly.For China to provide international public goods, it would need bases and military facilities.How United States would feel about China spreading its wings in the region in terms of military bases.Is this something that will be welcomed by the United States if uh if this uh happens?Thank you very much.
Okay, we have five minutes and we've got three big questions for everybody.So uh would you like to take the first crack?Uh give Abdul Khalik some cause for hope.You keep going to me first, Jonathan.
I just want to remind everybody you're here.
Of course, we have um very um clear rules in the United States about giving advice to our friends in foreign countries.So, let me just say very broadly, one challenge if you have been working in Congress for the past two years is there has been a lack of information from the executive branch.By that I mean the Trump administration about about what's actually happening in the region.And so this is something that during the election in the last two years we frequently heard members of Congress complain about um not having access to regular briefings uh not understanding what the strategy is or the policies ofthe Trump administration etc.And so one thing I just want to emphasize is that um just dialogue, consistent, very honest, very direct dialogue I think is very necessary uh with both sides of the aisle in in the United States um about what
especially in the UAE, but everybody uh living in the Middle East.What um is concerning you?Where do you want to work with the United States?where um have you lost confidence or are concerned because of changes in American policy?I think having very direct frank conversations is absolutely critical.Number two is uh very specifically with the UAE but it applies to many others.Uh Abu Dhakabi plays a critical leadership role on many issues and has a very productive contributions uh not just in the Middle East but far beyond not just on security files not just on conflict resolution but uh inall of the economic things we've been talking about critical minerals supply chains port development uh maritime and freedom of navigation all of these things and I think it's very important uh that your leadership which um is has actuallybeen extremely articulate and I've heard it in Washington DC what uh what the region wants for itself.
I think that is very important for Americans to understand.And with respect to uh spreading of Beijing's wings, I I um would just say, you know, one of the big stories in the United States uh in the past 24 hours has been about um uh the uh Nvidiasituation and ways in which um spycraft may have been used.I think this is a tension in the bilateral relationship uh which is that uh we find healthy ways to cooperate rather than uh undermining each other um through inappropriate means.And so the concern I think with military bases near US military bases is are we cooperating or um can we achieve a level of trust where the United States can be sure about the protection of its forces andits defense technology and that I think has been an ongoing dialogue.I agree here with Charles.I think that dialogue at the most senior leader level about these issues is absolutely critical to build trust because there has not been trust before and often uh certain installations are just a foothold for something uh much much
different than what has been articulated in the beginning from Beijing.
Okay.The scary clock is getting scarier.Um Hang, do you want to jump in?
Yeah.No, I I think that uh
we can let Charles also we'll give you five minutes more
Charles and then
Okay, thank you.Yes.No, I I just uh just briefly respond.I I think that uh you know uh for China to be it's it's a very reliable economic partner.You know, they've been they've been largest trading nation with all the Gulf states and including Iran.You know, China have a enormous in enormous influence.But I I would also want to say the roots of the problem it's really among the big countries.I think it's so important the big countries has to put ads together and then they have to meet and have to dial if they are stabilized their relations all those regional issue will be gone or be at lessless serious.That's why I really uh anchor what Chao just said.You know the trilateral summit between President Xi, President Trump and President Putin in Shenzhen can talk about those global issues and then you know if they can reach a consensus then they could go back to the UN security
council then they can produce uh send a peacekeeping forces and then they can stabilize the situation.We have to revive the UN you know uh m multi multilateral forces to really safeguard global peace that's the way to go and then in that sense China US Russia mid powers everybody will play so much role andI think mid power is really be a good regulating get best of the two world and then really uh monitoring and mediating the relation between China and the US and rather than take sides so that's really important II given the economic you know stability, prosperity that we really need and then all those security things will will come down uh as we actually see a more improved situation
on the question of navigating uh the United States.I would echo what Dana said.Uh maintain and build strong ties with both parties because nobody knows who's going to be in in power.Uh and I do think that one of the mistakes that BB Natanyahu made was turning the Israel issue into a partisan issue.And so whatever you do, don't go partisan.Build ties with Trump world.build ties with the Democrats, deepen your relationships with members of Congress, uh, play the field.The other the other point I would make, and this is more by way of trying to help you understand the mood in the United States.Now, any conversation or policy issue that you can have that speaks to the broad socioeconomic crisis in the United States will resonate.Mhm.
It it's hard to overstate the degree to which the combination of free trade, automation, and fear of AI is animating your average American voter.It's hard to overstate the degree to which you when you go out into the the Midwest into other parts of the country that used to be the kind of engine of America's industrial growth.They are now deeply hurting.Uh one of the most interesting trips I took in the last year was to Dayton, Ohio.It was because of the Dayton Accords anniversary, but was mo most interesting to me was just wandering around Dayton, Ohio, which was a uh a jewel of the industrial era.and it's now falling apart.I grew up in Wisconsin.When I grew up as a kid in Wisconsin, all we talked about was the Badgers and the Packers and football and cheese and cows.It's now a deeply dysfunctional state because of de-industrialization.
So if you could find ways to enter conversations about health care, about rebuilding uh uh the social contract, uh engaging in trade, these are the kinds of things that will speak to Americans and that will resonate in ourfractured political debate.
The moderator wraps up the second panel and invites continued conversation during lunch. The session ends with thanks and a transition to the next panel.
This has been great.Clearly, there's a lot more questions.find us at the coffee area or at lunch and let's continue the conversation.Thanks so much.Um, enjoy the next panel.I see they're impatiently waiting to get on.
The third panel opens by arguing that the West still has power but lacks consensus. The moderator frames the discussion around cyclical versus structural change, autonomy, values, and the Gulf perspective.
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Ladies and gentlemen, Panel three entitled The West Confronts Itself: Power Without Consensus in an Age of Fracture will start now.
Good afternoon to all and welcome to our panel.The west confronts itself power without consensus in an age of fracture.So tomorrow as we know uh US, Ukrainian and and American negotiators will meet in Abu Dhabi to discuss uh the end of the war uh which is the largest war since 1945 in Europe.thethere are conflicting reports of the involvement of Europe in these discussions, but what we know for a fact is Europe will need to be involved afterwards uh in in many things on security guarantees on reconstructions that uh willbe asked to pay for or to underwrite.So in a way the west has not lost its power.The problem is probably and this is the argument of this panel it has lost the habit of using it together not losing the power it's obvious uh we see uh what has been asked to NATO allies to come
up to up to 5% of GDP on defense and security uh at Anara this year 7 billion euros uh have been allocated ated for Ukraine and the the same amount is pitched for next year.Um but at the same time what has changed is a certain loss of the shared consensus uh between countries and and we we have seen that at the Munich security conference where we have been told that the rules-basedorder is almost or no longer exists.Uh we have seen also the US president last July criticizing two European countries Spain and Italy for not taking their stance on on the Iran war.Uh the US national security strategy of last December has spoken of civilizational erasure and and and for the first time I think America takes sides in European domestic politics.So uh I would like to have four questions more or less to structure what what what our discussions.
The first one will be about the cyclical versus the structural and we'll try to understand better uh are we seeing something now in governments uh that are changing and responding to electorates uh differently on many issues like trade,migration or alliances.We know that populism is no longer at the margins but it's it's it's very present in both sides of the Atlantic and it evens all over in in many countries right now.The second question is about autonomy or dependence.We will speak about strategic autonomy because it's one of the important factors and we'll try to understand better if it is a project if it is a negotiating position or if it is maybe an illusion.The third uh aspect will be the difference between interests and values because we know that the Icelandic alliance was uh uh very uh keen on both and it served many times in in history in Suez in in Vietnam
is in Iran in Iraq sorry but what is new is the nationalism the populism that we are seeing now right now these dividing values that uh uh that we see within each society and and we don't see anyantibodies against that right now.And the fourth thing is the the the view from the Gulf from where we are today and and this is basically what we will be asking the audience to to react to what is being said by our distinguishedpanelists about what is happening in the Gulf right now.And we have three exceptional guests today.Dimmitri Aramopulos first u who knows the uh European fault lines from the front line very well.He has been uh the mayor of Athens.He has been a Greece minister of defense and foreign affairs.He has been the European commissioner for immigration uh and is now a member of Hellenic Parliament.
Uh we have ambassador Stefano Stefani uh who served Italy in many positions in DC and in Brussels and Moscow also representative to NATO diplomatic adviser to president Italian president and nowadays adviser at ESP and last but not leastThomas Klein Brokoff senior fellow German council on foreign relations of which he was a director and uh he He I just want to add here that uh he wrote a very interesting book on uh develop than western theworld needs the west and this is very uh useful for devout today.So let me begin please on the first question on temporary divisions and and structural uh realignment with ambassador Stephanie.Um you have seen the alliances alliances folding and unfolding I would say from Washington DC and from NATO at the same time.So do you think the today's divergence we are seeing is a product of this administration in particular or u and and would you expect this behavior to survive the next one and and uh considering the midterms that are
just finished in the US do you see as well is changes something in foreign policy or only domestic politics
okay uh let me give you a quick quotation an American quotation on the general landscape uh you outlined.Um the report about the death of the west is greatly exaggerated but it is in intensive care that that's my addition.Uh you you ask me three question basically.uh the present situation is it because of the Trump administration or is it uh a more deep disease in the relationship?Uh will the transatlantic relations survive and what difference do the midterm elections do?
The first speaker argues that the Trump administration has deepened transatlantic divisions. He says the relationship will survive but remain damaged, with the midterms changing perceptions in Europe.
First, is it Trump?My answer is yes.My answer is yes to a large extent because differences between Europe and America have always existed and we've always dealt with them even at the time of a major rift like uh the uh Iraq war.But here we with the Trump administration there are three factors which are really devastating for the relationship.First, the administration deepens instead of trying to heal differences.Second, it is clearly parting ways with Europe on security and foreign policy issues, Ukraine, but even uh the Iran war.And third, which is probably the the worst, the cultural war on Europe.You mentioned the Eurasia and I mean the the the quotation on what has been Washington official sources in Washington have been saying about Europe in terms of are too long.Will the relationship survive?Yes.uh because the ratios is deeper than administration but will be different and damaged.
Uh the midterm do make a difference.Yes, they do.They do a difference in terms of perception in Europe about America.Basically, they tell us that there's not only Trump's America, there's another America.But in but to make a difference in the relationship, we will have to wait two years.Thank you.
This chapter defends the idea that the West as a political and cultural construct will survive even if its institutions are in crisis. It also distinguishes strategic agency from strategic autonomy.
Thank you, Thomas.If I can continue in the same vein and does the world still needs the West?I'm I'm pitching your your book and I'm I'm understanding that uh you might think that the world needs the West, but I would like to know a bit more about why.Well, it is a bit of a provocative statement of course, but um the West is not as the ambassador just said, the the uh so the news of its death are exaggerated.It is probably true that the institution the post-war institutions of the west are in are in crisis.Um but the west as a construct as the sort of as the as the political statement of enlightenment thought based on the transatlantic revolutions from 1776 and 1789 in France uh is going to survive.The institutional structure of it is in question.So countries that liberal countries, liberal democracies tend to gravitate towards each other and you you see that even in this moment of of crisis uh of our institutions.
So there is an ongoing attempt to preserve and to to uh reconstruct NATO NATO 2.0 uh in a in a different balance of relationship between the United States and Europe.And frankly that change of uh of relationship is necessary because we need a more capable also more self-confident uh and more independent Europe in that relationship and uh it will be necessary and it will be no to tochange Europe's position in that in that NATO uh alliance.it to Europeans.It will be no longer acceptable to have Europe, the Americans solely own command and control.Europeans, the European pillar of NATO needs to be able to uh be acting independently if necessary.The term strategic autonomy is something that gives me a little bit of a headache.Um it's not about autonomy that we're striving for strategic agency and that's a different thing because strategic agency allows us to be a better partner in the end rather the than to be an autonomous actor.
There needs to be an element of be of of cap of capacity and capability that allows us to act but it's not about autonomy per se.That's very interesting element to compare strategic autonomy and and strategic agency.
A former EU commissioner argues that migration and refugee crises fractured Europe and empowered populists. He warns that Europe risks repeating darker historical patterns if unity and leadership fail.
I think we'll come back to that because it it bears some more discussions.But coming back to uh the consensus we are all looking to retrieve in the European construct at west.Uh Dimmitri, you you have been commissioner at a moment in particular on migrations in in 2015 where there was something that has changed really and something fractures as the title of our panel says.So in view of this new uh pact on migration and asylum we have now do you think that uh it is possible to repair the consensus uh or or manage the politics uh even in terms of populism?
Well the damage is already done in Europe.It started in the year 2015.Uh when I was designated European Commissioner for Migration and Homeless Security, believe me, I could never imagine that I would be confronted with so many difficulties because migration divided Europe and it gave ground and unfortunately power to thepopulist and xenophobic movements.Everything started from that moment.Following the successive crisis, economic and refugee crisis, this wave of populist movements became even bigger and right now it's threatening from inside the unity and the cohesion of the European Union.I remember when I invited the ministers of home affairs to meet for the first time after the very first terrorist attacks in Europe.
Yeah.
There I realized how difficult it was to put all this voice together to think in the same way and adopt a common strategy on security.The same goes on migration.So everything started from that moment.Unfortunately, since you referred to the new pact, it's not going to solve the problem because as I said, the damage is already done and Europe has to find again its unity.It requires strong leadership that believes in the European project, in the European vision at both levels, national and European.But you see what's happening right now in Europe.Most of the governments, they are looking inwards.They care more about their the next elections
and less about the future of Europe.So this is the problem and I believe that if Europe, the European vision starts vanishing, we shall revert to the dark pages of our history because populism mixed that with nationalism, it is the worst recipe in order tosee troubles coming again.And the theater of what I tell you now is more visible in the Balkans.As you know, even a great war, the first world war started from there.All these nationalistic sensitivities have not gone away.That's why we I mean I belong to the ones who believe that we should open the doors for the western bulgans to become members of the European family.Final remark talking about the strategic autonomy Europe it is very very difficult as we said Europe is divided politically right now and even socially because of what I explained before.At the same time the question is does United States want Europe to be autonomous and can Europe have autonomy without being linked to the United States in order to come back to the beginning of your question.
So I'm very much concerned.
The panel examines whether Europe can achieve strategic autonomy without U.S. backing. It discusses conventional defense, nuclear protection, and the limits of European cohesion.
I believe that we have a lot of work ahead because we belong the generations.We had enjoyed the gift of living a peaceful world after the second world war and we could never imagine that we would be confronted today with wars and the fact that we have to do something in order toreinforce the unity of the European family.
Yes.What we are addressing now is this interesting question.I think we turn back to the same thing about the strategic autonomy while still depending on on on the United States.So we have to fix a bit the parameters of the possibility itself of strategic autonomy and then Thomas if I if I come back to you about thethis concept and uh trying to understand that strategic autonomy ends when nuclear deterrence begins.So in a way or another uh is a meaningful European nuclear dimension.We are seeing the French, we are maybe seeing the UK uh make sense and and could be a serious policy options in Europe or not.Well, first of all, we're trying to avoid this question as best we can for the past so many years and and even as we speak, the first line of defense is conventional defense.And you're seeing an enormous effort of European countries uh to make progress and make good on on that.
And that also includes a a sky shield initiative to guard against nuclear including nuclear threats that includes a conventional long range missile uh development program.So in order to uh replace some of the uh deterrence necessities that are created by nuclear threat.So that's I think the first the first thing to mention.The second thing to mention is that it is clear that if you have a United States that is less committed to European defense and understands itself no longer as a firstline responder as it did uh with a tripwire concept during the cold war uh but as a as a as a last resort responder.The nuclear commitment is also getting weaker and that includes by some who follow the restrainist sort of thought, a train of thought in in in Washington that you would see what they would call limited proliferation in Asia and
possibly even in Europe.So in order to preempt that, I think the concept that French President Mcron is putting forward to to look at uh ways to to to Europeanize the nuclear protections and cooperate on on nuclear protection that especially my countryGermany has resisted for so many years because it could send the wrong signal to the United States is I think the the path to go.I think the French have done their homework in that they have included a whole host of European countries into into that initiative and that I think is taking a different a different level of attention and but we'd haveto say we have a French election uh coming up this year and uh in some outcomes might see this as a dead end.So it is unclear at this point whether the intrauropean stability uh that is necessary for this type of project is even is even there in order to pursue it.
The discussion turns to Europe's lack of common foreign and defense policy. Panelists debate whether Europe can provide credible security guarantees to Ukraine and how much coherence is needed.
Yeah.So we we need for strategic autonomy if I understand well we need not only uh stability as you say but we need also coherence.So, Demetrius, when we speak of coherence and and we look at the southern flank of of the Mediterranean and and I know Greece has been spending a lot on on on defense since since many many years.Um, what what do you think about this type of coherence you can achieve within the European construct?Well, talking about strategic autonomy, we should know that it requires u uh something that's very important for Europe.Common defense and common foreign policy.It does not exist in Europe right now.Every country is following its own national path.The European leadership should give as a priority in order to see Europe flourishing again to complete the European project by adopting these policies that I referred to before and it is not the case for the moment.
Unfortunately, most of the European governments right now are fortified behind their national barricades
or what I explained before because they were inwards looking.So it's a big problem for the future of Europe.Yes, it is a nice word, autonomy, strategic autonomy.But how can you achieve it?You have to make some progress within Europe.So I believe it is difficult regarding the southern flank of Europe as you said before.Yes, it is true to say that my country is spending a lot of money for defense for obvious reasons.The priority for the Greek state, for the Greek government is to secure the national territory and the independence of our country.And I can tell you that the main purpose is also to play a stabilizing role in in the region.But we are still confronted with some problems with our neighborhoods.You read in the newspapers.Let's hope that we shall overcome it and the region will prevail because the last thing that we want right now in this part of of Europe to have uh this kind of problems that will revert us to to
the past.Regarding the rest, I can tell you that uh there is also another level of division among the European countries.
I come back to what I said before when I had to cope with migration.I realized that northerners believe that the problem of migration was a problem of Italy, of Malta, of Greece.No, it's not the case.And that's where the main principles upon which Europe is built was put at stake.Responsibility and solidarity, cohesion and unity without solidarity cannot exist.And solidarity is not just a nice word.It has been clearly stipulated and enshrined in the founding text of the treaty.So we have the first problem as I described before but also another thing which is very important.How can we foster and deepen solidarity among us?If we don't do it now we shall be accountable in the eyes of the next generations for the future and it is our obligation to save the European project and make it even stronger in front of these challenging
moments the whole world is facing.Yes.And and to understand a bit better the strategic autonomy, I think we need to resolve the main problem, Stephano, it's about Ukraine.So what did happen now about Ukraine?Can Europe offer Ukraine a credible security guarantee without the US backing?
Speakers question the usefulness of the term strategic autonomy and compare Europe and the Gulf in seeking a seat at the table. They argue that both regions face similar dilemmas about being included in decisions.
Well, uh, first like like Thomas and like Dimmitri, I I don't like the phrase strategic autonomy because I think is misleading.Just a very small example.We in Europe need to quickly build drones for our defense.We depend on China for the components of the drones.So where where's the uh coming to your question?Of course Europeans cannot accept to be in just a supporting or financing role for Ukraine.And truth to be told, the Europeans have stepped in since uh the initiative uh of the Trump administration uh a number of times uh you know, especially around the the anchorage summit sort of to contain uh what wehad the impression that the Trump administration was giving to uh to Putin.uh on the other hand when one main problem has being that both the Americans and the Russians don't want us at the table.
So you know that's that makes makes it difficult to be there.Third, which I think possibly the most important, we have to blame ourselves Europeans for we talk so much about the need to have a mediator or to for but do we have an idea if we were sitting atthe table do we have a proposal I'm talking about a plan a road map we don't so this is something we have to ask ourselves uh as we speak or tomorrow.Apparently uh the national security advisors Germany, France and and UK will be somewhat present at the trilateral talks.Um whether they'll be just briefed or somewhat participate, we don't know.uh it I think I would say it is a modest very modest progress.On the other hand and Dimmitri might disagree with me uh I think that the E3 is the only way the E3 that might become E4.
Uh but I mean you cannot have the the EU talking for Europe on this matter.If for another reason there are important European countries starting with UK that are not not in the EU.Uh can Europeans be guarantor?I think they can.Uh obviously uh we will see what a peace uh or truce will look like.But if some European countries are prepared to put troops on the ground as require then the back stop the US back stop will be there because of NATO.NATO is still there.So it can be done.
Yeah.There there is some parallel here to be drawn between the Europe position and probably the Gulf position because they have been requesting during the Iran war seat at the table.So Europe has the same problem with Ukraine.So in a way or another there is some parallelism here in requesting to be present at the moment of the future of these countries of the region is decided.So this is a very important element that should be taken into account.
This chapter explores the rise of nationalism and populism in Europe and the U.S. The panel warns that these trends threaten the core values and cohesion of the European project.
But I would like to come back because we speak about strategic autonomy.We speak about the west confronting itself.We speak about identity.We speak identity politics.We speak about protectionism.We speak about nationalism.These are words that are coming back very strongly in Europe now.and Dimmitri U are we in a strategy of containment or are we already it's already some sort of capitulation because we are seeing strong waves right now in in in Europe and and we see even mainstream parties uhwhich have adopted positions on migration in particular that were once associated with the far Right.So what we are seeing now is is can we contain populism or is it a way for legitimize it?It is very difficult right now because this wave cannot be contained.You see what happened in uh many countries in Europe.Unfortunately the populist
powers have started gaining ground.I believe that it is the responsibility of the European leadership to respond directly to the needs first of all of the citizens of Europe.Because the question is not only to see Europe becoming great again.It is how can you revive the ideal of the European Union.I remind you that the forefathers of Europe when they founded Europe was exactly in the aftermath of the second world war although they were persons who were involved in this conflict they decide to put aside all their differencesand work together.By the way I remind you that in the beginning we had two European communities.the European Command and the cold and the other the defense European community that never worked.So their dream was to see one Europe united on the basis of the same values.These values today are at stake because all these populist nationalist movements they directly attack the core of the European values.
So it is an ideological conflict.It is a big problem for the European leaders but also a huge responsibility.The qu the answer to your question it is difficult to do it because we have to go against the current of the societies.It will be hard.It will be difficult but we have to do what we can do in order to stop it from happening.Um you see what's happening right now in in your country in in France.U the majority of the people believe that this the solution will come from Mrs.Le Pen.In Germany there is also another big problem with
so nobody would believe 10 years ago that we would have we would experience this kind of internal political and ideological difficulty as if the younger generations had forgotten what happened in the past.Uh, regarding the west in general, the west is based on common values and the west stretches from the Urals to Vancouver.We belong to the same political, cultural and ideological system.But you see that this world is also divided at all levels because populism is not only threatening European political system but also the American political system.So it is a major global problem and I'm afraid that if we do not unite our forces at all levels and if we do not adopt a common way of thinking and acting we shall be confronted with manymany difficulties because everything starts from there and it is reflected on a global on a global scale and there we see the responsibilities that are divided among us.
The speakers discuss social media, youth discontent, and the strain on social cohesion caused by defense spending. One panelist remains optimistic that populism will eventually be overcome.
Social media today play a very important role.Everybody can infiltrate in the hearts and in the souls of the young people.And the young people today they want to make their own revolution.But how?With what kind of tools and what for?This is the response the answer that our generation has to give them and start opening a dialogue with the younger people.It is difficult.Yes, you see it what's happening in France right now.How can you establish a dialogue with these young people?What do they want?They want a better life.They want education.They want shelter.But at the same time, they want to stop the war.Because what they say,
yeah,
in Europe, you spend 800 billion euros for defense.This money will diminish will undermine social cohesion policies which is will be to the detriment of of the people and if you have this kind of problems then one day you will hear you will see also social reactionsthat might lead the societies to disintegration.
I think Thomas wants to react to that.
Let let me let me be the optimist on this pan.So we asked the question will the west survive?We I I answer yes.Will the will Europe be able to provide security guarantees to Ukraine?My answer would be yes.How do I know?Well, because we are taking on the lion share of support of Ukraine now.The question is how do we transition to that next stage and will we have the stamina to get there?Third question is will we overcome populism?My answer is we're seeing it gradually being overcome.We're seeing that the concept of a nationalist putoaucracy that we've seen in Serbia, in Hungary, now in the United States is being being rejected by electorate.My question is rather uh do we have to go through the phase of failing populist governance in some of our other major countries you mentioned Germany, France uh in order to get there.
So the question is not can we but how and when.
The panel debates whether populist governments can serve as transatlantic interlocutors. Speakers reject U.S. interference in European domestic politics and defend patriotism as distinct from nationalism.
Yeah.So maybe Italy can be a bridge because I I think it can be a bridge because how how can a populist government be maybe a better transatlantic interlocator but another one right now?
No.
Okay.
Abs.No.And I'm I'm I'm very convinced about this.
Yeah.
For three reason.One, the one you were mentioning, if you wish, uh about we've tried, Italy has tried.Italy has what what you could call now a light populist government because if you translate the the Italian coalition in the European Parliament, you have uh the center right and then the two parties the two uh families whichare uh on on the right.Uh Italy has tried to be the this is called privile interloctor and has failed.The reason I just failed is because populist governments are by essence nationalistic.So when national interests collide, centuries government try to find compromise accommodation they because centrist government believe in cooperation.Polish government be nationalistic go go for confrontation.So when and the example was all European governments right center left have disagreed with us on the Iran war because the interests were different.The uh the third reason is very simple.
um we uh what about in twoear times when uh uh in the US the land the political landscape might be different.So having a a populist government in Europe or populist government in Europe that wouldn't help very much with necessarily with the future US administration.But but c can we say right now that the uh US government, this present US administration is is fueling this type of divides within Europe because this is a question we we we need to address when the nationalsecurity strategy speaks of civilizational erasure and and and and uh advocates support for patriotic parties in particular within Europe.Europe, it seems to me that there is some encouragement not to speak to governments anymore from Europe in particular, but to speak directly to political parties.So, is there something that some of you would like to comment on?Maybe.
First of all, I mean the the term patriotic, I would consider myself as a patriotic German and a committed European.I'm not about to give up the term patriotism to the rightwing.Let's not have them own Let's not have them own those terms.Um, secondly, I think the idea that we do not interfere in our our country's uh domestic affairs is an established principle of of international relations.That principle applies to the United States as well.Therefore, it is unacceptable that the United States interferes into European affairs by sawing domestic divisions and interfering in campaigns even uh having funding streams to do that.I think that is one of those divisions and these fissures that we're seeing in the transatlantic relationship now.And that is part of what we consider unacceptable certainly in my country and I'm sure in many other European countries as as well.
The concept that that is being pushed here is one that is uh is a as Stefano said a a a nationalistic ethnic-based concept of nationhood um that is is counterveailing the the very nature of the European idea.That is why this is so threatening.This is why European leadership responded so strongly to the two speeches by the American representatives in the past two years of the Munich Security Conference being JD Vance uh and the and the foreign secretary.Um so Marco Rubio I think this is has something that we have to reject as Europeans.
This section argues that Europe has become economically powerful but geopolitically weak. The panel insists that common defense and foreign policy are necessary for strategic autonomy.
Can I make a Well, we talk a lot about nationalism and we do very well and populism but also about patriotism.What is the difference between patriotism and nationalism?In patriotism, you love your country.In nationalism, you have you have to hate the country of the other.In such a simple way, this is what is happening right now in some parts of Europe.And upon that populist mainstreaming powers are bu are building their theory and they influence the people.So when I said in the beginning that if we continue like this we risk to revert to the dark pages of our history.It's not far away from being a reality.That's why I gave you as an example what's happening in the in the Balkans and regarding the rest of the world.You know Europe and the European values was was always the beacon for many many countries around the world.
It has stopped being Europe is not present as before.Its voice is not heard.You said in the beginning that tomorrow there is a big important event here in Abu Dhabi.Where is Europe?Europe is trying to be present.There is another scheme.Russia, Ukraine and United States.Where are we?Because Europe manages to become an economic superpower but not a geopolitical superpower.That's why I said this is my opinion that if the European leadership both at national and European level don't decide to complete the European pro project immediately to the adoption of a common European defense agenda and command policyand foreign policy.I'm afraid in this divided world we shall be the weaker link.
The discussion shifts to burden sharing, Europe’s role in Gulf security, and the limits of Western predictability. Panelists note that inward-looking politics reduce Europe's global ambitions.
Yes, I'm seeing we had a lot of questions.So I will uh just uh ask maybe one or two others to our panelists before I turn to to the audience.We we have been speaking about burden sharing.I think the United States has has spoken a lot about burden share sharing.First it was burden sharing about defense and security and then now it's it's burden sharing for not helping in the Iran war.So there is no burden sharing from the part of the Europeans because they didn't come up to help for the Iran war.So is is burden sharing the meaning of burden sharing shifting in the in the US government itself from defense related issues to just not helping in the iron war.What what's your take on that?Maybe uh Stephano
uh it it has shifted in Europe.Uh I want to repeat what uh Thomas has already said because now the issue for Europeans is not the burden sharing it the defense of Europe meaning the capability not tomorrow but maybe the day of tomorrow of defendingEurope if need be with or without the Americans.That's so the and and that means that Europeans uh have to look at issues in other parts of the world especially in this part of the world which is very close to us and on which we depend morethan than the US.Things like the freedom of navigation uh not only throughout but the Babel band etc are essential for us and Europeans have to be ready to take responsibility to defend freedom of navigation and the security of this part uhof the world.the the shift of mentality when for instance Italy has changed its relationship with this country with with the UAE from being an economic partnership to a strategic partnership because for us and I think I'm sure the same for
all European countries this part of the world is not just uh important from the economic and energy point of view but from a geopolitical and security point of view.
Yeah.And and if I add I can add to that because since I am living here since now certain number of years I I feel that the if I can voice what the countries in the region are feeling isthat the west is is is uh present but less predictable.So this less predictability of the presence of the west is a burden as well for everybody.And and I think that these countries feel that commitments become conditional.They become conditional on horrors.They become conditional on Haza.They become conditional to the security of Gulf partners themselves.So are there countries in Europe first?Is Europe and maybe Germany able to fill that space in a very meaningful way and uh uh or should the Gulf prepare for West as I said prison but less predictable as well.
I can understand that question and also I can understand the feeling of commitments becoming conditional that is underlying that sentiment.Now, of course, all of our countries, especially when they're confronted, like most of ours, with a populist challenge, are inward-looking, as the commissioner said, and that inward-looking tendency um gives less space uh to global ambitions, and that isespecially true if you have a direct military challenge on your doorstep.So I would see that as a limiting factor of our engagement globally as as as as Europeans.But there's also uh opportunity in this in this new world as we're looking for to diver diversify uh relationships.Um there is also opportunity in all kinds of coalitions of the willing issuebased uh uh alliances.There is a whole host of issues where partnerships can be struck including with with this region and this country from from AI to uh economic security to logistics to energy.
I mean the the number is of those is endless.Freedom of navigation is of course the most security related one of those.So I wouldn't see it as sort of just a loss on the one side.is not that Europe will be a lock stockhole barrel security provider to the region but it will be will have a large interest in certain things and certain partners uh and there's a lot of opportunity in that
burden sharing if I'm allowed was firstly tested in the area of migration
and from the very first moment it failed Europe started being divided.There is no burden sharing.Unfortunately, for the reasons we explained before and the other thing I would like also to say following uh our discussion, populism and all these problems, there is a problem of democracy.A German stipton conducted a survey some months ago and it gave us very very worrying results.One out of four of the younger youngsters in Europe, they would like to have a authoritarian dictatorial government.This is very very warning for the future of Europe.
An audience question raises Turkey's growing role in the Middle East. The response highlights both the significance of Turkey and the need to avoid nationalist escalation.
Absolutely.
Thank you.Let me now turn to the audience.Rashel Brunson, please.Thank you.
Rachel Bronson.I'm a visiting professor at the American University in Dubai.I wanted to raise the question of how the Europeans are thinking about Turkey.I think Turkeykey's transformation as a true Middle Eastern influence is significant and one of the more significant changes that we've been seeing.We've seen it in the Mecca defense agreement and we've seen it most recently in the support for a corridor with Libya.So while I think Turkeykey's role is significant, I'm not sure that it's stabilizing and I'm curious how that's being viewed in Europe and how you're all thinking about it.Thank you.
Do I ask to somebody from Greece or to some other
Sorry, Eric.Can you take all the question then?Then
okay you know we Greeks we have become experts on Turkey and let me tell you that yes what you said is absolutely correct.It's a very important and significant factor in Europe and in the eyes also of the western system.Uh but there are still problems in the region.So I believe that as I said before region should prevail.uh in within the Turkish leadership.Personally, maybe you don't know that I have been very close to Taiperan from the very first moment of his mandate when he was mayor of Istanbul.I was mayor of Athens and the two of us established a relationship that created a new atmosphere in the relations between the two peoples because there we somehow biased the central governments by adopting what we call cities diplomacy.So that was a good moment.But recently there are rivalries in the region.And I believe that if what we said before is the case of of Turkey with the return of nationalism within the system, secular system can be at the same time patriotic but not nationalistic.
In this area there are still problems.Let's hope that we shall overcome it.This will be beneficial for everybody in the region.
Thank you.
Audience questions focus on Europe-China relations and the meaning of strategic autonomy. Panelists argue for deeper cooperation with China while preserving a common European voice.
So we will go with the three next people online and then we'll club the questions and we will ask them all together.Obeni first my question to the panelist what's your assessmentChina
mic please.Yeah, we don't hear you or they we don't hear you.
What's the relationship between Europe and China strategically on the global issues?
Joseph Leo.
Thank you.Joseph Leo from Singapore.Um I am quite curious about the discomfort that some speakers have expressed um regarding the concept of strategic autonomy.I come from a region where autonomy is very precious and something that uh we are aspiring towards particularly in this uh geopolitical climate.Um so in the case of Europe I suppose to some extent you're right to say that autonomy maybe does not describe the present conditions but should it not be something that the region should aspire to given your overexposureto the US for security your overexposure to China for supply chains and trade and uh immediately at the outbreak of the Ukraine war your overexposure exposure to Russia for energy.I would imagine that all these reasons would drive Europe to think more seriously about autonomy, not less.
Thank you, Simeonos.
Simeon Tomos from the Del Economic Forum.I share somehow the optimism of Mr.Klein Broov about this decline of populism uh example Serbia, Hungary, now the United States.Uh my question is these last 80 years Europe moved forward because of the FrancoGerman cooperation.What is the future of Europe if for any reason Madame Le Pen comes in power?Who are going to be the driving forces of Europe to move forward?Thank you.
Well, three important questions and uh we'll go with the first on China.Maybe
China.Yes.You know, recently we shared it some years ago.I wrote an article about the EU Chinese relations.It's very important for Europe and China to cooperate more.It requires also what we said before, strategic autonomy.If Europe is only connected to the American strategy about China, things will be very complicated.But at the same time, China is a global stakeholder.And I believe that the recent discussions and meetings between President C and President Trump opened the door for something more apicish in the future.This deep rivalry of the last let's say 10 months is changing.Let's hope that we shall we will continue this way and for Europe it is very important to cooperate deeper with China at all levels.We live in a globalized world and China as I said is a global player and a global stakeholder.But on the other hand, it is important for us within Europe to adopt a common voice and a common strategy on the European Chinese relations.
The panel clarifies that autonomy means agency and capacity, not isolation. It concludes that Europe will need a smaller core group of countries to rebuild consensus and act effectively.
Thank you.I I think the one of the other questions was on again on strategic autonomy in Germany, France.
Maybe you want to address that.
So I would be misunderstood.I have I have expressed myself uh in in a not so good a way if uh if I wasn't saying that I wasn't aware of the overexposure uh that you that you quoted.You're absolutely correct and I would agree with uh w with that.But the the term autonomy uh to me creates a self-reliance, a self centeredness and even a loneliness that I don't strive for.I don't I strive for agency and capacity in Europe that we strategically don't currently exercise and some in some areas don't have.And that is to be a better partner.We're building new a a a new uh a new version of European defense or of European defense within NATO.Uh that's a partnership strategy also.I and that comes in a context.I think the context is I I've hear I've heard in this forum a lot of talk about multipolarity.
Yes, there may be a multipolar world.I don't foresee a multi-polar order much too instable.I might see a multi-order world where there's different competing concepts and attempts at ordering.Uh, one of which gives me the most concern and Charlie Cupchin on the previous panel has has alluded to that a meeting between Mr.Xi, Mr.Putin, uh, and Mr.Trump smacks to me of a a direction of a concert of powers that that concerns me the most because as Canadian Prime Minister Carney has said if you're not at the table you're on the menu and I feelall of us others will be on the menu in these types of constellations.So I think we're uh uh we're we're headed to a very instable situation in which Europe will certainly need to build up muscle build up a solidaric version of that muscle uh and and be ready to engage with
others in in this world on the basis of its uh of its its its western exposure and its western mindset.Yeah, I think autonomy needs solidarity.Without solidarity, it's very difficult to see autonomy and strategic autonomy.And when we had this title of a panel, the west confronts itself.This is something Europeans understand very well because it's a sort of reflexive metaphor and the west has been struggling all the time uh being what it is.Uh the third question,
Mr.asked a question about u the driving force of the European Union till some years ago to Germany and France.
Yeah.
Where are they now
these these were the proponents of strategic autonomy if I remember well
as well.So now no look where are they now is a good qu I mean they're both in domestically tumultuous uh situation that weakens uh weakens their ability to act outside and to and and that by the way includes theeconomic position that they're both find themselves both find themselves in Germany is in a structural fouryearong economic structural crisis so the the ability to project to the outside is re is reduced and to project stability inside equivalently butthat is not going to be a status that is going to last for last forever.So we have to think about what that next step of of uh of of creating a new European consensus will will have to be and it will be structured around a group of countries.I think Stefano already mentioned it is not strictly the EU because we're going to need Great Britain uh in in this and and a few others.
So the uh the architecture of this is not strictly the EU.Um and it's also not strictly the EU on on Ukraine, but uh it is centered around a more agile group of core countries that will will take the lead in in that uh in that perspective.
The moderator thanks the panelists and audience and closes the discussion. The session ends with a lunch break and transition to the next part of the conference.
Thank you.With that, I would like to to thank our panel for reminding us that the West internal debates are not only its own business.And then may may I also thank uh the EPC, the emergence policy center and its president for convening this debate.It was very insightful, very useful.Thank you.
I think we are all part of it.Thank you very much.I'm the only thing between you and your lunch.So, thank you very much for all One round for applause to everybody.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Ladies and gentlemen, please enjoy a 1hour lunch.
The fourth panel opens by framing the discussion around how advanced technologies are transforming warfare. The moderator asks how military capabilities should adapt to the new landscape.
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ladies and gentlemen.Panel 4 entitled Beyond AI, the transformation of warfare and the next strategic shock will start now.
Asalamaikum.Ladies and gentlemen, we will run this panel in English.I'd like to start by thanking ABC for running a flagship event like AD strategic dialogue for the 13th uh instant which is not uh I would say um an a small effort it's one of the critical efforts thatwe see around the ground as well uh today as we are speaking about what is beyond the AI it's actually the conversation around transforming warfare uh and uh your excellency and uh ladies and gentlemen My fellow p panelistshere uh we want to understand the new landscape of war.When we are talking about war today the conception and def definition of war have changed dramatically because it is intertwined by the definition around advanced technologies definition about new economies that are being as well placed on the table.We're not anymore just talking about the excessive spending on at the moment on military and defense capability because in 2025 we've seen over 40% increment on this uh which maps around 2.9 uh trillion uh defense spending that has
been initiated on the ground.This is a data point that has been given to us by our fellows in the center of peace in Stockholm by Dr.Karim and we were just discussing around lunch uh that you can't today discuss sovereignty and national sovereignty economic competitiveness and military paradigms without discussing advanced technologies.My question is for you first, your excellency.How can we play the new landscape of advanced technology when it comes to military capabilities?
The first speaker explains that modern defense must be cheap, accurate, and innovative. He contrasts legacy systems with flexible, low-cost responses to drones and other threats.
Um, first of all, thank you for having me here and uh I'd like to thank you and the panelists here also for joining me.Um, a very important question and it's it's very simple.I mean I think earlier this year uh it was a it was a case study for all of us to learn from uh the war that the region had to go through and the different technologies and means thathave been deployed to either disrupt um or to even cause damage and harm.U it's about being cost effective.It's about being cheap when when when building your technologies and deploying them to defend your country or to to to have some kind of capability to to to deter a risk.Uh it's about accuracy.Uh and it's about being innovative and and and and creative and thinking out of the box.So in the old times is about having big systems you know with with a lot of power which would cost you a lot and which require a lot of facilities and infrastructure to be able to accommodate those uh
systems and and deploy them and be able to actually be effective in in in in defending your country.Uh today uh you can use off-the-shelf components to cause damage uh and you can also use offtheshelf uh components to defend your country.So how can you do that in in a in a in a very changing environment given also the the new um emerging technologies that are coming up into our ecosystem which includes AI and others.Um if you look at the case of of uh the the war that happened on the 28th of Feb and and the the ripple effect of it had uh I mean one can argue okay yes uh some ofthe um systems or technologies used to to to try to uh attack the region or countries such as the UAE uh were not uh very accurate, were not very high performance.
That's true.But it was enough to disrupt the global order.It was enough to disrupt the economic ecosystem globally and regionally.Um and then when it comes to actually uh limiting that that that that disruption uh how can we think out of the box and we have different cases of how DOE was able to do that you know uhinstead of shooting down a $10,000 drone using a1 million or $2 million missile we're shooting it down using like shotguns on on helicopters and and fighter jets you know which cost us $200 around something equivalent to that.So that's also being able to adapt and learn on the spot.So uh with with with the current uh I think approach it's about again being very cost effective, being very efficient and being smart about how you deploy those capabilities and defend your country and moving away from the very
rigid traditional approach.You still need that.We cannot underestimate again the the the capabilities that were built based on legacy uh because they also played a vital role in defending uh the UAE uh during the crisis.But also as part of the mix it needs to be a mix of of some smart uh cheap um effective solutions combined with those very advanced capable complicated systems.
So the economies of scale is not going to cut it anymore.So we have to be in absolute readiness when it comes to the new stack.
A builder from the defense industry describes how AI systems are developed for real-world use. He emphasizes data pipelines, integration with legacy systems, and rapid adaptation.
And my question to you Danielle, our conversation today around AI and military readiness, especially within the private, corporate, commercial structures, it gets a little bit critical because when you talk about AI today, it's not just AI.It's the drone systems that they are empowering at a catalystic uh kind of rate.We've seen the Ukrainian Council published the reports.They're using over 8 million drones supported by 160 manufacturing global entities during the Ukrainian war which gives us the incentives and intuition to analyze also the supply chain behind this all the kind of uh uh you know militarygrade uh units that you should bring on the table.uh conversations around not just we had a conversation as well that when you are investing in drones you are also investing on optical fiber you're investing on uh undersea cables you're investing in a new stack of minerals a
new stack of chips so my question to you today what are your priorities when you are a commercial entity producing for a national capacity
thank you Dr.Um, and thank you APC for having me in this panel.Um, I'm going to bring I believe a different view because I am I'm going to bring the being the view of the builder.That's that's what I do.Uh, we build AI systems specifically within the defense industry uh in in the UAE.Um, there is a lot to unpack there.Um, I believe right now the priority is
not so much who's able to produce the the best model, but who is faster in adapting to changes and and creating new capabilities that are able to response to to the challenges.I'm going to make a very bold claim that might sound weird coming from me, but I think AI is overrated.
You agree?
I strongly agree.
Um, I'm not making this as a as a universal generic uh statement.Uh, but I do believe that AI is overrated when compared to how underrated all the system uh around it.um and that are fundamental and necessary in order to enable the AI.These other systems are completely underrated and these are the ones that will make the difference between labs and real world scenarios.We're talking about uh data pipeline ability to uh create taxonomies and and and make sense of that data.Um, we're talking about integration with legacy systems because this is the real world.We're talking about the ability to adapt and retrain models that are in the edge in order to uh adapt to new new challenges and change of situation.So for us the uh priority right now is to respond to field feed and repair field fast time to market from lab to real world feed.
How do we get the the right data and the right input the system on the field and repair?How do we adapt when something gets broken or something needs to to change?Those are the three principles I think.
The panel explores whether smaller states can gain leverage through new technologies. Speakers argue that resilience shapes deterrence and that munitions depth and sustainability remain decisive.
So it affects our resilience, adaptability and it definitely taking us to the next segue.Maybe Ankat you can help us look a little bit deeper under the hood to understand if truly economic power is being redistributed and the way economic uh power affects military readiness today is different especially with advanced industries inthe picture with advanced industries today I I don't want to say technologies to undermine the holistic development that goes with every type of technology pathway that is there on the ground do we foresee smaller nations having bigger powerto overthrow greater military power today because of that.
Sure.So, thank you.So, first of all, it's really great to be here at the Abu Dhabi strategic debate.It's been a very rich discussion today.Uh, I think you're asking a really consequential question uh about the diffusion of these new military technologies and how they might shape the aspiration of smaller states.I think it's worth noting that we are living through a 10-year period roughly speaking where interstate conflicts are rising uh steadily around the world.Obviously, I don't have to mention that in this part of the world, but certainly that's not been something that I think many of us uh anticipated uh at least from the vantage point of a few decades ago.So, as the world becomes more dangerous, there's a greater interest in resilience, sustaining the effects of attacks that might be initiated against you.We heard about that earlier today at the opening keynote session.
uh the importance of resilience at a societal level uh beyond simply what the armed forces of a country can bring um but also about the ability to pursue your own national military objectives um in in the pursuit ofself-defense and also we need to acknowledge that um increasingly smaller states might be the aggressor uh in conflicts around the world I spent a lot of time working on the Korean peninsula where North Korea's ability to for instanceuh stoke violence against South Korea uh has been a constant source of anxiety and now we see evidence that North Korea is actually innovating quite a bit with new defense technologies.But fundamentally what I would emphasize is that uh on a panel about technology and warfare, it's important to remember that technological change changes the character of warfare, but the nature of warfare essentially remains constant.Uh and this is a lesson that I think perhaps my country, the United States, would have done well to remember before initiating the war against Iran, which is that wars are ultimately contestations around political objectives.
uh they are one at the strategic level where one's will to fight is what matters more than anything else but at the tactical and operational level technological change can ultimately make a difference to how a war is foughtand sustained uh at the level of I think many of the more higherend conflicts that we see around the world uh there's obviously a lot of interest in building precise mass lower cost cheaper systems to accomplish effects butmass is really the key uh for modern highintensity precision warfare are um munition stockpiles have been a constant topic of conversation in Washington lately uh and increasingly around the world.I think there is a lesson being drawn from standoff conflicts from here in the Middle East, from the conflict last May between India and Pakistan that the depth of munitions, the availability of munitions, the ability to sustain munitions
production within a time of conflict will be ultimately determinative to the pace, tempo uh and the outcome of that conflict.And so increasingly I think these are lessons that middle powers who will be more restrained in their resources will have to contend with and deploy in ways that advance their national interests.
Can we build a valuation structure do you think and Kate to that like how can we value resistance uh resilience today and we we've seen the definition of Dr.from Muhammad Baharun in the in the earlier session where he said it's not anymore uh kind of sufficient to say that resilience is the ability to to to exist but resilience is the ability to sustain any type ofvulnerability and be able to grow in the future as well.So how can we value that uh for the future when it comes to maybe quantitative aspects?
That's an interesting question.I mean I would say um I mean I would just add to the question here in the discussion that resilience I think shapes deterrence right deterrence is about communicating to the adversary that they will not succeed in theirobjectives against you at a cost that is acceptable to them and what resilience conveys is that there is an ability at the societal scale at the level of national infrastructure at the level of national defense to spring backfrom adversity uh which means that the attacker will have to undertake greater resources to actually pursue their objectives against you.So it shapes the nature of deterrence and it can ultimately as a result shape outcomes within a conflict as well where at the strategic level a resilient society is less likely to have its its focus on the fightbroken uh and as a result uh concede uh defeat.
Evaluating these things I'll be fully honest with you I think is extremely hard to do in a rigorous way.Uh these are ultimately capabilities that are tested in a time of adversity.Um there are constant debates about how do you rightsize spending on resilience?Uh some people will make the argument that capability X Y or Z is excessive.It should not be pursued because we can we can accomplish our objectives cheaper with a lower range of capabilities.But until a time of adversity or a time of conflict, uh the answer to these questions does not get known.So I think quantification while I think an enviable goal could also add to a sense of overconfidence around these objectives.So my sense is that societies that are pursuing resilience would probably do better to actually air on the side of caution uh depending on the threats that they face, the region that they sit in.
And so here in the Middle East, I think especially uh there will be a need to I think be rather conservative about how one thinks about resiliency.
This chapter addresses how international norms can keep pace with AI, quantum, and future technologies. The speaker warns that governance must be proactive or it will always lag behind innovation.
I would say we have to keep our eye always on the dashboard and in the target of what's happening on the global sphere for sure.your excellency.We've seen you being very busy in the past uh in the past time uh especially when it comes to improving I think international norms in response to global risks.We're not living in an easy age because technology is being developed in in an in a fast space and the implications and the diffusion of convergence of this technology on military readiness we see it today.I mean, we've been as well read the 45 years report that Dr.Karim was referring to today when he talked about uh the work of the Stockholm Peace Center.And we've seen that the data is showing that military is being um affected by over 50% of the current reality that is happening in technology.
We know every two or three months we have new models, a new AI, new stack and new structure.How can the international norms today cope up with this?What kind of a new international uh laws, regulation or norms we should build to have a better cooperation across this global volatility.
Um so I mean for centuries innovation always played a vital role in redefining warfare and also redefining geopolitics.However, the pace of that today is significantly faster than than before.Um, there's something I always tell people and you might have heard that from me before, but you know in after the theafter World War II again till about during the cold war, let's put it that way.During the cold war, what defined foreign affairs geopolitics was politics security, defense.After the cold war, a third element came into that and that was economy that's gon ge economic topics and and and and and issues.Today there is geotechnology is playing a significantly bigger role in redefining the geopolitical uh landscape and definitely the the the setup of warfares.Um I don't think people still understand significance of some of the upcoming emerging technologies and how that's going to reshape the world that we live in.
Uh we speak about AI today.I mean AI is not fully deployed.It's not fully diffused still in its like early stages of being uh developed and deployed.The moment you reach a level in which it is reaching kind of the optimum capability and ability, it will reshape the world that we live in a geopolitical point of view, more warfare point of view.Now in few years from my my point of view, we'll see quantum coming into picture.Can you imagine AI plus quantum that's a totally different geopolitical landscape totally different set of challenges to totally different set of capabilitiesthe political structure globally will be re um structured around those capabilities.Now add to that in two years AI plus quantum plus genomesa very very different world than what we live in today.So today we are what we have with AI is an opportunity not just an opportunity for us to improve the quality of life to uh ensure sustainable development but also to start coming up with frameworks uh legal frameworks
systems standards to govern such disruptive technologies.what we do today with AI when it comes to multilateral discussions or even bilateral when it comes to governance it's about experimenting with new approaches and models to to deploy and and govern those technologies um if I don'ttake advantage of this opportunity I'm already reactive by the way globally we are all reactive to AI when quantum comes into place when genomes becomes actually part of our daily life also when it comes to to deployment ofthese capabilities I will not have time to catch up with that.So one of the things that we keep hearing over and over is about how u AI is going to have a negative impact on our lives and so on.I mean simple it's 8020.Yes, there is that 20% chance of it being misused and it will be misused.But there's also there's 80% chance of it and probably will be used for the good of people but also I should not miss out on that opportunity because if I don't then I'll be in big trouble because these
technologies will be used by responsible players but also will be abused by irresponsible actors and and I don't think I don't think I can afford that.So um the smarter we are in the way we deploy AI the better it is.We do it in a responsible way.We do it in a in a structured way.Uh we don't do it in a reckless way.However, also we should not uh become too reserved in a way that also we lose out on a on on an important opportunity that not only will improve the quality of life but also teach us how to governfuture technologies
which is not easy.
The discussion turns to sandboxing, export controls, and the difficulty of governing advanced technologies across different national thresholds. Panelists stress the need for shared standards and realistic cooperation.
your excellency achieving that balance in between leaping into the future by being very mindful of your you know defense capabilities as well is quite really uh important.I have a follow-up question with you.Actually, I wanted to zoom in to this concept because in UAE for example, we've seen this intertwined application of uh um quantum in the financial sector, the sandbox around it with ADGM for example.We've seen as well the other use cases when uh space 42 announced the initiation of space uh QKD in terms of sandboxing and application.So we are trying our best to be a bit into the analytical uh mindset when we are trying to see what will happen in the future if we started sandboxing these technology using them in multitude of dimensions.Uh but in reality it takes more than this right it takes a global cooperation because there are different global powers that are currently in control of developing this um I would say technology it's not in the hands of
everyone.We've seen you as well being at the forefront of packed silica and other types of international collaborations to maybe ease up um and maybe I use that in a such an elastic way uh the restrictions around export controlswhen it comes to the stack of of technologies that are we are facing today.How easy is it to strike that level of balance?
Uh it's it's not going to be easy.uh the thing about the nature of the technology that we deal with today is very different than the past.As I said in the past, you know, if I'm going to get a nuclear weapon require a lot of uh hardware, a lot of infrastructure, it's big, it's difficult and so on.Today, those technologies are very easy, very easily accessed by by anyone.So, so governing it will not be easy.And this is why international collaboration and and integration in governing uh such technologies in a realistic way uh is is critical and to do that that means that traditional rigid system of my way or the highway in governingsuch technologies is not going to work.Um I need to understand my partner much better.I need to understand the political structure of my partner's uh uh system of governance.
I need to understand the common the sorry the the traditions and the values of the society that I'll be working with you know so so um why and goes back to the thresholds you know when I come andI deploy those technology or diffuse technology into our daily lives there is a threshold that governs it right my threshold as a society will be let's say different than my partnering nations thresholds because you know for example theway I define extremism or I approach approach extremism is very different than the way my partner approaches extremism.My partner might just focus on violent extremism.For me as a UAE uh as a country that has more than 200 nationalities given the demography that we have, I cannot tolerate any kind of extremism.So will my partners be able to understand that and will be willing to work with those again thresholds that are different than than what they have?
they would need to at the end of the day.So again and it's it's about also again it's when it comes to governing these technologies also if you if I want to take it to a different extreme also when it comes to let's say threat assessment or nationalsecurity threat assessments um and the and we've seen this even happening today with with with let's say the assessment of the Iranian nuclear program.Uh you you hear different countries different intelligence uh sources analyzing it in a very different way.I'm come and tell you like Iran's maturity level like before it was was attacked by the US and and Israel about a year ago in June 2025 was that they're very close to let's say u breakthrough.Some countries said no.But why?Because the the approach or the philosophy is very different.Like some countries approached it as a a technology as a hardware you know having it ready.
Some approach it from a knowhow point of view, do they have the knowhow?Yes and no.So if I'm going to come and govern the technology in the future, I need to understand also is my partner approaching it from a hardware software point of view as in like it's ready, he's going to be ableto deploy it or I'm going to go approach it from a knowh how point of view like he doesn't have it yet there but he has the knowledge how to to build it and make it happen.This will really affect.So I think do I have an answer for that?But I think the international community would really need to have to have those difficult conversations, set aside their differences, become less emotional and agree on set of standards of how to um set standards cause of ethics and alsoassess the national security risks around these technologies because at the end of the day ultimately those are the elements that will define how those technologies are going to be deployed and controlled.
The panel examines how AI systems create new vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure and national security. Speakers argue for sovereign capabilities, diversification, and secure access to avoid dependency.
Very interesting.Definitely a redesign and redefinition of what constitutes economic advantage.We're used to the concept that economic advantage that governs economic cooperation is labor and capital and other aspects.But it's not that anymore.It's the hardware, it's the tech stack, it's everything in between.It's the knowhow development as well.So my question to Daniel is going to be a little bit um I would say intricate because we've seen in the p in in in March and April when when the conflict has escalated in the region uh umthat the first targets were actually the uh cloud infrastructures the satellite systems uh in different countries in both countries uh and as well as well as the airports the supply chain kind of uh continuity points.So when it comes to you developing just within a commercial space that develops for national security as well on a welfare kind of system when you take a decision of integrating AI into the component it's not just AI
because when you put that AI into the component you are deciding where also to put the next military targets.Um so how do you build technology assurance here?because I'm not going to ask you just about technology assurance and the uh um spectrum of uh you know defense measures of cyber attacks.That's the easiest part.But technology assurance and in in totality and understanding the total risk stack that comes with it
and on top of that because that's an excellent question how do we build the sovereignity uh factor?
because of uh obvious obviously because of the domain in which we operate uh security is a fundamental aspect resilience is a fundamental aspect everything we we do we build inhouse on prem um with a hybrid approach there wherewe can use a hyperscaler as you were mentioning the we saw we had examples how in March uh there was a severe disruption due to to attacks on specific data centers.That's the let's say the external that's an external uh risk on this regard but it's also the the internal one which is even if we don't consider those the potential attacks how do we shield ourselves from dependency oncommercial uh solution and commercial offerings that depend on third parties who has actually the key to turn on and of uh certain services that are paramount to to national security.We've seen in the last year a couple of examples uh September last year how Microsoft um shut down one specific service in in a country in the region.
We saw how um Anthropic in February, February, March, probably March.In March, Anthropic um said no to the request from the from the DoD um for certain use of of the of their capabilities.I don't think that can be reversed.I think it should be governed.The principle is basic in itself.If you uh have one single supplier for for a core part of your uh activities, you don't have a supplier, you have a dependency.What we do in terms of building sovereign AI capabilities is of course we work with commercial offerings always within a secure environment uh especially for the data we manage.But there are certain principles that we always apply.One is assure access.there can be no possibility for an external party to decide whether the access to the service is on and off for us.The second is uh diversification.
Um we should be able to for example change our models overnight.So there is an abstraction layer that needs to be put on top in order to change from one model to the other because as you were saying before uh every week we get a a different model or abetter model.So those are the the the fundamental principles in which we operate daytoday and we are building the the sovereign capacity for for AI.
This section focuses on the risks of AI around nuclear energy and cyber infrastructure. The panel warns that conflict can create correlated failures and that norms against attacking nuclear plants are essential.
Just a very quick note on something the his excellency was was saying before regarding quantum.Um some of the products we we are working on are considering postquantum uh communication and postquantum encryption today.And it's uh it's invigorating to see how in the the UAE uh the UAE has been investing for a long time in in technology and research and we have some of the best uh centers and a great instituteum in the world.So we are trying to get ready also on that that side.I still have a curiosity around uh the infrastructure and that's a great point actually regardless of how much we are building the minute we have this kind of conglomerate effect of different technologies it's a compound effect as wellon risk so an I want to ask you about the combined effect on risk when it comes to critical infrastructure especially in the region we are a region of I remember when we had this conversation with a closed
panel discussion of a nuclear expert.We're a region of almost 28 future rising nuclear plants, not just what we are seeing in the region.That was the plan uh from different countries around.Um and when it comes to this kind of race of AI where we are claiming that a dashboard can help you do deterrence of a critical infrastructure like a nuclear plant, how ready are we today?Because what level of risks do we need to analyze differently when we're talking about this level of risks?
Sure.This is a big problem around the world, right?Nuclear energy is becoming a lot more essential uh for powering everything from the AI boom to um to creating new sources of green energy.But at the same time, like I said earlier, we're living in a world where unfortunately conflict is on the rise.And so um we need to I think first of all establish a norm going back to your question about norms against attacking nuclear power plants.It's just completely unacceptable practice that unfortunately uh has been um tested recently particularly uh in in Russia's um war against Ukraine.Um but at the same time um you know there will be a need to I think understand that designing and deploying reactors including new small re um you know small modular reactors in areas where the possibility of conflictuh is real just introduces new risks.
I mean reactors are designed to um to high safety standards but essentially what happens in a time of war is failure modes that are normally uncorrelated.let's say external power supplies for um the reactor's operations, cooling operations and onboard power might fail in the same way because of factors that just come together uh in a time of conflict unexpectedly.So again I think um there needs to be of course a a full-scale study of the risks before pursuing these capabilities uh just just with the understanding that you know um if the risks cannot fully be eliminated whatare the mitigation measures that need to be in place uh and again internationally the efforts to uh set up norms uh around the region.Um there is I think a way to also have these normative conversations in a regional context that could be much more productive uh to actually have a shared set of understandings uh in the region.
But critical infrastructure of course goes far deeper.Uh and ultimately the the other thing I would just note here is that um we need to also remember that cyber uh the the kind of underlying cyber fabric of our societies is essentially critical infrastructure today.And I think one of the greatest sources of anxiety that I see at least manifesting uh in the United States over the last several months is that we are living through a pro a period right now of rapidAI enabled cyber offense dominance where the defense is still catching up.And so in the immediate next few years of potential conflicts, uh the temptation for cyber interference with critical infrastructure, uh some of what we've just seen in recent weeks in Europe, for instance, with uh you know, supermarkets beingattacked, a blood bank being attacked in France, uh where the temperature of of you know, blood storage was was being raised by offensive cyber actors.
These are the kinds of defensive modes that I think countries that do rely on um these these types of systems for their societies will again have to take into account for a comprehensive defense.
The speakers discuss how military industrial capacity is changing and how new technologies may accelerate defense production. They also debate whether restraint and governance can coexist with rapid innovation.
Very interesting.I think this leads to my final question which I would love for it to be shared amidst all of you.Um so when it comes to building this kind of competence warfare competence globally and not just in the in the region or GCC I think we live in parallel universes because what you build in one universe for examplein the United States affect and impact what is being developed uh in Europe in China in the region uh and there is this cascading effect again uh of how do we look at industry and industrial capacity when itcomes to military readiness.Um we see a lot of nationalization of efforts globally like I mean if we look at the data on war zones Ukraine is one of the publicly recorded one uh that they have initiated an effort of 55 billioninvestment on their local military capacity where 70% of this capacity will be developed on domestic grounds.
um what is the future of uh industrial competence when it comes to military warfare in the region and and globally as well.So I'll start with you.
I think the most important thing thing is um reliable partnerships that's based on trust uh and based on credibility.Uh I think um I don't think countries to do everything from A to Z on their own efficiently.I think for countries to be able to defend their national interest effectively, they would have to collaborate with with others strategically.Uh so that's why trust and credibility is is extremely important.Um to defend your sovereignty and to ensure your strategic autonomy, you would need to work with others.This is the model that the UAE uh takes when it comes to its advanced tech ecosystem.
Love that trust and strategic autonomy when it comes to sovereignty.Daniel,
I want to add on the on his uh answer bringing it to the technical and technological uh domain because we we are talking a lot about uh building sovereign um capabilities but I agree that doesn't mean we areclosed and uh and and we don't establish bridge bridges of collaboration and cooperation with other with other countries and we are indeed doing that.We work uh it it's an exercise that we take in parallel in which uh we reinforce the ability of the country to defend itself and being resilient while at the same time uh understanding what's outside because as yousaid it's parallel universes and and how can we reuse uh improve uh and and learn from from one another.Um we are in a very interesting geopolitical scenario in which we're in kind of in the middle between west and and and east uh for AI.
This has also implications technical commercial um you were referring before to the chips and how chip wars are are raging.uh we work with companies from both part of the of the spectrum in order to yeah to reduce reduce dependency as I was saying before on a single supplier and still learn from from what's outside
distribution of value is different definitely right now an
sure so I'll just make two additions to the excellent comments by my co-panelists on this uh so the first one is uh Supplier relationships unfortunately have a geopolitical component, right?So who you buy your exquisite equipment from does have downstream geopolitical effects.There may be an exclusionary effect.If you buy something from the Americans, then the Americans might not be too happy down the line if you're also doing business with China because of
economic tariffs as well hitting the ground.
Exactly.And so um understanding those of course is is deeply important to how one will navigate these choices about exercising sovereignty and autonomy and agency uh in a world where these geopolitical realities will unfortunately weigh on smaller countries andmiddle powers that will have to uh a try to optimize essentially seeking sovereignty while also potentially purchasing some of the top-end capabilities from the very small number of countries that produce them.So that's the first point.Uh the second point on kind of defense industrial um acceleration essentially is to look at the effects of new technologies on fundamentally accelerating the defense industrial enterprises.Right?So one of the greatest sources of excitement right now in sort of um defense industry um conferences and and settings in the United States is the extent to which AI could
research institute.I I just want to underscore the importance of what was mentioned by his excellency uh Omran Shariff about the need for frameworks of governance for these technologies.These are highly disruptive technologies.The pace of acceleration is moving faster than policy frameworks to adjust to them.But I I wanted to take the conversation maybe a little bit further and prompt you to address the need not just for governance but for restraint on the use of these capabilities.So we are looking at capabilities that will be highly destabilizing for future warfare.If we look at the acceleration of the battlefield effects of these technologies, the nexus effects that I think Ankit mentioned, you know, the the nexus between quantum and AI, space and cyberspace, all of these will have potentially escalatoryuh effects on future battlefields.You know, the the effect of holding at risk critical infrastructure.
So therefore what when we look at the overall impact we are looking at highly destabilizing uh effects.If we look at the future of deterrence for example deterrence is based on credibility but also on stability which will be highly compromised by these technologies.So that underscores what I think some of the panelists were getting at in terms of norms of restraint, the need perhaps for crisis communication, the need for confidence building even in situations of high conflict.And the tricky thing there is these things have to be negotiated not between friends but also between adversaries.So is that an agenda that is conceivable given the very disruptive and destabilizing effects of these technologies looking forward?
Panelists argue that responsible deployment of AI requires collaboration, not overregulation. They describe ongoing work on sovereign AI, post-quantum security, and partnerships with government.
Uh thank you Dr.Karim for the question.I mean I can build the same argument also about how such technologies could be used for stabilizing also to offset the destabilization destabilizing effect of it.So I mean definitely these compositions are very important.Definitely there needs to be some kind of restraint when it comes to how to deploy these technologies but we shouldn't also uh underestimate the benefits that will bring in addressing those risks.So we really have to be smart about it when we approach it.Um I think um sometimes overregulation might kill innovation and would allow irresponsible players to be ahead of us and that's something that we have to keep in mind.However, if we have responsible actors working together regardless of our differences uh to address the risks and make sure that these technologies are even deployed in a way that addresses those disruptive uh negative elements of them, I think
that that's where the energy should be focused on.um being too reserved and overregulating I think will really uh push us in a corner that will make us not ready for the future.Uh I mean the progress is is coming uh in one way or another countries have their national interests and they need to work towards that.super powers have their national interests and they need to maintain that as part of their national as to to to to to achieve their national interest.Um so um I think when it comes to progress countries will always try to to build the best to to increase the quality of life of their uh uh population but at the same time also to make surethat they are competitive and ahead of the game politically, economically and so on.Uh that's that's a human nature I guess in general.
So to be also realistic in how we approach it is very important and that's where also when it comes to the deployment of technology and there's an analogy I always was telling people um when I said some ofour partners is that you know in the past if you wanted to maintain dominance or specific kind of global order as as a as a as a as a as a regional power or a superpower or global poweryou would deploy your uh military navy ships bases all around the world I think with today's technology as part of that mix you will have to deploy your technology all all around the world.The more you deploy it, the more you have it around the world, uh the more um political weight you'll have and and the more inclusive you are also of your partners in partners in in in in shaping the
global order.
So finding a new balance is quite really essential in this new sphere.I think Anka, do you have a quick followup?
Yeah, just a quick quick addition to it.So I I was going to make a similar point actually that I think one of the problems at the moment is that there is no international consensus about the stability or or or or instability that might be broughtabout by the diffusion of technologies but particularly artificial intelligence which I think is you know we should remember is a general purpose technology that can be used in military settings for everything from predictive maintenance all the way tothe much more concerning stuff decision support autonomous targeting and employment.So part of the moment that we're in, I think, and part of what's frustrating is obviously that the technology is advancing at breakneck and breathtaking speed.Uh, and you don't have to go to California to know that, although that's certainly true.Um, but at the same time, the ways in which governments and adversarial actors are reasoning about what artificial intelligence in military settings will do to their competition, uh, that's not moving fast enough.
And so it it the space for dialogue ultimately does require a shared sense of the risks.I think that's one of the greatest lessons that we might take away from the nuclear story between the United States and the Soviet Union from the Cold War.So I think there's much more work needed there.
Absolutely.I think we have another question from Dr.Muhammad Baharun uh who was talking this morning about the redefinition of resilience.Please go ahead doctor.
Good afternoon everyone.Thank you very much.This is a yet another question on governance.We've always seen the gap of how fast AI is developing versus how slow governance comes.It's almost like postmortem and AI development comes out, people test it, see the problem, then regulators comes in.Is this partnership between governments and AI as we see for instance in the case of uh edge uh help governments to plan in governance while the development is happening?Does it break that cycle or not?Thank you.
Do you want to take that?
Um, very good question.Thank you.Thank you, sir.Um, absolutely.Yes.The answer is the answer is yes.Uh,not only we we work in building capabilities, we work in understanding the needs and and provide guidance to to our leadership basically and and to the different the different ministries.Uh,
I was u I was in in in London a couple of weeks ago evaluating some u startups that could have capabilities that are very much needed here in the in the UEE and this was not just an exercisefor edge as such.So this is part of what we do.um to add to the point that uh uh the previous uh the previous question um and and and it's very relevant to this uh to this new one uh we also participated in in the the reaim uh summituh in February in in Aaronia in which in artificial intelligence in in the military real was was discussed.So it is it is in short a holistic uh engagement.Yes.
The moderator thanks the panelists and closes the session. The room transitions to the next panel after a brief photo opportunity.
So definitely we need international collaboration to fix this aspect.It's not just technology being built on the stack.Uh I'd like you to join me in thanking my fellow panelists.Thank you so much for the very insightful conversation.I hope it brought so much value to everyone else.Your excellency Daniel Anenit.Thank you so much for your time.I think we'll just take one quick picture with Dr.Uptasam if you don't mind.We have Samir Sarn in the house.I think it's the next session, right?Fireworks in the room.God bless.
The final panel opens by framing Asia as the key arena for U.S.-China strategic competition. The moderator introduces the panelists and the question of how Asian middle powers will respond.
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Hello everyone.Thank you for coming uh again today to this 13th edition of ADSD.I see so many tired faces in the room.Uh believe me, I'm tired as well.But so you stayed until the end.So you deserve a very juicy and interesting conversation on Asia.This is what we're going to give you uh today.My name is Ahmed Abu.I'm the head of East Asia here at uh uh APC.Uh and I am also associate fellow with Jaffam House uh in London.Uh today we are going to talk about this very important uh uh dynamics in in Asia and the Asian order.And as you all observed since Trump uh first administration we've been uh going through very volatile strategic competition between China and the United States.uh and it started with pure competition under the first Trump administration and then went uh into a combination between cooperation and uh competition with the aim to maintain stability in the bilateral relationship under the B administration which has
been sustained under the second Trump uh administration and what the two countries now call constructive strategic stability.We will we will see about that.Um two years ago in 2024 I sat here and I also chaired this particular uh panel I opened with the return of Trump.Today the United States also gave me a very very interesting opening which is the results of the midterms which will affect or will not really affect the dynamics of the of the US China competition.As Dr.Dr.Anog said earlier, it is too early to judge.However, I think in the past two years, we've seen a lot.The whole world's seen a lot, especially this region and Asia.Asia has gone through two trade and tech wars between US and China, fragmented supply chains, an ongoing conflict here in the Middle East since October 7, 2023, and finally the midterms.
The first speaker argues that Asia will set the boundaries of U.S.-China competition rather than simply react to it. He describes a promiscuous, flexible Asian order built on multiple coalitions and reduced dependencies.
This of course will change Asia.
in the future and how Asian middle powers can navigate the implications of this strategic uh competition and can they through strategic autonomy, interdependence and strategic resilience actually shape their own regional orders.To dissect that and answer these questions, I'm honored today to be joined by an excellent panel.I'll start with Dr.uh Joseph Leu, dean of the Liuanu School of Public Policy and Wong uh Gong Jong Yu, professor in East Asian Affairs at the National University of Singapore.We are also joined by Dr.uh Ryu Zahashi.He's member expert panel on the strengthening uh uh intelligence capabilities in the Japanese prime minister office and professor of international relations at the institute for advanced studies on Asia at the University of Tokyo.He is with his colleagues are trying to build Japan CIA.Also Dr.um Jai J Park he's a professor and associate dean at the graduate school of international studies Yonai University in Seol and last but not least I'm honored to be joined by Dr.
Sami Saran, president of the observer research foundation in New Delhi.So based on this very brief and boring introduction as I just gave you, I would like to ask this question to everyone here.So until now we have seen three summits between President Xi and and President Trump.They will meet actually for four for the fourth time next week in the APIC summit in Shenzhan uh in in China.The midterms might as I said impose restrictions or might not uh on the bilateral relationships.I would like to to see your opinion on that but also to ask how will strategic competition change in general and uh what are the implications for the for the Asian orders?I will go with Dr.Sami Saran first.Thank you Ahmed and Ablah sorry let me first uh wish you a happy Diwali and and I'm here just because you summoned me and as far as I'm concerned uh EPC and this this particular conversation is something that
you can't miss.I think you bring together fantastic diversity of thinkers here and it's something you learn from.So um here is my here are a few thoughts to respond to you.The first I think there's something interesting happening here.Obviously Asia will respond to the competition and I'm we are all cognizant of that.But let's turn it around.I think Asia is going to set the boundaries of this competition.In some sense, I don't think the powers in Asia are just going to be responding to what's happening amongst the big two.Rather, they are going to be deciding how the big two arrange their ambitions in this continent.and and let me let me come to that particular point in a bit.So that's the first point.Asia is deciding the nature of the competition.It is not only just being implicated by it and it's something interesting because when you have countries like India, Indonesia, Japan and other consequential powers I don't like the term middle powers.
That's a very European-American term and I reject it.I think we have consequential powers.Some are very big and some are very old and some are there for the for time in memorial.These consequential powers don't necessarily bend to the whims of individuals and personalities in certain countries.They have their own gravitas.Let me give you a a example.Forget about the middle powers.Even the ASEAN countries have balanced security and economic interests so well over so many decades between the Chinese and the Americans.You know, they trade with the Chinese.They have the Americans providing them security and then they have the optionalities with Japan and India and EU and and the Gulf states increasingly and they are balancing all of that.So in many ways China and the US can decide what they want to do with each other but what they do in Asia is not something they are going to decide by themselves.
It is going to be decided in engagement with the different countries in Asia.Uh that's the first point.Second, the Asian order is going to be promiscuous.There is not going to be an ideological 20th century architecture where you have two different blocks with two different political and economic ideologies.Asia is going to choose bricks when it wants to do certain things.It is going to choose quad when it wants to do other things.It is going to have a trading arrangement amongst the Asia-Pacific when it wants to do certain other activities.you are going to see a promiscuous cluster of of groupings that is going to manage the edges between the Americans and the Chinese and the Russians in certain uh in certain aspects.So Asia is going to use a cluster and a web of relationships to manage different domains of interests and and the variable uh dynamics of power that particular.
So that's the second point.You're going to see a promiscuous Asia and that promise that promiscuous Asia will balance uh uh the overbearing presence of any of these two or three actors and four and five in the future as they become more prominentincluding perhaps India at some point.They will they will manage big powers and great powers and superpowers in you know through these web of relationships.And the third point and which is increasingly important um there is going to be a Asian veto.There is going to very soon in the next decade an Asian veto on certain activities with certain actors.And let me try and explain that to you.For example, if you if you would notice that uh in the last few years, there has been a certain movement towards buying defense platforms from certain countries.It's very interesting that you will see increasingly Europe beginning to emerge as a defense supplier in in in the Asian countries.
You will see Indonesia and Philippines buying the Brahma missile systems from India and the defense systems.you will you will you will eventually see Asia uh remove itself from the dependencies the perverse dependencies and and vetoing certain transaction with certain actors who were considered until now trusted partners and I think you're going to seea big dramatic transformation in some of those relationships the factories from China and the and the and the ordinance from America may no longer be the very simple binary descriptor for the Asia or future you might see anAsian flavor emerge in where in in uh in the their own formats of resilience and optionalities uh that currently only the Americans and the Chinese are thinking about.So u an Asia that will shape the competition and not necessarily just be shaped by it.An Asia that will be promiscuous in terms of partnerships that will serve different interests and different domains and an Asia that will increasingly remove certain dependencies from its options.
The next speaker emphasizes Asia's diversity and the limits of ASEAN centrality. He argues that the region must work harder to earn its central role and manage great power rivalry.
I think that's the Asia we are looking at and of course Asia is so big it's impossible to to treat it like a homogeneous monolithic actor but I'm saying all of us the Gulf the the South Asians ASEANcountries we all have learned how to play the chess board um in some way so that we can extract uh the you know concessions benefits and and of course uh outcomes from situations that are served to us.So we know how to play the chess.
It's a very uh it's a very positive outlook and very optimistic I would say uh on the Asian order going forward.But I would like to bring in an organization.Joseph, uh do you share Samir's optimism?
Um okay.So let me let me say a few things and I would try to disagree so that we can have some discussion.But before that let me first uh start by saying oh let me first thank as well for the for the invitation and wonderful to be here.Um first is uh I really don't think we should overestimate the impact of the midterm elections as far as uh any significant shift in US foreign policy in the Indo uh Indoacific is concerned.Yeah.And I do not believe that any of the states in the region are any under any illusion that uh you know uh US policy has con has turned a consequential page as far as that is concerned.Um second uh we talk about Asia but one thing we need to remember Asia is very diverse and along with that diversity significant differences in outlooks.
Yeah.So um yes we do labor very hard and goodness knows as far as Azan is concerned right Azan centrality and all that sort of stuff um is predicated on this aspiration to be able to sort of bring everyoneto the table and to sort of uh uh read if not sing from the same page.And the reason why Azan labor so hard to do that is because congenitally the region is not given to that.It's not given to that.Right?Um and I don't have to tell you all the differences among the the different powers uh re uh regional powers and you know larger regional powers smaller regional powers.I I share uh Samir's uh aversion to this whole middle power uh nomenclature.Yeah.Um at the heart of it uh the third thing is of course um the USChina relationship.Yeah.Um I think there is uh hope and aspiration and again certainly from the perspective of Azan to try to um uh if not manage at least set some kind of parameter for that uh relationship and how it evolves.
But uh I think at the same time we are also quite mindful of the of the limits that uh that uh we face right there's this thing uh Edward Lut thought about great power autism right that
the great powers i.e the United States and China are simply not self-aware enough to to understand or even care about the views of other powers.Yeah.um they're so fixated with each other.Of course, we should not allow that to sort of cast a shadow.Um but that is a strategic reality that everyone else in uh Asia if not the world has to deal with.Uh and then my last point uh is um well Southeast Asia Azan.Yeah.Um the this great aspiration to be um uh central in the regional architecture.The only reason why is because we know if we if we don't try to be central, we are automatically ipso facto marginal, right?Because we're a bunch of small states, right?Uh so we have somehow cultivated that myth.Um which has been bought into by many many uh powers.Good for us, I suppose.
Um but it's one thing to say that uh Azan uh wants to be central but it's it's not a genie in a bottle thing right you rub it three times and then boom you have centrality we have towork to earn the centrality so the onus really is also on Azan now right that okay if we want to be at the heart of the regional architecture we have to walk the talk and we got to showhow we are going to do that and that is uh that gets to a whole set of uh issues uh because it is predicated on the unity unity of the organization which uh is uh let's just say atthis point in time it's being uh stretched quite a bit.
Yeah.And I think I think this crisis really put pressure on on the organization and tested its limits.Uh that's the least I would say here.
A Japanese panelist describes an increasingly fragmented Asian order and the need for new partnership networks. He highlights defense cooperation and practical collaboration beyond formal institutions.
Um I would like to turn to you Rio.
Okay.Uh thank you very much and uh first of all thank you very much Dr.Keti and EPC for inviting me to come here.I really wanted to come to UAE because Japan and UAE we both a really good comprehensive partners strategist partner and recently our prime minister my prime minister and your president had a really good telehon conversation in April tocelebrate our economic partnership.So um it is very important regional major power actually I don't like to be called middle power.So regional measure power uh to have such a very meaningful partnership like UAE and Japan
started that.So uh coming to the question by moderator I think for me the future of Asian order start to look like more fragmented and more separated more chaotic.Why?Because you know United States influence uh start to see a more decline.It is very clear and you know even as a just a academic strategist in Japanese university we have to admit it is a decline of America's influence in Asia.So it is very important for us to start our discussion from there.But the second important uh thing we have to admit is China has no power and intention to cover or to pray American law in Asia like US has has done last 70 years.I you know don't take me wrong because I admit China try to have uh try to contribute uh more constructively to regional and international order and some country like AAN country start to shift more inclined to uh China
last few years but and but I believe China has no intention to deprace United States as regional hamon.uh China is more selective uh in choosing the partner.So I believe you know the future of Asia without the strong part strong influence of the United States should be destined uh to have very fragmented uh order without the central pillar of the national order which has beenactive last 80 years.So in that sense I you know uh Japan has been doing so well uh to uh how can I say uh to fill the gap uh of the regional order by having more I think uh our Karim fromIndia says web or webbing but I think partnership is another word but it is very important to have more strong partnership network in the region uh even without United States so we start to see more partnership without United
States but you know among like Japan, Australia, India and some other countries and sometimes you know with some Asian country Japan and Australia.So I think it is very important to see such a new part style or partnership in the region to underpin the regional order.But the second point this is my last comment but I think uh some you know my colleague discuss about regional architecture but I think our discussion start to go beyond regional architecture if that means regional institutions.I think like Japan start to have more meaningful substantial cooperation with say Australia, Indonesia in defense equipment.So that is more substantial and uh it could be you know uh which we cannot ignore.Same to you know the partnership between UAE and Japan right?we will have more defense equipment cooperation because we already have uh uh you know the partnership for defense equipment and technology.
I think you know uh we are simply going beyond the just you know building the regional institution or regional you know mechanism.So I think it is another important point we have to develop more in the panel.
The discussion distinguishes between competition among coalitions and a simple U.S.-China rivalry. The panel warns that strategic competition may produce more instability at the regional level.
Great.Um, thank you for that and probably you generally agreed with with some of your especially on self-reliance um and trying to build your strategic autonomy even without the United States which is the most important and interesting trend goingon now in Asia.J please go ahead.
Okay.Uh first of all I would like to thank EPC for having me here today.I'm very much honored.Thank you very much.There's the last person to respond to your first question.You know, I would say that I share both positive and negative perspective on the Asian order.You know, I characterize the emerging Asian order as the competition between uh coalitions rather than competition between China and the United States.During the cold war was a strategic competition, pure strategic competition between China and the United States.But now we are witnessing a strategic competition between US-led security network and China red you know coalitions the US has been maintaining so-called you know U and spoke system but in addition to that US has been expanding itto include the security partners that's one hand on the other hand you know China has also been expanding you know China security we would not call a security network but China le you China Chinese style multi multilateral coalitions.
So I I think we are witnessing ma many rivalry between the US lead network and the China China rad coalitions at a very strategic level.But it does not mean that you know the regional level at the sub regional level you know managed uh library manage library be uh translated into a stable library because you know if you read a coalition you knowthe more you like to the more you like to consolidate you know your coalition know the more incentive you have to challenge the weakest link or the weakest link of the other opposing the coalitions.So that at the regional level we see you know recurring uh uh recurring crisis more frequently.So that at the strategic level Asian order is heading toward the stability manage stability but the regional level so regional level so we are heading toward more leading to the instability.
Okay.
The moderator asks about Taiwan, Japan's energy security, and the lessons of the Gulf war. The response stresses the importance of U.S. credibility and the difficulty of diversifying energy dependence.
This this this is very important and I would like to actually touch on it and come back to it later on.The idea of coalitions because this to many would mean the return of the cold war.So I'll give you the the opportunity to clarify that if this is what not the thing you mean but I would like to go to Ryu and ask him the ultimate question in East Asia about Taiwan.Um you you've seen this war and what what the war did to Japan's energy security.Uh Japan still imports 90% of its oil from this region.Uh Taiwan itself imports 90 97% of all its energy and the Taiwanese minister recently warned that a closure of the Taiwan Strait would cut off all energy supply to the region to the whole region.So forgive me for this complex a little bit complex question um because I I I wanted to back a lot of things in it but what the Gulf crisis taught Japan about its energy security that's the first bit
of the question and then um what are the lessons for Japan and its borders and its and its neighbors if Taiwan kicks off in the Taiwan crisis drawn from this crisis right in go and and the last oneis do you think this war the Iran war is an emboldening or restraining factor on China to move on Taiwan
don't take your time three minutes
no no no that that is very difficult set of questions and uh okay um first of all um the lesson we learned from the war here uh to the Taiwan situation I think it is very important but toadmit the difference uh between uh two regions because Taiwan straight uh you know of course Japan's position is we really want to see the stability peace of Taiwan straight uh and but at the same time you know westill have a vast uh ocean you know uh in west Pacific this is a totally different situation from the straight of Horus.So um even though you know of course we really want to pay more attention to uh straight of mark I mean in Singapore uh but I think uh uh for the situations of Taiwan straight uh the I thinkwe really need to apply the different uh perspective on uh on that I mean to in interpretating the scenario at the same time um I believe you know now it is very critical moment for us uh towards the
situation the international politics surrounding Taiwan straight that is because uh last from last year United States led by President Trump seemed not to satisfy its uh commitment uh to the stability of Taiwan straight.It is very critical for us and uh but I think that is only to satisfy basin's dream or basin expectations and they dearly want to see us not to sell arms to Taiwan and uh looking at that uhTaiwanese uh sensible people start to lost some confidence on the side of US commitment to the defense of Taiwan and to the uh defense equipment they could have in the future.So I think uh it is more uh worrisome for me because you know if after the midterm election I think that President Donald Trump really want to focus more to Middle East and say other region except Asia orWest Pacific.So he may want to focus more on the partnership with China.
So he may freeze the arms sale to Taiwan in coming years.That might make dearing situations not only for the uh Taiwanese politics but also for the sense of credibility on the side of allies in Northeast Asia.So I think uh it is really critical and finally to answer your third question is uh so it is about uh what China learned.So what was the third question?
I was I was talking about the energy lessons for Japan.uh I think but you know it is very difficult for us uh to diversify uh the source of energy and uh uh it is still very difficult for us uh to change our energy security from scratch.So in that sense I think we dearly believe uh it is very important for us to see the restoration of home trade very soon and after the war I think there is a room for us I mean forJapan's SDF to collaborate with Asian country for mind sweeping and in that sense you know uh UAE and Japan can do more um towards that direction
well I think being in one of the major oil supplies the suppliers to Japan this is good you cannot guys just diversify easily.Uh but it is it is not very good for Japan itself because when when you are under pressure and we don't know how long this war will will will will will go on or at least instability in theGulf, you need to cooperate with other partners.But given that you get still 90% of oil from the Gulf is not an easy task and it will take years to diversify.
The panel discusses South Korea's security concerns and its reliance on U.S. deterrence. It notes that calls for nuclear weapons reflect hedging rather than a collapse of trust.
Um but I also like the you questioning US commitment to Taiwan and I would like to take this to Chai uh when it comes to uh South Korea and as you know a lot of or some THAD andPatriot missiles and interceptors have been moved from uh South Korea and around the region to be able to cover gaps here uh in in the United States u weapons uh in confronting Iran.And a recent poll uh showed that more than 60% of South Koreans actually support having their own nuclear weapons.To me, this sounds like fear of abandonment by by an ally and South Korea is a treaty ally to the United States.So, so in terms of commitment, do you think that the United States is still seen as a reliable security partner for South Korea and all over the region or do you think Asia actually is not a priority under
this administration?
No, I think still the US is you know from South Korea perspective still reliable the security provider.It is still
it is still a reliable security provider because you know US has been stationing 28,500 US troops.It still serves as a trip mechanism.So that you know and then North Korea hasn't developed ICBM capabilities they can bomb the US mainland.So until the US North Korea complete ICBN capabilities or SLBN capabilities I think the United States is a very reliable uh partner.You know, as you pointed out, there's a growing voice in South Korea that South Korea should go nuclear.But that's not because we are not uh US extended nuclear US provision of extending nuclear deterrence is not reliable, but because you know that is a part of South Korea enhancing South Korea's own capability that can go alongwith you know US USFK in South Korea.This is this is also uh very interesting because if you ask anyone here in this region the the answer will be completely different um which is also a a different divergence because between the Gulf and and East Asia
This chapter examines how Southeast Asia is adjusting to war, tariffs, and Chinese economic influence. The speaker contrasts U.S. reliability with indispensability and highlights trade imbalances with China.
they're partners in East Asia and I would like to go back to this point later on in in our conversation but Joseph um you Southeast Asia were one of the most regions that have been hit by by bythis by this war in Vietnam and Philippines, they took drastic measures uh uh when it comes to uh energy uh and suspending fuel exports.Even China did that in the opening phase of of the war.Um but this also comes at a time when some Southeast Asian nations are still negotiating trade with the Trump administration.So it's a double whammy uh basically for for you.Do you think this war has the potential to increase or decrease Southeast Asian nations dependence on China and the United States?And another question regarding China, do you think China is actually using or learning the lessons from this war to reduce its vulnerability to the Malaka dilemma?
and and and do you think the Chinese manufacturers will increase or decrease their relocation of supply chains to Southeast Asia after the war?
Okay, let me let me take that last question first because I think the Chinese have been thinking about their so-called Malaca Straits dilemma long before this war broke out.Yeah, I mean it gives it added reason, right?But China has been very acutely aware of their vulnerability to the US controls of sea lanes, right?Which is why they make such a big deal of uh being able to break past the first island chain into the second island chain.And uh recently both the the the Leaing and the the Futs and Carrier groups had uh conducted joint uh exercises.Well, not not joined, I mean they're on join as in the two carrier groups exercising with each other um around the South China Sea, right?Um and uh that gives you a sense of the sort of uh strategic orientation as far as their bluewater navy capabilities are concerned and that is all about uh
yeah malaca straits and their ability to to sort of um fend off any attempt to shut off uh sea lanes uh uh to them.Yeah.Um I I want to say something also about some of the discussions about reliability of the US.I think uh some of us in Asia, we will draw the distinction between reliability and indispensability.
Yeah.Um is the US indispensable?Yes.Is the US reliable?
Yeah.Yeah.So, so um it's not a case that you know we are we 100% committed to the US because we know they're 100% committed to us.Is that um we look at the alternative, right?And we don't like that alternative.And so the orientation back which then connects to your your last question about the the dependence at least as far as the US is concerned.Um I'll just give you an example uh liberation day tariffs when liberation day tariffs was were announced uh in April last year right um how did the Europeans respond?The European responded by, you know, crying foul, backstabbed, uh abandonment, uh you know, uh renting of sackcloth, that sort of stuff.And then they they, you know, um uh subsequently adjusted to the reality that this is the new landscape.Um in Asia, when Trump said that uh the tariffs are going to increase, everyone just said uh okay, now let's figure out how to pay that increase.
Um when uh Trump said we expect defense burden sharing, everyone said, "Okay, let's look at our budgets and figure out where we what we're going to cut in order to buy to to to sort of uh buy more,right?To to fulfill our our our share, right?Um and that gives you an example of um how the region views the the role of the United States.As far as China is concerned, I think there's no question that uh Chinese influence uh economically over the region is going to grow.No, no one no one questions that at all.Right.But um there are um there are some concerns with regards to uh what the Europeans are very vexed over which is the huge trade surplus that uh China has with uh Europe.they have a huge trade surplus with uh certainly with Southeast Asia as well and uh with India as well and it's squeezing out a lot ofmemes the small medium enterprises and that is a big that is a big
issue in many parts uh of the region consumers well consumers benefit you know I mean Chinese EVs right they just knock everyone else out of the park right there's no competition there right you get you get uh moreadvanced technology at uh rock bottom prices compared to to non-Chinese models, right?But for producers especially of uh low-end manufacturing uh labor intensive industries, um the Chinese have posed a significant uh challenge.So a lot of questions have been uh posed to China by uh leaders from Southeast Asia, by governments of Southeast Asia that look um we need to do something about this this uh uh trade uh imbalance and uhwhether or not the Chinese take it seriously I don't know it remains
I was about to say good luck with that because the Europeans have been trying for so long
and and uh the their attempts took them to almost trade war.Nobody knows if the trade war will kick off or not between China and the UA yet the EU.
Although just very quickly, I will say that the Chinese have a slightly different view uh with regards to the Europeans and uh Southeast Asians.
With the Europeans, pardon my French, suck it up.
Yeah, with Southeast Asia, they're a bit more u understanding.
Empathetic.
I would say that.I'll say that, too.And and also I I liked um what you said about the reliability of the United States.
The conversation turns to Pakistan's role in Gulf security and the Mecca pact. The speaker argues that Pakistan is not a true security provider and that regional states must build their own architecture.
And I remember we were holding a workshop at Chut in London and one of my colleagues said uh something very I think a very interesting line.He said the United States has uh no credibility and uh is unreliable but also indispensable.And this is also the problem we are facing here in in in the Middle East that nobody came up with a solution yet.Uh but I think the debate will still uh go on for years to come.I would like to bring the the conversation here where we are now in the Gulf and ask you Samir and and I I'm really interested in in in hearing your opinion on that because u this is one ofthe defining mechanisms now in of security in the Middle East Pakistan's growing role in in the Middle East.So we have seen the Mecca agreement.We have seen separate security agreements with Pakistan and other countries including Kuwait here in the Gulf.
And we are seeing also the debate fading away on the IMC corridor.So first the first part of the question do you think Pakistan's growing security role in the region will come at the expense of India and subsequently in the long term uh although we are actually not aware of thisnow or don't see the dynamics happening now but in the long term do you think a growing security role for Pakistan will automatically mean a growing footprint for China uh in the region and last bit what do youthink the fate of IMC will be in the long term.
Look, I like the other questions more.Can I respond to you?
You don't get to choose, my friend.
I mean, because to be honest, you made me think of something I don't think about.
Okay.Which is
the purpose,
right?So, so now now I'll have to really think about a country that doesn't figure in my strategic compass.Um uh you know, a parasitic state which which exports terror is not necessarily a security provider to anyone in this region.If you and if you think you are you deserve to be a senior fellow at Chatamounts uh because that's what the British believe that Pakistan offered to the world but in this region everyone is aware of what thatcountry can and cannot do and everyone is right you know has right-sized its neighbors so in this region no one is under any illusion that what anyone brings to that table that if you are referring to the Meccapact it is a it is a scratching of a head of a region that doesn't know what to do when America doesn't love it anymore you know doesn't offer it the security they it did.
They're all scratching their head that how the hell do I live when the country that I believe would be my protector is not necessarily turning out to be that guardian angel.So this is a this is a frantic, you know, scurry of finding something uh and landing, you know, with a with an agreement that only one country would be willing to sign and that is Pakistan,
right?and that the that agreement was tested within 48 hours of that being announced and we have seen what that mechapact has really done for any of the signaries.Right?So uh the durability of Pakistan is not even 3 days.The that meapact did not even survive 3 days after its signature.So in some sense uh the Asian order does not see Pakistan as a as a as a security provider.You might see Pakistan in different roles in different parts of the world but certainly not as a security provider.So that's that's on Pakistan.
The panel broadens the argument to Asia and the Middle East, insisting that states must create their own security and governance structures. It warns against relying on external powers to solve regional problems.
But I think the other questions were more interesting.Uh and I really I mean I you know I did not understand why you felt that the Middle East and Assean are really that different.
I I don't think so.I think we are having that same debate in this part of the world as well that you have an unreliable eagle.Now you don't have a alternative to the eagle but the fact that America is unreliable is un is is uh without question in this region.You can talk to folks across the countries that you listed and they will tell you that the reliability factor, the the trust factor uh versus the indispensibility factor are two different stories.It's true in Assaan.It's true in uh in this part of the world.We don't care because America was never part of my security considerations.When India was deciding its foreign policy, its security policy, its international relations, we had an antagonistic America.We had America's seventh fleet in our waters.We had America arming our neighbors to harm us, right?So, we have seen the Nixons and the Trumps across a 50-year period or a 40-year period.
So, we are used to a a hostile White House that has worked against our interests across multiple decades.Now, the good news is that while the host while the White House may still be hostile to us, the the much broader American state is friendly to America.We have American business interests that are interested in in India.We have the people bridges.We have diasporas.We have industry, we have creative sectors, we have a whole whole of nation relationship with America which is far deeper than any elected government.That is not necessarily true for many of these countries in in ASEAN or in in the Middle East and that is what is missing.India has a relationship with the US which is beyond the white house in the G2G formats that other countries have necessarily organized themselves uh in terms of their American uh posture.It makes it difficult.
That's the first part.Second, if you are a watcher of history, you should be asking you asking yourself this question.Is this the west of sways moment for America?Is this the end of American power as we know it in this part of the woods?And if it is, then what is going to come and replace it?And Pakistan is not that provider.You guys will have to do it yourself finally.If you think that someone else is going to come and clear your security mess, you are wrong.You know we are living in a world which is a very big Ikya store.We have to do it ourselves.We have to build our own security architecture, our own data centers, our own technology solutions and our own governance architecture.This region will have to come up with its own answers and certainly uh it will include uh countries which are friendly and invested such as India.
It will also include others that you have named it.But the the reality would be that the core will have to be the region itself.You will have to define that future you know and you will not be able to to continue to pay for security you know you should learn from the EU not the ASEAN learn from the EU EU EU EUhad come up with a very unique model of multi-alignment energy from Russia markets from China security from America they had a concent concentration risk on all three and all three failed them and I think that's what most ofus are going to be heading towards if we don't think of diversifying and you know rethinking our architectures.
This section argues that coalitions are not a return to the Cold War but a pragmatic way to manage trust and national interest. The speaker distinguishes engagement from trust and explains Asia's flexible approach.
So uh uh uh quick final point.I think um coalitions that you mentioned are absolutely vital and coalitions does not mean cold war.In fact, it rejects the cold war.Coalitions means that I will work with members based on national interest, values, trust, right?Asia in the past believed in efficiency.We wanted the cheapest supply chains.Asia today is going to move towards trust and reliability and is going to work towards creating an architecture where you can actually um you know in in many ways take certain sectors and protect them from certain interests butuh in other times work with a much wider uh uh you know array of actors for domains that are not necessarily that vital.I'll give you an example.You know we were with the Chinese we had 100,000 150,000 troops 5 meters apart in in the 2020s and 2021 we grew our trade by 7% even in those years right so there is an Asian pragmatism where we
will continue to engage with all but we will trust only a few and I think that is something that Europe and most uh American experts do not understand that that engagement does not equal to you know in engagementis not equal to trust engagement is is is a certain pragmatism and trust is based on a certain reliable uh uh you know assessment and I think those are the two different things Asia is going to you're goingto see plenty of in in that in this part of the world.So sorry I hope I answered your question
very well um regardless of the comment on Chhattam House but u but I couldn't ignore the question on on Pakistan and you are sitting next to me because a lot of people here in the region maybe in India
no but you made me think of a country I'd forgotten about
but you know I I agree with you actually I agree with your assessment and I wrote about it publicly but in the end a lot of people here in the Gulf are thinking about it because whether we likeit or not whether some people here in the room like it or Pakistan is asserting itself as part of the security equation whether that is effective or not as we are seeing now in the escalation of Yemen.That's a fair no I'd like to finish my point.But what what I'm trying to say here is
will it be effective?That was my question and I think you answered it very well.It will not be and people in the Gulf here should not rely on Pakistan.But I would like to remind that people here are not only thinking about Pakistan they in the Maka agreement you have Turkey and you have Saudi Arabia and you have Pakistan and then you have the Egyptians, you havethe UAE and you have America of course and China.They're not going anywhere.Emma there is a provenence to it.The provenence was that you had Pakistan boot on the ground in many capitals in this region.They were the boots to hire.
So there is a provenence here.It does not mean that they are part of your strategic future.You tactical recruitment of green uniforms does not equal to a strategic architecture.So let us not conu confuse uh uh you know the the presence of of folks serving your parameters as becoming part of your strategic architecture.They can protect compounds.They can't protect regional interest.There's a difference between the two.And I think that must be understood.You asked a fair question.I'm sorry if I if I came down heavily on that, but it's a fair question to ask.And it's also I think absolutely uh you know on point to suggest that they have been very nimble in being able to you know integrate themselves into multiple conversations.But that was Pakistan's forte forever.You know when when the Soviets came to Afghanistan it was Pakistan.
When the US went after the Taliban and al-Qaeda in 2001 it was Pakistan.But look at the consequences and the cost they've had to pay.They're a rentier state.uh you know it is a it is a country which is struggling to remain you know definitional for itself.
The panelists answer a final round of questions on Gulf-South Asia cooperation. They emphasize economics, technology, defense equipment, and the need for deeper regional partnerships.
So in some sense you know they have always been very good at signing deals but those deals have never had really any weight.That's that's a fair point and uh and as I said I I actually agree with your conclusions but for the sake of time I'd like now to go around with one question for everyone and I I just Iwould be very grateful if you keep the answer to one line.So Gulf states now are all about diversification and resilience and especially when it comes to defense security and AI and technology.I'll start with you um Samir again and what is the If you have a gun to your head, what is the single thing that the Gulf States and South Asia should cooperate on in the next 5 years?And I will come to you the same question.
I think economics, trade, investments.I think we are the biggest economic geography of the world in the future.The most dynamic between the uh between Middle East and and South Asia.India contributes 17 to 18% of global growth.and this region as it rebuilds and gets over this hiccup.I think between us we could be one-third of all global growth in the future.So for us we are an economic and trade relationship and of course that will mean that we will have to build and and create an architecture for peace, security, prosperity that serves the region.
Thank you Joseph.the same thing,
economics,
economics.Um, and uh, so Singapore is chairing AEAN next year and Singapore as far as I know is very intent on hosting the third AAN GCC uh, summit, right?And what I would request from uh, Gulf friends is that Southeast Asia is a summit.So Southeast Asia is very invested in it and we will pay we'll be paying a lot of attention to the level of representation that comes from the Gulf.
Interesting.
My question and let let me add here something because you guys are militarizing now but you're not you're not anywhere here to be seen.
They call it re army.
Well okay call it whatever you want but South South Korea for example is a major security or defense partner to the UAE and even Saudi Arabia.But where are you guys?
Yeah.
Okay.So from my perspective in the next five years you say
what I really want to see is a technological cooperation technology.It should include artificial intelligence and space.Actually between UAE and Japan we already started a really good cooperation technological cooperation over AI and space.But in addition to that as I say uh I think it is very important to collaborate more in defense technology
and it could include interceptor drone um electronic warfare and sensing capability.So I think uh you know we really have to seek out the collaboration potential in this area.You know now I think there is no taboo for me.So I think we really have to deepen the conversation on technological cooperation.
Definitely.Yeah I I totally agree.J please.
No so of course you know it depends industry cooperation and energy security that those are the items you know that can enhance cooperation between South Korea and the Middle Eastern states.But but I'd like to make an on uh you know to point out is that you know for this the symbolic or you know think South Korea and the military eastern states should get together for the shake ofgetting together.So in order to know ex uh genuinely exercise middle power agency you know South Korea should reach out you know the states in the Middle East because you know when it comes to middle power diplomacy in Asia Pacificyou know it's a so gathering among US allies or security partners South Korea Australia Japan India security partner so so even we promote cooperation among themselves without the United States in the and in you just contributing to the
you know to reinforcing the US security network.So from that point in order to genuinely exercise South Korea's middle power diplomacy and South Korea should extend hands to the states in the Middle East.I think that's the the things we should pay more attention to next five years.I think and South Korea is well positioned because uh you guys also are compatible with United States and Western military systems which is the majority here in the Gulf and across many countries in the Middle East and youcan compensate for any gaps in supply from the United States especially when the United States army is under pressure and I think this is this discussion is going on not only with the UAE but also Saudi Arabia andPresident Cece was in SU uh uh recently and I know that uh this came up in the conversation.
Audience questions challenge the panel on Iran, regional responsibility, and India's role. The responses stress strategic autonomy, the need for regional security architecture, and the difference between engagement and trust.
So thank you so much for such an interesting conversation.I would like now to open the the conversation to the floor and please feel free to share your questions.Yes, I will start with you Brian.Please go ahead.
Well, thank you.Thank you very much to that fantastic panel.Uh my question is directed towards dear Samir Shri Samir who is always so eloquent and incredibly informative.What's one thing you'd say to the Chinese that they don't get right about India?And what's the one thing you'd say to the Indian establishment that you'd want them to take more seriously when it comes to China?
Okay.Thank you.Uh I would like to go to uh S Alchar
please
from Bahrain.Uh I am not sure if I am the only one who I I would be speaking in Iraq.So, okay.
I'm not sure if I am the only one who finds it strange that Iran was not mentioned by any of the panelists from China, Europe, and Asia.They haven't mentioned Iran as a regime and what this regime is doing to the world.Although this uh session is about the security of the region and the the the war that you call the US Iran war although it's a war that threatens the global security not just Iran or the region the securitythat's being threatened right now is not the GCC security.We are talking about the uh global security which leads me to the role of China or the role of Asian countries that's that are represented here or the European countries that were in the previous panel.Everyone wants the uh results but no no one wants to talk about their actual role.You all have interests in this region.
What are you doing for these interests and to maintain and protect them?As a Gulf citizen, I don't want to rely on the United States and I don't want to be uh in the middle of conflicts between uh two uh polls conflicting the US and China.I don't want this polarization.I want diversity.I want autonomy and so but I want to ask you as countries that have interests in this region.What is your role?I amum uh I I feel sad that this uh conversation is looking at the region as an arms market.You are promoting your weapons.Korea with all due respect Japan, China, European countries, everyone is promoting their weapons.that might be uh provided such as uh instruments and technologies that will protect the security of the region but no one is actually talking or wants to take the responsibility about the security of this region.
I'm not talking uh again I'm not talking about the security of the GCC countries.I'm talking about your own interests in the region.What is your role in protecting your own interests?And I will take India just as an example.Uh sorry for the sake of time can we make it brief?Yes.Uh in a minute uh n there are 9 million Indians in the GCC countries and 50% of the foreign currency remittance to India comes from the GCC almost $30 billion.What is India doing to protect this interest solely as an example?Of course there are other interests.Thank you Huda.
Thank you so much for the amazing panel.My question is maybe to Samir primarily and to the rest because you use the ripping example.Um what's going to be the next landscape of making new industries in the region?We know Asia has a lot.Asia itself is a big concentration of power.It has the capital.It has the knowhow, the industrialization capability and Europe is not keeping up.We know that for sure in building these new industries and the race at the moment is being concentrated in between the United States and then China.Uh but that's not the reality.Asia and the big conglomerate of all different countries has the power to concentrate its markets, its capital to build new industries.So how would it be?Would it be a nationalized effort or would it be a collaborative effort?
Thank you.Thank you.Uh the last question.
Yeah.
Here's here's the guy from Turkey posing as the big boss.Okay, we Turks might be imposing at times.Now, it's about the Meccaak.Actually, I would like to comment and uh pose a question to Samira.Now, Mecca in my opinion is a poster impingact.It's not a deterrent of any sort at least for now.As long as it's not tried, it will stay as a successful posturing pact.But definitely not posturing.
Yeah, it's a postering pack.It's not it's not it's not an alliance that that promises you deterrence or uh would would involve any of its uh signitaries in the conflicts of other signaries that these signaries have no pragmatic reason to join it.In that sense, in that sense, uh it definitely is not uh what it promises to be.But let me tell you this, in Turkey, even though nobody takes it as I mean, nobody in their serious minds take it as a Pakistani extended nuclear guarantee which can replace the US or NATO uh in times ofneed.The strategic mindset is actually that what we are doing as Turkey by signing uh the Mecca is easing the United States job to pivot back to Asia.Hence hence the Turkish decision makers actually feel that they have the blessing of the United States.What would you say about that?
Okay.Um thank you professor.We are running out of time so I would really appreciate if you keep the answers very brief.
Well, I thought I The four questions are all
Well, yeah, exactly.
So, look uh very quickly I think that question was very good, a very important question and let me broaden my earlier argument.It's not just the Gulf that needs to think about its own security or the Middle East that needs to build its own architecture of defense and prosper prosperity and and peace.I think it's a much wider Asia that needs to be thinking about the same question.I think an Asian security order is something that has been spoken about but never has really anyone attempted to put together the building blocks to think of a panontinental arrangement.We should also have folks who don't necessarily agree with each other uh in that same conversation.So I think it is time, this is a wakeup call.As Americans rethink their own commitments and investments in this part of the world, our part of the world, your part of the world, we really need to be thinking about uh what that future could be.
And I have always been a voter that countries which such have such large economic interests like ours in the future have to be the ones who have to be contributing to the security for the future.So we need to be doing more in building that security architecture.That's the first question on on Huda.I think the opportunity is not just Asia.The opportunity is Africa.I think what we can do in this region, India, South Asia, Middle East with the African continent.That is the future of the industrial 21st century.And I think that is the arc we need to work on from ASEAN and Japan to uh the African uh continent.That is the new uh geometry of growth and geometry of of of innovation that we need to be focusing on.on the question from uh professor from Turkey u my response is you are right it is a posturing pack that's a better description for it I will use it next time uh it's a nice description to it but
you are also right that it could happen only under the Trump white house and that white house is not going to last forever so you have to also think about what happens uh post that white house and whathappens to that pack therefore so you have in a sense answered your own question it is uh just drama it is not substantive until it is tested and I've not seen that test uh of that pact uh ohno I've seen the test but I've not seen the pack pass that test yet so so I think you have answered your question there was one final question someone asked me which was which was Brian Brian uh youasked what does okay
the Chinese get wrong about India
what what do the Chinese get wrong about India Chinese are very suspicious of strategic autonomy they somehow believe it is a it is uh argument in favor of India's American partnership against the Chinese.China has to understand that strategic autonomy is real.We will not bend to the Americans and neither to the Chinese.We will we will deal with them as equal partners.That is what China has to get right about India that our sense of self is strong
and this is what
and what does what does India have to get right about China?I think that's the second part of your question.We have what we have to get right about China is is that many of the things China does is not directed against us.
It is just that because we are neighbors and and you know when China builds up to rebuff America, we feel the pressure on our neighborhood.China that arms itself to take on the Americans pressurizes us like we when we arm to take on the Chinese, we pressurize Pakistan etc etc.So we have to realize that everything China does is not directed against us although it has implications for us.So I think that is the reality.
This is interesting and ironic because the Chinese want the Europeans to have strategic autonomy but when it comes to India it's quite controversial.
The panel concludes with thanks to the speakers, audience, and organizers. The first day of the Abu Dhabi Strategic Debate is formally wrapped up.
Thank you so much uh our great panelists was it was a great uh conversation.I learned a lot from you all of you guys.Thank you so much for our audience for bearing with us until uh the end of the day.Thank you uh EPC and Dr.to Sam Kidby for pulling off as usual such an amazing event and enjoy the rest of your stay in the hotel and see you all tomorrow.Thank you.Thank you.
Ladies and gentlemen, with the conclusion of this panel, we wrap up the first day of the 13th Abu Dhabi Strategic Debate.Thank you.The second day will begin tomorrow at 9:00 a.m.
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